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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This PhD dissertation investigates the impact of terrorist attacks on equity financial 
markets. It uses traditional event study approaches to identify and measure market reaction to 
these attacks. This project concentrates on the United States and the last “wave” of 
international terrorist events initiated in 2001 by the September 11 attack. The purpose of this 
research is to improve our understanding of the consequences of terrorism for equity financial 
markets.  
Three empirical studies are presented. The first study examines market efficiency 
during the events of September 11 by studying the stock returns of tenants in the New York 
World Trade Centre (WTC).  It measures the abnormal equity returns of tenant firms on 
September 17th 2001 and compares their performance with a group of control firms. The 
abnormal returns are also regressed against financial and industry variables to assess cross-
sectional determinants of returns. The results show statistically significant differences 
between the abnormal returns of the WTC tenants and control groups. The differentials are, 
however, dependant on industry sector. This industry effect is confirmed in cross-sectional 
analysis. The analysis also reveals that firm financial performance has a significant role in this 
relation and can mitigate abnormal returns. Overall, it seems that investors were sensitive to 
the effects of September 11 and tended to discriminate tenants of the WTC from other firms. 
Beyond the issue of tenancy in the towers, investors also took into consideration the industry 
and the financial performance of firms.  
The second empirical study investigates the industry-specific effect of terrorism on 
equity financial markets. It evaluates the industry effect by calculating U.S, Spanish and U.K 
industry portfolio abnormal returns and volumes following the September 11 attacks 2001, 
the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004 and the London bombings of July 7. Results from 
this study show that terrorist attacks generate abnormal returns and abnormal volumes with 
  iv 
some variation across industries. Recurrent patterns across countries and events enable 
identification of terrorism sensitive and terrorism neutral industries. The research outputs also 
suggest a positive relationship between returns and volumes as well as between abnormal 
price volatility and volumes following major terrorist attacks 
The third study provides a comparative analysis of event study methods. Using five 
event study techniques, abnormal returns are calculated on 95 portfolios of U.S industry, 
sector and sub-sectors, following the September 11 attack, the 2002 Bali bombing, the 2004 
Madrid bombing, and the 2005 London bombing. The techniques include the Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) approach coupled with parametric and non-parametric tests, and four 
modified market model regression approaches: the CAPM model, the Fama and French three 
factors model (1996), the GARCH model and the GARCH model with Fama and French 
factors. The estimations produce two different categories of abnormal returns: the Brown and 
Warner model generates mean adjusted abnormal returns, and the regression models produce 
market adjusted abnormal returns. Results from this study exhibit some variation in the 
abnormal returns produced by the alternative estimation models. Differences between the 
mean and the market-adjusted abnormal returns are considerable. While there is more 
coherence amongst the regression results, the various market-adjusted abnormal returns differ 
considerably. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Terrorism is a low intensity conflict characterised by tactics of coercion and 
occasional use of violence. A definition of terrorism is “the substate application of violence or 
threatened violence intended to sow panic in a society, to weaken or even overthrow the 
incumbents” (Laqueur 1996, p24). Terrorist violence outbreaks are rare but extreme events, 
with an unpredictable nature and a significant potential of destruction. They are catastrophic 
events that can generate large economic costs and trigger exogenous shocks in financial 
markets. Terrorism threats of violence raise the level of uncertainty as the possibility of 
terrorist attacks hangs over the country.  
Past research suggest that terrorist attacks have a negative impact on the economy that 
reverberates through to financial markets. Ongoing terrorism appears to lower economic 
growth and increase financial risk. Terrorism has very similar characteristics to natural 
disasters or man-made catastrophes. Little is known about the detailed consequences of such 
catastrophic events or risk for financial markets. 
Financial studies could improve financial market resilience to terrorism by defining 
what market reaction can be expected to such events. Increasing our knowledge of 
catastrophic events helps to reduce uncertainty. It may limit the element of surprise and avoid 
potential financial crises1. 
                                                 
1
 Crisis refers to what happens when a surprise reveals an unambiguous failure of rules, norms, behaviour, or 
infrastructure used to handle the surprise.    
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1.2 Terrorism 
 
There are many definitions of terrorism and many forms of terrorist organisations. 
“There has been no “terrorism” per se, only different terrorisms” (Laqueur 1999, p. 79). Post 
World War II and until the 80’s, terrorism was predominantly used by separatists and 
anarchists (Laqueur 1996). They aimed to pressure domestic governments to change their 
policies on specific territorial or social issues (Rapoport, 2001). Their messages appealed to 
minorities.  
Today, the most visible threat of terrorism for Western countries is from transnational2 
terrorist organisations with religious motives. In the 1990s terrorism went through a 
generational change that paralleled the growth of religious fundamentalism and the emergence 
of religious based terrorism (Hoffman 1998). Al Qaeda illustrates this new terrorism. Osama 
Bin Laden, leader of Al Qaeda, bases his arguments “on an interpretation of Islamic history” 
and derived his power “from playing on the current social, economic and political problems of 
the Muslim world” (Burke 2003, p. 25). The group has multiple targets and a broad audience. 
The main objectives are the destruction of the rulers of Saudi Arabia, of the Western world 
and of Israel (Bergen 2001, p. 103). Al Qaeda uses international connections. It works 
through a network of local terrorist groups with common interests or ideologies (Bergen 2001, 
p. 33). The organization is also known to have links with criminal organisations (Radu 2002). 
Finally, it is possible that this new form of terrorism is more violent than past terrorism. From  
1999 until 2005, the number of lethal terrorist incidents has increased significantly (Bellany 
2007; Enders and Sandler 2000, 2005). Enders and Sandler (2000) suggest that the surge of 
violence coincides with the development of religious based terrorism.  
                                                 
2
 Transnational terrorism is a terrorism that has “implication for two or more countries” “through its 
perpetrators, victims, or audience” (Rosendorff and Sandler 2005, p. 172). 
 
  3 
1.3 Importance of Research  
 
Terrorism appears to have a significant impact on economic and financial markets. The 
terrorist attack on the United States on September 11 2001 (September 11 thereafter) provides 
evidence of the potential economic damage of terrorism. The overall cost of the attack was 
estimated at $48.70 billion (Enders and Sandler 2006). The U.S authorities counted 3,000 
deaths (U.S Bureau of Public Affairs 2001). Beyond the on-the-ground losses, the attack 
altered the U.S economic prospect as it is believed to have decreased national growth by 0.5 
percent (Lenain, Bonturi and Koen 2002b). Stock markets did also respond to the event. In the 
weeks that followed the attack, U.S equity market indices fell dramatically. The event appear 
to have had a contagion effect, with a crisis not contained to the U.S market but spilling 
through to the rest of the world (Hon, Strauss and Soo-Keong Yong 2004; Mun 2005). Both 
negative returns and increased volatility was recorded on most international equity markets 
(Chen and Siems 2004; Fernandez 2006). 
September 11 lead to a crisis on the U.S financial markets. In the week of the attack, the 
equity market remained closed. Markets were closed due to the destruction of some trading 
infrastructure but also the authorities feared a market crash. A better understanding of the 
impact of terrorism on financial market would have helped to rationalise the event and to 
lower uncertainty. Moreover, given the similarities between terrorist events and other 
catastrophic events, research on terrorism could contribute to the management of most forms 
of catastrophic event.  
Future terrorist attacks are likely. The terrorists represent a growing threat for Western 
countries and especially the U.S. Developed countries are more prone to terrorism than any 
other countries (Tavares 2004). The U.S in particular appears to have been the “preferred 
target” of terrorist groups (Crenshaw 2001, p. 432). From the late 1960s until 2001, the U.S 
has been “the victim of one-third of all international terrorist attacks” (Crenshaw 2001, 
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p. 432). Enders and Sender (2006, p. 41) estimate that “40 percent of all transnational terrorist 
attacks were against U.S citizens or property” from 1968 till 2003. Moreover, terrorists focus 
on businesses. “In the past 30 years, 80 percent of the terrorist attacks against the United 
States have been aimed at American businesses” (Bremer L. 2002, p. 22).  
This new form of terrorism considers the economy as a key target. Terrorists attack 
their opponent on several levels including on the economic front. Frey and Luechinger (2003) 
suggest terrorists have three main tactical goals: to obtain publicity, to challenge governments 
and to damage the economy (Frey and Luechinger 2003). By damaging the economy terrorists 
hope to pressure the government and the population. “The more an economy is affected by 
terrorist acts”, the higher marginal benefit of an attack for terrorists (Frey and Luechinger 
2003, p. 239). When terrorist groups intend to inflict economic cost to a state, they practice 
what is called “economic targeting” (Jackson, Dixon and Greenfield 2007).  
 
 
1.4 Research Approach 
 
The research approach followed in this thesis is to analyse the change in demand for 
financial products induced by terrorist events. Terrorism generates costs, risk and uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is not risk. While risk can be measured, uncertainty is a risk that cannot be 
calculated3 (Whalen 2001). “Risk and uncertainty” are central to finance. It is “the basis of 
asset demands, equilibrium capital asset pricing, and corporate investment decision” (Fischer 
and Merton 1984). Investors are risk averse. Their demand for assets changes according to the 
                                                 
3
 Whalen’s comment is based on the work of the economist Frank H. Knight (1885-1972) economist from the 
University of Chicago.    
  5 
level of risk and uncertainty. Asset prices reflect change in demand. For higher risk, investors 
ask for higher return. In informatively efficient markets such as the U.S security markets, any 
news related to terrorism should be processed so that the share prices reflect the new level of 
risk (Bouchet, Clark and Groslambert 2003). Change in asset prices should therefore reflect 
the economic costs, the risk and the uncertainty terrorism generates.  
This research takes a narrow approach. It uses the traditional event study techniques to 
analyse abnormal changes in demand for financial products around terrorist events. This 
research includes three quantitative event studies. In the Journal of Finance Eugene F. Fama 
explains that event studies are useful and efficient: 
 
Using simple tools, this research documents interesting regularities in the response of stock prices to 
investment decisions, financing decisions, and change in corporate control. The results stand up to 
replication and the empirical regularities, some rather surprising, are the impetus for theoretical work to 
explain them. On all accounts, the event-study literature passes the test of scientific usefulness. 
(Fama 1991, p. 1600) 
 
In this project, several econometric techniques are used to detect abnormal changes in 
equity returns or volumes on a given day or over a specific time period.  
 
 
1.5 Thesis Contribution 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine equity market behaviour during and after terrorist 
attacks. So far, the financial research has analysed the impact of terrorism on the aggregate 
equity market level or on individual firms from terrorism sensitive industries (insurance, 
transportation, defence). These studies have focused on the U.S market and almost 
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exclusively on the September 11 attack. Many of the market responses to terrorist attacks 
remain unexplored and this thesis fills some of the gaps in the literature. It will attempt to 
answer three main questions:  
 
1. How does terrorism affect the equity value of firms involved in a terrorist attack? Was the 
market efficient following the September 11 attack? 
This research will investigate the equity return of firms physically damaged by the 
September 11 attack. This investigation will give some indication of the efficiency of market 
during the crises. So far there has only been evaluation of the price effect of September 11 on 
the insurance and transportation industries (see Carter and Simkins 2004; Doherty, Lamm-
Tennant and Starks 2003). These are terrorism sensitive industries however, for which 
terrorism has considerable consequences beyond the damage caused by the attack. Our study 
shows the impact of terrorism on both firms from terrorist sensitive industries and on firms 
from industries that are not especially sensitive to terrorism. Taking into account a possible 
industry effect, this chapter aims to evaluate whether the market identified firms as victims of 
terrorist violence. This investigation is unique, as market efficiency during terrorist attacks 
has not yet been investigated. Nor has the change in equity value of firms directly damaged by 
terrorist attacks. 
 
2. Does terrorism have an industry and a sector differential effect? 
Past studies have investigated the impact of terrorist attack at an aggregate market level. This 
thesis will research within the market, the various industries and sector simultaneous price 
and volume responses to terrorist attacks. It will evaluate terrorism differential effects on 
three international equity markets, the U.S, the U.K and the Spanish market, following local 
and foreign terrorist attacks. Enders and Sandler (2006) suggest a possible industry 
differential effect. In reaction to terrorism, the economy should reorganise its activities. In the 
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process, it will reallocate its resources from industries sensitive to terrorism to industries 
considered safe. If terrorism has an industry differential effect, there would be an opportunity 
to lower terrorist risk by diversifying equity portfolios across industries. This study represents 
the first cross-country analysis of the impact of terrorism on multiple industries and sectors 
equity returns. It is also the first study on terrorism examining the market reaction looking at 
both prices and trading volumes. This research also gives some insight into the relationship 
between price and volume effects in the context of catastrophic events.  
 
3. To what extent do event study methods influence the assessment of market abnormal 
reactions? 
The assessment of abnormal change in equity price represents an initial step in 
investigation of the impact of an event. There is no consensus on the econometric method to 
be used for such investigations and various studies use different techniques. This thesis 
presents a critical analysis of event study methods by comparing and contrasting abnormal 
returns estimated using five different econometric techniques. This analysis will also be 
performed on U.S sector equity indices following the September 11, the Bali bombing, the 
Madrid and London Bombing. It provides an opportunity to evaluate the sector specific 
effects of terrorist attacks on the U.S market.  
 
 
1.6 Outline 
 
The remainder of this thesis is presented in the following manner. Chapter Two reviews 
the literature on various aspects of relationship between terrorism and financial markets. 
Chapters Three, Four and Five present the three empirical studies. Chapter Three investigates 
  8 
market efficiency following the September 11 attack. Chapter Four evaluates the industry 
differential effect of terrorism on equity prices and volumes on the U.S, U.K and Spanish 
markets. Chapter Five provides a detailed investigation of terrorism sector and sub-sector 
differential effects on the U.S equity market, as well as providing a critical analysis of 
abnormal return methods. Chapter Six presents a summary of the dissertation, its 
achievements and limitations. It also suggests subjects for further study on terrorism and 
financial markets.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Terrorism constitutes an external shock for both the economy and financial markets. Its 
occurrence is rare and unpredictable, but the September 11 attack has made developed 
countries realise that terrorism is an on going threat. Prior to September 11, little had been 
written on terrorism in the field of economics and finance. There was a pre-existing literature 
on the economics of terrorism, with occasional studies published in war, peace or defence 
economics journals. This research mainly focuses on rationalising terrorism, defining its 
causes and consequences. Very few of these studies estimated the impact of terrorism on the 
economy. In the finance literature, research on terrorism commenced after the September 11 
attack. Six years after the event, the economic and finance literature on terrorism is still at an 
embryonic stage, but it is growing rapidly. See Enders and Sandler (2006) for a survey of the 
economic and finance literature on terrorism (see also Bruck and Wickstrom 2004; Llussá and 
Tavares 2007; Sandler and Enders 2005). 
This chapter presents a survey of the existing literature on terrorism and its impact on 
the economy and on financial markets. This review comprises two main sections. The first 
section reviews the current research on the economic implications of terrorist attacks and 
terrorism. The second section is dedicated to the literature on the reaction of financial market 
to terrorism. 
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2.2 The Economic Analysis of Terrorism  
 
The economic literature suggests terrorism has both direct and indirect economic 
consequences. The direct consequences are the loss of human life and property damage 
caused by a terrorist attack. From an economic perspective, these tend to be short-term costs. 
The indirect consequences of terrorism on the economy are increases in the costs of counter-
terrorism policies, as well as the dampening of trade and investment flow. These are long-
term costs and persist until the terrorists cease their activities.  
 
2.2.1 The Cost of Terrorist Attacks: the Case of the September 11 Attack  
Each terror attack has a different impact on the economy. The September 11 attack 
provides an example of the potential damage that such catastrophic events can cause for 
Western countries. The significant size of the attack facilitates a review of many of the 
potential costs and short-term consequences of a modern terrorist attack.  
 
2.2.1.1 The On the Ground Costs  
Several studies (Enders and Sandler 2006; IMF 2001; Lenain, Bonturi and Koen 2002b) 
review the immediate costs of the September 11 attack. The estimation of the damages and 
costs differ depending on the method used for the estimate. Enders and Sandler (2006) 
provide one of the most thorough analyses of the short-term costs of the September 11 attack. 
They summarise the physical losses as follows: $16.2 billion4 of damages to structures and 
equipment, $3.3 billion lost in wages and salaries of private sector employee and $10 billion 
in the clean up costs. A gain was made with an increase in $0.8 billion in wages of state and 
government employees. Enders and Sandler (2006) extracted these data from the U.S Bureau 
                                                 
4
 Unless specified otherwise, $ refer to US$.  
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of Economic Analysis (BEA). They estimated the human capital losses at $20 billion for the 
death of 3000 people. The value of human life is estimated following Navarro and Spencer 
(2001). Enders and Sander estimate for the total cost of September 11 at $48.7 billion.  
Table 2.1 Direct Cost of the September 11 Attack, 2001 (in billion US dollars) 
Physical loss   
 Structures and equipment 16.20 
 Private sector employees wages and salaries 3.3 
 Clean up of the sites 10 
 Wages of State and Federal Government employees -0.8 
   
Human capital loss  
  Death of 3000 people 20 
   
 Total cost $48.70 
Source: Enders and Sandler (2006) 
 
Lenain, Bonturi and Koen (2002b) provide further detail on the $ 16.2 billion damage 
to structures and equipment mentioned by Enders and Sandler (2006). They break down that 
figure as follows: $14 billion representing physical losses for private sector businesses, $1.5 
billion for the losses of the state and local government enterprises and $ 0.7 billion for the 
losses of the federal government. Lenain, Bonturi and Koen also estimate $ 11 billion in clean 
up costs. They mention the temporary loss or relocation of 200,000 jobs but do not provide a 
figure of the cost of this disruption. Finally, they discuss a $40 billion dollar emergency 
package cleared by the U.S Congress in the aftermath of the event. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2001) estimates the direct total cost of the 
attack at $21.4 billion; this amount represents a quarter of the U.S annual GDP growth. This 
IMF valuation is however much lower than other estimates, being less than half of Enders and 
Sandler (2006) estimate for instance. The valuation differs mainly because the IMF does not 
use the Navarro and Spencer (2001) model to measure the losses from human capital. Instead, 
the IMF report uses insurance data provided by the BEA. According to insurance losses, lost 
human lives and injuries represent only $ 2.6 billion. Other items in the IMF balance sheet 
  12 
include $2.6 billion of other insurance losses for compensation for workers, homeowners, and 
general government. Excluded from the IMF calculation are costs from lost wages, salaries 
and site clean up.  
The IMF report puts the cost of September 11 into perspective by comparing the event 
with other catastrophic events. This analysis shows that September 11 produced smaller 
property losses than did the 1994 Northridge earthquake, or the 1992 Hurricane Andrew. 
These events generated, respectively, $13 and $16.95 billion of losses. Moreover, the total 
cost of the attack was less than the cost of the damages caused by the 1995 Kobe earthquake 
in Japan, which produced damages estimated at $114 billion.6  Overall, the IMF concludes 
that the cost of the September 11 attack was relatively smaller than the cost of other 
catastrophic events. 
 
2.2.1.2 The Indirect Short Term Effect of September 11 
It is difficult to evaluate the general impact of the September attack on the U.S 
economy. The major challenge of any evaluation is to isolate the event from other events or 
from changes that may have affected the economy. In the case of September 11, the estimate 
is even more difficult because the U.S economy was in recession. The then chairman of the 
U.S Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, explained that economic “stability was only 
barely becoming evident in the United States in the period immediately preceding the acts of 
terrorism. Aggregate measures of production, employment, and business spending continued 
to be weak” (Greenspan 2001, p. 757). Following the event the forecast for “U.S real GDP 
growth was instantly downgraded by 0.5 percentage points for 2001 and 1.2 percentage points 
for 2002” (Lenain, Bonturi and Koen 2002b, p. 119).   
                                                 
5
 Data of Insured losses from Navarro and Spencer (2001) cited by Enders and Sandler (2006)  
6
 Data from Becker and Murphy (2001). 
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The actual economic data show that the attack weakened the U.S economy in the third 
quarter of 2001. During this quarter, business and consumer confidence fell significantly 
(IMF 2001). The confidence indices dropped by 2.5 to 5 standard deviations leading the 
September 2001 index figure to fall to 97.6, almost 20 points lower than the figure recorded in 
September 2000 (IMF 2001; Virgo 2001). The attack also reduced confidence levels overseas. 
The fall was especially significant in Europe and Canada (IMF 2001). The disruption caused 
by the attack led to an estimated loses in output of $47 billion (Enders and Sandler 2006). The 
Insurance, the Airline and the Hotel and Tourism industries were especially hard-hit by the 
attack. These industries are discussed in the context of financial markets in a latter part of this 
literature review (see section 2.3.1.3). Private investment also declined significantly (Lenain, 
Bonturi and Koen 2002a). Between September to November 2001, the U.S Federal Reserve 
lowered the interest rate by 1.5 percent, moving the rates from 3.5 percent to 2 percent (Virgo 
2001).  
Despite the lower forecasts and the fall of some economic indicators, the U.S economy 
appeared to be recovering by year’s end. Real GDP fell in the third quarter of 2001 but it 
bounced back in the fourth quarter (Lenain, Bonturi and Koen 2002a). A fall in energy prices 
and an increase in government spending appear to have counter balanced some of the 
economic losses caused by the attack (Lenain, Bonturi and Koen 2002a). In the last quarter of 
2001, the U.S Government increased defence spending by 9.5 percent (Lenain, Bonturi and 
Koen 2002a). Becker and Murphy (2001) argue that the U.S economy was resilient to external 
shocks. It survived the 1970s oil shocks and the Cuban missile crisis withstanding major 
damage. Becker and Murphy (2001) explain that, during crisis, falls in consumption and in 
investment are not felt throughout the economy and some sectors are less harmed than others. 
They expect the economic slow-down to be only temporary. They believe the economy will 
adjust to terrorism the way it has adjusted to crises in the past: it will reorganise its activities 
to remain efficient despite increased costs and uncertainty.  
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2.2.1.3 Long Term Effect of September 11 
Following September 11, the IMF and other institutions estimated the possible long-
term effects of September 11 on the U.S economy. The IMF (2001, p. 18) listed five key 
potential long term effects: “higher operating costs”, “higher levels of inventories”, “higher 
risk premium”, “a shift of resource away from civilian labor force toward the military” and a 
“shift away from globalisation”. Higher transaction and transportation costs were expected to 
generate “higher operating costs” and “higher levels of inventories”. The increase in terrorist 
risk was expected to generate the “higher risk premium”. The “shift of resources” to the 
military did occur as the U.S Government initiated a vigorous counter terrorism policy. That 
policy attracted criticism: Stiglitz (2003a) warned that the Government policy may be 
unaffordable, even more so when the “war on terrorism” leads to open military conflict. 
Stiglitz reminds us that military actions do not only affect macroeconomic performances but 
they also trigger uncertainty (Stiglitz 2003b). The cost of counter terrorism programs is 
discussed later in this chapter (see Section 2.2.2.4)  
September 11 is likely to have had a long-term impact on specific industrial sectors, 
such as the Airline, Tourism and Insurance industries. However, some studies suggest that the 
event may not have a long term impact on the overall economy (Becker and Murphy 2001; 
Enders and Sandler 2006). The U.S economy should be flexible enough to adapt to the higher 
uncertainty and cost generated by the attack (Becker and Murphy 2001). Enders and Sendler 
(2006) explain that, in large countries such as the U.S with low terrorism levels, terrorism is 
not expected to have a significant impact on the whole of the economy. Terrorism will 
generate a substitution effect where economic activities will move from economic sectors 
vulnerable to terrorism, to sectors that are less vulnerable. In this thesis, I test this hypothesis 
studying stock market activities and the movement of equity prices across sectors to evaluate 
the industry differential effects of terrorism. While most studies on the September 11 do not 
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identify a long-term impact on the aggregate economy, they also acknowledge that there are 
major uncertainties about the long term impact of on going terrorism on the U.S economy. 
 
2.2.2 The Mid to Long Term Impact of Terrorism  
 Through indirect means, terrorism can have a mid to long-term effect on the economy. 
The current literature suggests terrorism can retard economic growth and decrease aggregate 
economic output. This economic slow-down could be explained by terrorism’s negative 
impact on trade and investment. Counter terrorism policies, established to fight terrorism, also 
contribute to the on going cost of terrorism.  
 
2.2.2.1 The Macroeconomic Impact  
Very few studies estimate the long-term effect of terrorism on the overall economy. 
The existing research suggests that terrorism has a negative impact on a countries’ economic 
growth and economic output. Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) present an international 
study on the impact of terrorism, internal wars, and external wars on economic growth in 117 
economies. They analyse 32 years concerning the events and GDP growth with cross 
sectional regression, panel regression and a structural vector autoregression (VAR) model. 
Their study shows that terrorism results in increases in government spending and decreases in 
GDP growth. Terrorism lowers GDP growth by around 0.5 percent per year. Compared to 
other forms of conflict, terrorism has a smaller impact on GDP growth. Finally, estimates 
from the VAR model indicate that terrorism also has a short-term impact. Its negative 
influence on GDP lasts no more than a year, while other forms of conflict can lower GDP for 
up to three years. With a very large sample size (117 countries over 32 years) and given that 
multiple variables influence the economy, the Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides study may 
suffer from omitted variable bias. This bias is a major limitation of studies estimating the 
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impact of terrorism on the economy; however, the negative impact of terrorism on growth is 
confirmed by Tavares (2004) and Crain and Crain (2006). 
Tavares (2004) also investigates the economic impact of terrorism on growth. Using a 
cross-country dataset from 1987 to 2001, Tavares runs ordinary least square regressions 
measuring the impact of terrorism, natural disasters and the currency crises on GDP growth. 
This analysis suggests that terrorism reduces GDP annual growth by around 0.2 percent per 
annum. Terrorism from known organisations can hinder growth by more than 0.3 percent; it is 
the most damaging form of terrorism. Overall, terrorism causes more harm to the economy 
than natural disasters and currency crises; these events reduce growth by only 0.12 percent 
and 0.24 percent respectively. While the IMF (2001) observes that the cost of natural 
catastrophes has been higher than the costs of terrorist attacks, this result suggests that 
terrorism has a greater long-term impact. The Tavares estimate of -0.3 percent in GDP growth 
is slightly below Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides’ (2004) estimate. This study, however, has 
weaknesses. Unlike Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004), Tavares does not control for 
alternative conflicts. Moreover, the result on terrorism and GDP growth becomes statically 
insignificant when standard macroeconomic variables are included in the regression. 
Crain and Crain (2006) also suggest terrorism has a negative impact on GDP. This 
study follows a traditional growth analysis framework using economic and demographic 
control variables. Crain and Crain (2006) show that terrorism decreases actual GDP by 0.01 
percent. They also find that on a five year average terrorism reduces GDP growth by 0.7 
percent. These results appear robust though the analysis omits variable accounting for 
alternative conflicts such as internal and external wars. This omission could have significant 
consequences on the results.  
Some country specific characteristics could also play a role in determining the 
economic cost of terrorism. In an analysis on the impact of terrorism on GDP growth, Tavares 
(2004) controls for country social environment and location. He finds the costs of terrorism to 
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be lower for democratic countries. However, this does not mean that democratic countries are 
less likely to experience terrorist attacks. Wealthy countries are more likely to be terrorist 
targets as there is a positive relationship between number of attacks and the level of GDP per 
capita. Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) also report results suggesting developed 
nations are more prone to terrorism than other countries. Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides 
(2004) observe that despite the elevated level of terrorism activities, the overall cost of 
terrorism (in terms of GDP growth) for OECD countries is not significantly higher than for 
the rest of the world. In contrast, Africa has the lowest number of terrorist attacks compared 
to the rest of the world, but the economic impact of terrorism in the region is higher than in 
the rest of the world. These results suggest that the level of terrorist activity is not an indicator 
of the cost of terrorism for the economy. Alternatively, Enders and Sandler (2006) suggest 
that country size also has an influence on the economic impact of terrorism. Small countries 
are likely to be more sensitive to terrorism because their economy may not be diversified 
enough to enable reallocation of activities to reduce the inefficiency caused by terrorism 
(Enders and Sandler 2006).  
The Basque region of Spain illustrates the case of a small economy damaged by 
terrorism. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) study the influence of Euskadi Ta Askatasuma 
(ETA) activities on the Basque economy from 1968 - 1997. For their analysis, they model a 
synthetic “control” region made up of Spanish regions sharing the same characteristics as the 
Basque region. They then compare the GDP of the synthetic region to the GDP of the Basque 
region. Their results suggest that ETA activities in the 1980s retarded economic expansion 
and lowered GDP per capita by 10 percent. In the 1990s, spike in terrorist activity widened 
the gap between the actual GDP of the Basque region and the “control” region GDP. 
Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) use quarterly data to provide a detailed analysis of Israel 
from 1980 - 2003. They perform an analysis with a VAR model to estimate the impact of 
terrorism on GDP, GNP, investment, exports and non-durable consumption (NDC). Their 
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regressions also include seasonal dummies and an interest rates variable. They adjusted the 
data to take into account September 11 and they control for war with a dummy variable. Of 
the five variables tested, export and investment are the economic variables most sensitive to 
terrorism. Terrorism lowers quarterly GDP and GNP growth by 0.46 percent and 0.67 percent 
respectively. On an annual basis, GDP growth is lowered by around 2 percent. Finally, 
Eckstein and Tsiddon use forecast methods to estimate an Israeli GDP free of terrorism using 
a sub-sample from 2003 - 2005. The comparison between the forecast GDP and actual GDP 
suggests these three years of terrorism prevented GDP growth of 10 percent. These results are 
consistent the findings of Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). 
 
2.2.2.2 Terrorism and Trade 
Terrorism and counter terrorism have a negative impact on trade flows. Nitsch and 
Schumacher (2003) describe three mechanisms through which terrorism harms trade. 
Terrorism creates insecurity that alters production and consumption patterns, making a market 
less attractive for international producers. Terrorism triggers increase in security measures. 
Tighter security makes trade more expensive by causing delays in transaction processing and 
deliveries of goods and services. Terrorism can damage traded goods and infrastructure 
needed for the trade. Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) estimated terrorism lowers Israeli exports 
by around 4 percent per annum. 
Empirical studies confirm the adverse effect of terrorism. Nitsch and Schumacher 
(2003), for example, evaluate the impact of terrorism and wars on the trade flows of 200 
countries from 1968 to 1979 using a gravity model7. The results suggest that terrorist 
incidents reduce bilateral trade by 4 percent. Internal and external wars also lower trade flows. 
Finally, a single terrorist occurrence or participation in a war is sufficient to significantly alter 
                                                 
7
 A gravity model is a regression framework used to model trade flow between two countries. In a traditional 
gravity equation, the volume of bilateral trade is a function of variables such as GDP, population, tariff, 
geography and language. 
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a country trade flow. Also using a gravity model, Blomberg and Hess (2006) compare the cost 
of conflict including terrorism on trade to the potential gain from international trade 
agreements. They conduct a panel data analysis on 177 countries over 31 years. Their results 
show that conflicts generate a cost equivalent to a 30 percent tariff. This tax exceeds the 
potential gain from the elimination of borders and of language barriers, the establishment of 
Generalized System of Preferences or any WTO bilateral or multilateral trade agreements.  
Terrorism increases frictional trading costs such as transport, handling, insurance and 
customs. Walkenhorst and Dihel (2002; 2006) focus on these frictional costs to estimate the 
losses generated by terrorism on trade. They analyse the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) database using the GTAP model. This research is quite extensive as it investigates 
bilateral trades over 50 sectors across 40 countries (grouped by continents or “semi 
continents”). The results suggest that an increase of 1 percent in frictional costs leads to a 
global welfare loss of $75 billion per year. An increase of 1 percent in frictional costs was 
estimated for the September 11 attack. This also represents a quarter of the potential estimated 
gain from merchandised trade liberalisation.  
 
2.2.2.3 Terrorism and Investment 
Investment is one of the most responsive macroeconomic variables to terrorism 
(Eckstein and Tsiddon 2004). This sensitivity is due to the high mobility of capital and the 
risk aversion of investors. Investors are reluctant to keep their funds in an environment 
considered risky. They will react to an increase in risk by either removing their investments or 
by demanding higher returns to compensate for the additional risk. Terrorist risk is part of a 
countries political risk, which in turn is one of the components of country risk. Country risk 
represents the additional risks occurring when dealing with foreign nations. It is defined as 
“risks arising from a variety of national differences in economic structures, policies, socio-
political institutions, geography and currency.” (Meldrum (2000) cited by Bouchet, Clark and 
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Groslambert 2003, pp., p12). Political risk can be defined as  “the occurrences of a political 
nature, usually political events or constraints imposed at the specific industry or specific firm 
level’” (Fitzpatrick 1983, p. 249). This definition of political risk is one of many, see 
Fitzpatrick (1983) for a discussion on this issue.   
Traditionally, political risk is considered very low in Western countries. It is perceived 
significant only when dealing with less developed nations with high political instability 
(Bouchet, Clark and Groslambert 2003). Since September 11 however, there has been an 
increased interest in developed nation “country risk” rating. With terrorism, the U.S appears 
to have gained higher political risk (Bouchet, Clark and Groslambert 2003). It has been 
suggested that, in the long term, the U.S could be perceived as a “less-safe haven” and it may 
experience a decline in direct foreign investments and in securities purchase (Ford 2001). The 
2000 - 2003 U.S investment figures show a decline of the percentage of foreign investment 
(U.S Gross Fixed Capital Formation), conversely, it also presents an increase in the U.S 
foreign direct investment (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2007). These raw data suggest a 
significant reduction of foreign investments in the U.S around September 11 but this has not 
yet been confirmed by empirical research. 
In their international analysis, Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) find that 
terrorism lowers the ratio of investment to GDP by 0.5 percent. Terrorism is the only form of 
conflict that has a statistically significant impact on investment. Investment also seems to 
adjust more negatively than government spending, the other elements of GDP evaluated in the 
study. In the case of Israel, Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) also find that terrorism reduces 
investment. They estimate that from 1980 – 2003, terrorism lowered investment to Israel by 
around 4 percent. 
In a broad study over 110 countries, Adbadi and Gardeazabal (2007) find evidence of 
a negative relationship between terrorist risk and country Net Foreign Direct Investment 
(NFDI). In an integrated world with high capital mobility, investors diversify the terrorist risk 
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by relocating their investments across countries. Because of this diversification process, 
terrorism generates significant movement of capital, which has a significant impact on 
economies. For this study, Adbadi and Gardeazabal isolate the terrorism effects by creating a 
terrorist index based on the terrorist level of activity in a country. They use an endogenous 
growth model including a terrorist index, other political and country risk as well as 
demographic variables. Their results suggest that a rise of about one standard deviation in a 
country’s terrorist index leads to a fall in NFDI equivalent to 5 percent of GDP. A standard 
deviation can be represented by the difference in terrorist risk in Italy and in the U.S.  
Looking at Spain and Greece, Enders and Sanders (1996) study the influence of 
terrorism on NFDI. They use a VAR model with a sample of country NFDI and terrorist event 
time series from 1968 - 1991. For Spain, the results are highly significant with a 13.5 percent 
reduction in NFDI due to terrorism. For Greece, on average every year, terrorism lowers 
NFDI by 11.9 percent. Enders and Sanders purposely used small countries in their analysis. 
They expect the impact of terrorism on investment to be more significant because small 
countries have a pool of investors too small to diversify terrorist risk. If terrorist risk cannot 
be eased through diversification, investors are likely to move their investments out of the 
country. Using the VAR model, Enders and Sanders perform additional testing on three large 
European countries and find no significant relationship between NFDI and terrorist events. 
This result suggests that terrorism does not appear to have an impact on NFDI in large 
countries. Consequently, these findings could also imply that small countries are more 
sensitive to terrorism than large countries because terrorism has a significant, adverse effect 
on their investments.  
Alternatively, terrorism can also influence the flow of investments from a country that 
is the victim to terrorism. Enders, Sachsida and Sandler (2006) using the U.S Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) shows a small, but significant relationship between the flow of funds from 
the U.S and a time series of international terrorist events targeting the U.S. From 1989 - 1999, 
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terrorist attacks directed at the U.S and at U.S interests overseas have reduced U.S FDI by 1 
percent. Terrorism appears to have an adverse effect on the inflow and the outflow of 
investment. 
 
2.2.2.4 Economic Costs of Counter-Terrorism Policy  
Counter terrorism represents another significant aspect of terrorism and generates 
significant costs. Counter-terrorism policies are government reactions to terrorism. They 
describe the measures taken by the government to limit or eliminate terrorist activities. These 
measures not only have an impact on terrorism but also on the rest of society, including the 
economy. Counter-terrorism needs to be mentioned in the analysis of the cost of terrorism for 
two reasons. First, counter-terrorism security measures generate significant costs through 
higher transaction costs (see Section 2.2.2.2, Terrorism and Trade). Second, counter terrorism 
can divert economic resources away from productive sectors or even away from countries (see 
Section 2.2.2.3 Terrorism and Investments). Given the multiple economic implications of 
counter terrorist policies, it is extremely difficult to estimate their actual cost. Some 
researchers have approached the issue by using cost-benefit models. The models evaluate 
potential economic cost or gain generated by counter terrorism programs. Alternatively, 
counter-terrorism has been analysed in term of the efficiency and design of counter-terrorism 
policies.  
Zycher (2003) presents a cost-benefit analysis based on the case of September 11. 
Zycher (2003) compares the total of costs of the September 11 attack with the cost of United 
States counter-terrorist programs initiated since the event. He uses September 11 data to 
project the potential cost of new terrorist bombings. The cost analysis takes into account both 
tangible and intangibles losses, such as the “cost of physical damages”, the “cost of life”, the 
“loss of privacy” or the “preservation of national pride”, and basic mid-term economics 
losses. Balancing the benefits and the costs, the potential cost of a terrorist attack outweighs 
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the cost of the counter-terrorism program. Consequently, the report concludes in favour of the 
U.S government counter-terrorist policy. This analysis may be incomplete since it does not 
take into account the negative externalities of counter-terrorism programs. These externalities 
include higher transaction costs and possible diversion of resources from the private to the 
public sector.  
With a more theoretical approach, Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) built a cost benefit 
model of counter terrorism expenditure by taking the example of Israel. In their model, 
government defence expenditure generates safety, which reduces insecurity and, 
consequently, preserves human lives and material wealth. Eckstein and Tsiddon rely on the 
assumption that the threat to, or the destruction of, lives and wealth lowers the country’s 
overall economic performance, by putting downward pressure on consumption and 
investment. The model is also based on a closed-economy, infinite horizon model in which 
the government is the sole provider of security services. Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) draw 
the following hypothesis from their model: in a country exposed to terrorism, an increase in 
government defence expenditure leading to an effective reduction of insecurity should be 
followed by an increase in GDP. Using data on Israel, they perform an empirical study which 
results appears to confirm this hypothesis. Results show a positive correlation between 
economic performances and level defence expenditure. Like Zycher (2003), this study does 
not acknowledge the potential externalities generated by counter terrorism programs. 
Moreover, these studies assume that defence expenditure and consequently counter terrorism 
policies will reduce terrorism. Few economic studies however question the efficiency of 
counter terrorism policies. 
Two main types of counter terrorism policies can be identified: the proactive (or 
offensive) and the defensive (or passive) policies (Enders and Sandler 2006). The proactive 
policy includes deterrence measures tackling terrorist resources and financial support. The 
defensive policy focuses on increasing security of potential terrorist targets, but also works on 
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discouraging terrorism by offering non-violent alternatives to terrorist or potential terrorists. 
In recent years, the U.S Government has pursued both proactive and defensive approaches; 
but the proactive approach has been dominant (Enders and Sandler 2006). Several empirical 
studies suggest that counter-terrorism measures of proactive policies such as harsh 
punishments, weapon screening, and military strikes have a limited impact on terrorism (see 
for example Enders and Sandler 1993, 2005; Landes 1978). Terrorists appear resilient to most 
deterrence measures; when a new policy is implemented terrorists adapt by changing tactics 
or finding new soft targets (Enders and Sandler 1993, 2006). Deterrence measures have major 
drawbacks. In his analysis of the 1960s and 1970s hijacking incidents, Landes estimates the 
cost of the prevention to be equal to the expected cost of a successful hijacking. Moreover, an 
excessive proactive policy with drastic measures can be perceived as unfair and can increase 
terrorists support (Rosendorff and Sandler 2004).  
Proactive counter-terrorism policies have been proposed to replace or complement the 
current deterrence policy. Frey and Luechinger (2002) suggest decentralising political 
infrastructure and markets. Terrorists should have more difficulty organising attacks if their 
targets are geographically dispersed (Frey and Luechinger 2002). Frey and Luechinger (2003) 
also propose a defensive policy focused on opening up alternative opportunities for terrorists. 
This policy would encourage the involvement of terrorist groups in international and political 
forums. The literature proposes other policy alternatives, and it also discusses the 
development of international counter-terrorism policies, see for example Lee (1988) and 
Sandler (2003), (see also Sandler and Arce (2005), Sandler and Enders (2004) Sandler and 
Siqueira (2006), Siqueira and Sandler  (2007)). 
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2.3 Terrorism and Capital Markets 
 
The finance literature on terrorism suggests financial markets reflect most of the 
economic costs brought about by terrorist attacks and terrorism. The market reflects both the 
short-term and the long-term costs of terrorism. In the short-term, terrorist attacks seem to 
trigger an overall market reaction. In the long term, on-going terrorism and the resultant 
uncertainty also seems to increase overall market volatility. Studies on natural catastrophes 
offer some alternative views and ideas on terrorism. 
   
2.3.1 The Impact of Terrorism on the Capital Markets  
 
The finance literature looking at terrorism is new and has yet to be consolidated. 
September 11 is the case study for most research on the impact of terrorism on financial 
markets. These studies investigate the U.S equity market and some international equity 
markets at an aggregate level.   
 
2.3.1.1 September 11 Financial Crisis 
The September 11 attack illustrates terrorism that specifically targets financial markets. 
Two of the planes that crashed in the United States destroyed part of the New York financial 
district. The attack severely impaired “telecommunication and trading capacities” and 
disrupted “the payment transfers that are usually measured in terms of trillions of dollars each 
day” (Greenspan 2001, p. 757). In the aftermath of the event, to manage the crisis, the U.S 
Federal Reserve cut the federal fund interest rates by 175 points. It injected “liquidities 
through discount windows”, increased “overnight repos”, and made additional “swaps 
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agreements with other central banks” (IMF 2001; Keleher 2002). Lenain, Bonturi and Koen 
(2002b) suggest that the efficiency and quick response of the U.S authorities made the 
financial crisis “largely transitory”. Johnston and Nedelescu (2006) believe that the presence 
throughout the financial sector of operational risk management plans also help contain the 
crises. Businesses had at least operational risk management plans ready for century date-
change (Y2K) and used these contingency plans during the crisis. In the emergency, the 
government also initiated some long-term changes in the financial system. The most 
significant change was the introduction of new legislation on counter-terrorism financing. 
This topic goes beyond the scope of this literature review but see for example Jayasuriya 
(2002), Allen (2003) and Koker (2006). 
 The attack had direct and practical consequences for markets. On September 11, 2001 
the U.S equity markets and most future markets did not open (CFTC 2002). The trading of 
U.S firms listed on overseas markets was suspended. The equity markets reopened one week 
after the attack on September 17. The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) futures 
market reactivated its electronic platform on Friday 14th September. Its floor trading was 
restored on September 17. The New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) also resumed outcry 
trading that day. The futures and options markets operating in the Chicago exchanges were 
not physically damaged and trading was only suspended on September 13, although none of 
the equity-based contract was traded until September 17. Bond trading was suspended on 
September 12, and resumed on September 13. When the markets reopened on September 17, 
the U.S equity market reaction to the attack was immediate. In one week, the NYSE, the 
AMEX and NASDAQ indices had dropped by 11.24 percent, 8.01 percent and 16.05  percent, 
respectively (Navarro and Spencer 2001). Together these price falls represent a total loss in 
market capitalisation of $1.7 trillion. The NYSE price fall on its own was $1.3 trillion of 
market capitalisation.  
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2.3.1.2 The Price Effect of September 11  
Observation of the raw data suggests September 11 did have price effect as it lowered 
most market indices though Chen and Siems (2004) make a more formal assessment of the 
price effect of September 11. They provide an extensive study on the impact of September 11 
on international equity stock markets. They use a traditional event study approach to detect 
abnormal price movements on 33 equity markets following the attack. They estimate 
abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) using Brown and Warner’s 
(1985) adjusted return method. The assessment of the U.S markets indices reveals that, on 
September 17, the Dow Jones and the NASDAQ recorded -7.14 percent and -6.56 percent 
AR, respectively. Although less severe, the S&P 500 and the NYSE also experienced 
abnormal losses with AR of -4.84 percent and -4.55 percent respectively. According to the 
CAR estimates, the indices fell further during the week. The markets did stabilise after two 
weeks.  
Chen and Siems (2004) compare the market reaction to September 11 to the market 
response to thirteen other historical events, representing either terrorist or military attacks. 
The comparison shows that on the first day of trading, September 11 generated negative AR 
larger than those of any other events did. However, the negative returns were short lived.  The 
CAR analysis shows that over 11 days abnormal returns were not statistically different from 
zero. In contrast, while past military attacks generated smaller AR than those of September 
11, after military strikes, CAR remained statistically significant over at least 11 days. In some 
cases, CAR even increased over time. Moreover, following military strikes the recovery 
period was longer, ranging from two and half years (1940 invasion of France) to seven 
months (1990 invasion of Kuwait). After September 11, the U.S markets took only 40 days to 
return to their pre-attack level. Chen and Siems suggest these results could be a sign of the 
market becoming more resilient to terrorist and military strikes. The relative short-term 
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impact of September 11 could also be explained by the facts that terrorism is only low 
intensity conflict, and not an open war.  
The Chen and Siems (2004) results for non U.S equity markets suggest that most 
international markets had a significant negative price response to September 11. Initially, 
these markets experience large statistically significant AR and CAR. AR range from -12.42 
percent (South Korea) to -0.43 percent (Austria). The six day CAR range from -13.51 percent 
(Italy) to +7.49 percent (Helsinki). After 11 days, the markets started to recover their losses. 
The results suggest that over all small markets experienced larger abnormal losses than large 
markets. Moreover, markets seemed to register smaller and shorter-lived CAR if they had 
resilient banking and financial sectors that which experienced only small equity losses. The 
U.S results confirm these observations. While at the centre of the attack, the U.S market 
recorded some of the smallest cumulative losses. It also recovered faster than did any other 
large international markets. Chen and Siems conclude that a strong financial and banking 
sector could help stabilise the market in times of crises. Chen and Siems present a 
comprehensive study on the price effect of September 11 on international equity markets; 
however, their results may lack robustness. They only use parametric tests to evaluate the 
statistical significance of the abnormal returns. Daily stocks returns are known to have non-
normal distribution and so the use of non-parametric tests could help to confirm these results.  
The negative impact of September 11 on international markets is confirmed by 
Charles and Darné (2006). Charles and Darné (2006) perform a study on the impact of the 
September 11 attack on international stock markets using a alternative approach. They analyse 
daily returns of 10 indices representing major international markets, including three U.S 
indices, five European indices, a Pan European index and a Japanese index. They take an 
unconventional approach by estimating abnormal price changes using an outlier detection 
method based on an ARIMA model. This model enables them to identify whether the changes 
in the market are endogenous, exogenous, permanent, or temporary. Results show that 
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September 11 produced outliers in all indices (with the exception of the NASDAQ). The 
shock was negative and permanent for all indices except the NASDAQ index and the Pan 
European index. Like Chen and Siems (2004), Charles and Darné also observe that the U.S 
markets were less affected by the attack than other international markets. Finally, Charles and 
Darné detect other outliers in their sample; corresponding to political or economic news 
announcements. They argue that correcting for outliers would greatly improve financial 
modelling. 
Chen and Siems (2004) observe that the U.S market recovered faster than other 
international markets because of the strength of its financial system. Other market-specific 
events may have contributed to the U.S recovery. For instance, the September 11-17 trading 
halt on the U.S equity market could have accelerated the recovery process. Hauser, Kedar-
Levy, Pilo, Shurki, (2006) estimate that after a trading halt price adjustment to new 
information is 40 percent faster than during normal trading. A U.S companies’ announcement 
of share repurchase, made in the weeks that followed the attack could be another reason for 
the U.S market’s fast rebound. After the attack, the authorities relaxed restrictions on share 
buybacks and encouraged companies to repurchase stock to support share prices (Gu and 
Schinski 2003). More than 300 companies announced buybacks in the two weeks that 
followed the event (Gu and Schinski 2003). Gu and Schinski (2003) investigate the impact of 
these repurchase announcement on stock prices. In theory, while supporting the share price, 
the repurchase of stocks can also weaken a firm by reducing its cash and equity. The 
empirical studies suggest however that the buybacks had a positive impact on share prices. In 
a situation comparable to the September 11 attack, during the 1987 stock crash for example, 
positive AR were observed following the buyback announcement. Gu and Schinski’s results 
suggest that during the September 11 crisis, repurchase announcements did have a positive 
impact on share prices. The results are however weak, since Gu and Schinski do not estimate 
abnormal returns but market-adjusted average returns. 
  30 
Ignoring September 11 and the U.S market, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) also show 
that terrorism has an adverse effect on equity markets. They study the case of the Basque 
region in Spain and find evidence that terrorism related news has a significant impact on 
equity prices. They examine the stock returns of Basque firms around the 1998 ETA cease-
fire. For their analysis, Abadie and Gardeazabal generated Basque portfolios made up of firms 
with significant business in the region and a control portfolio made up of Spanish firms with 
no activities in the Basque region. They used three event study methods (the market model, 
the mean return model, and the Fama and French three factor model) to estimate Basque 
firms’ AR following new announcements related to peace talks during the cease-fire. The 
results shows that following the release of good news the Basque portfolio outperformed the 
non-Basque portfolio and following the release of bad news the Basque portfolio 
underperformed the non-Basque portfolio. Post-September 11, Mooney, Zuber, Gandar and 
Lamb (2006) conducted a study on the market response to changes in the U.S Department of 
Homeland Security threat level. This investigation revealed that the market did not respond to 
the changes. It is possible that the market did not consider the information provided by the 
Department as reflecting the actual level of terrorist threat. 
 
2.3.1.3 The Insurance, the Airline and the Defence Industry 
Specific sectors responded differently to the September 11 attack. Brown et al. (2004), 
Drakos (2004), Carter and Simkins (2004) investigate the equity reaction of firms from two 
industries which have been direct victims of the attack: the insurance and the transportation 
industries. Capelle-Blancard and Couderc (2007) and Berrebi and Klor (2006) also look at 
potentially positive impacts of terrorism on the defence sector. 
For the insurance sector, September 11 generated losses estimated at around $35 
billion. At the time the attack, it represented the most expensive event in the history of the 
sector (Michel-Kerjan and Pedell 2006). The losses were shared between U.S and overseas 
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insurance and reinsurance firms. Two third of the losses were incurred by European 
companies  (Michel-Kerjan and Pedell 2006). September 11 and terrorism risk triggered a 
major crisis in the U.S Insurance Industry. In the days that followed the attack, insurance 
companies declared that they were excluding terrorism coverage from their policies (Gron and 
Sykes 2002). This decision had consequences for the entire business community. Most 
commercial loans require that businesses and properties are fully insured, and the exclusion of 
the terrorist coverage leads to breaches in loans covenants. Reacting to the crisis, the U.S 
Government stepped in and provided temporary terrorist coverage. In November 2002, the 
U.S Congress passed the Terrorist Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) (Brown et al. 2004). Still in 
force, this legislation is a double-edged sword. On one hand, TRIA provides support for 
insurance firms by stating that the Government will share in insurance losses in the instance 
of a new terrorist attack. On the other hand, the TRIA requires that insurers offer terrorism 
coverage. It also states that if a new terrorist attack happens, a special charge will be added to 
insurance premiums to fund Government’s past and future interventions. Gron and Sykes 
(2002) claim that although U.S Government’s intervention in the insurance market was 
necessary at the time of the attack, it should remain a short-term measure. They argue 
government intervention disrupts the market by preventing the private sector from adjusting 
to the “terrorist risk”. This claim is supported by the findings of Brown, Cummins, Lewis and 
Wei (2004). 
  Brown et al. (2004) investigate how U.S insurance stock prices responded to the 
introduction of the TRIA. They use a multivariate regression model (MVRM) to estimate 
CAR for insurance and reinsurance firms. CAR are also calculated for firms in those 
industries highly dependant on insurance or highly exposed to terrorism: the construction, the 
utility and the transportation industries. CAR are estimated around the days of the signing up 
of TRIA and around 12 events leading up to the acceptance of the Act. The CAR  indicate that 
stock prices of firms in the insurance, reinsurance, transportation and banking industries fell 
  32 
as the TRIA was passed through Congress and  signed by the President. Only the utility 
industry responded favourably to the Act with utility stock prices displaying positive CAR in 
the days prior to the passing of the Act.  Brown et al. give three possible reasons as to why the 
TRIA had a negative impact on firms’ equity value. Firstly, TRIA requirements could be 
excessive for insurance firms. Secondly, TRIA could have reduced market expectations by 
defining the limits of government support. Thirdly, TRIA could have generated inefficiency 
in the insurance market by preventing the market from freely adjusting to terrorist risks. Chari 
(2004) comments on the Brown et al. (2004) paper. Chari believes that on a theoretical level, 
the analysis by Brown et al. is sound. Chari argues however that Brown et al. fail to 
acknowledge the possible welfare consequences of the policy. Doherty, Lamm-Tennant & 
Starks (2003) also studied U.S insurance stock prices in the context of September 11. They 
report that insurance firms recorded negative AR after the attack. As this paper highlights the 
similarities that exist between equity price responses to September 11 and natural disasters, it 
is reviewed in section 2.3.2.1, Natural Disasters.  
Like the Insurance industry, the Transportation industry experienced exceptional losses 
and required government intervention following the September 11 attack. The direct loses 
from the attack are estimated to be around $1.32 billion8 (Carter and Simkins 2004). Drakos 
(2004) uses the market model to study the change in risk in airline stocks following the 
September 11 attack. Drakos tests a sample of 13 international airlines, with a pre-event 
period starting six months before September 11 and post-event period finishing six months 
after the attack. Results from a chow break point test suggest that September 11 dramatically 
increased the systematic risk (beta) of airline stocks. In the six months before September 11 
airline stocks were defensive stocks. In the six months following the attack they had become 
aggressive stocks. Tests of equality of volatility reveal a significant increase in price 
volatility. Finally, the decomposition of stock total risk suggests an increase in the proportion 
                                                 
8
 This represents the losses cause by four days halt in operation following the September 11 attack. 
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of systematic risk in contrast to idiosyncratic risk. This surge in systematic risk represents a 
non-diversifiable risk for which investors will require compensation.  
Carter and Simkins (2004) also look for possible abnormal price movements in the 
equity of U.S and international airline and airfreight carriers following the attack. They also 
evaluate the market response to the release of the Air Transportation Safety and System 
Stabilisation Act (TSSSA). The Act was passed a few days after the attack. Carter and 
Simkins estimate AR and CAR with MVRM regressions. In addition, they conduct cross 
sectional analysis to assess the significance of firm specific characteristics. The results show 
that: major airlines; non-major airlines; international airlines and the airfreight firms recorded 
statistically significant negative AR on September 17. The AR are however smaller for the 
international airlines and the airfreight firms. On the days the TSSSA was being passed, the 
major airlines did not display negative AR but other airlines did. Results from the cross-
section on firms 6-day CAR (from September 18-24) indicate that, overall, the Act did 
mitigate the equity losses. The analysis also suggests that relative to the rest of the sample, 
airfreight and non-U.S airline firms experienced smaller losses. Finally, it also shows that 
firms with strong cash reserves were more resilient to the attack. Overall, the negative price 
effect appears most significant for U.S airlines. Carter and Simkins interpret these results as 
signs of market efficiency where firm equity performance reflects its exposure to the event.  
In contrast with the Insurance and the Airline industries, the Defence sector reacts 
positively to terrorism. Capelle-Blancard and Couderc (2007) performed an event study, using 
a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, on the equity 
54 international defence firms. On the first day of trading following the attack, Capelle-
Blancard and Couderc detected abnormal price performance for most of the firms in their 
sample. However, these results are mixed, as half of the firms display negative AR and the 
other half record positive AR. The mean for negative AR is -9 percent and the mean of 
positive AR is 14 percent. Capelle-Blancard and Couderc find that firms with a majority of 
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revenue from defence did experience superior returns compared to other firms. Moreover, a 
sub -sample analysis by country reveals that the September 11 attack had a clear positive 
effect on U.S and Canadian defence firms. The U.S and Canadian firms recorded a positive 
mean AR of 6 percent in the aftermath of the event.  
Berrebi and Klor (2006) present a study on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which also 
suggests that defence firms react positively to terrorism. For their analysis, Berrebi and Klor 
select Israeli firms traded on the U.S equity market, and U.S firms traded on the same market 
and from the same industry. Using a Fama and French three factor model, AR are estimated 
for each firm on days corresponding to a terrorist event in Israel from 1994 to 1997. The AR 
of U.S firms is then discounted from the AR of its corresponding Israeli firms. This operation 
aims at isolating the price effect of terrorism. Berrebi and Klor perform a cross sectional 
regression on the adjusted AR and find that Israeli defence firms display positive AR on the 
day of a terrorist event, while the rest of the market records statistically significant 
negative AR.  
 
2.3.1.4 September 11 Financial Risk, Volatility and Contagion 
 Maillet and Michel (2005) find that September 11 triggered the worst U.S financial 
crisis since the 1987 market crash. The shock ranks as number nine in the history of U.S 
financial crises9. The crisis lasted a month. For the French market, September 11 generated a 
crisis that lasted 14 days and which reached its peak on September 12 when the U.S market 
was closed. Maillet and Michel (2005) obtain these estimates using an index of market shocks 
(IMS) estimated with daily and intraday equity indices price volatility data. The IMS 
calculation is based on the Richter scale used in geophysics. The IMS measures the magnitude 
of financial crises in the same way that the Richter scale evaluates earthquakes. While the 
                                                 
9
 The 1987 and the 1924 financial crashes represent the largest crises experienced by the U.S market. 
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Richter scale is a function of the energy dispatched by an earthquake, the IMS uses price 
volatility.  
Fernandez (2006) assesses whether the September 11 attack generated permanent or 
temporary volatility shifts in the world equity indices and in seven regional equity indices. 
She uses iterative sum of squares (ICSS) and Wavelet based variance analysis. The analysis 
results suggest several break points and an increase in volatility during 2001-2002. This 
volatility shift appears especially significant for the World, the G7 and the North American 
indices and could be attributed to September 11. Fernandez repeats her analysis using data 
filtered with a GARCH (1,1) model to remove possible heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. This second analysis provides mixed results. The Wavelet based variance analysis 
confirms some volatility shifts but the ICSS cannot detect any significant change in volatility. 
Fernandez (2006) concludes that volatility did increase during the period of 1997-2002. The 
Fernandez (2006) paper also demonstrates the sensitivity of event study results to the method 
used. It shows how various methods, using the same dataset and evaluating the same effect 
can generate contradicting results.  
Further evidence of an increase in equity risk following September 11 is provided by 
Wrolstad and Krueger (2003). Wrolstad and Krueger (2003) study the alteration in the risk 
return relationship following the September 11 attack. The researchers use the Security 
Market Line (SML) and the Capital Asset Pricing Model to analyse the behaviour of 33 
exchange-traded funds. Wrolstad and Krueger (2003) find negative SML slopes six months 
before the attack and positive SML slope six months after the attack. In the CAPM, they 
observe that before and after the attack high-beta firm returns were lower than returns from 
low beta firms. From these results, Wrolstad and Krueger (2003) conclude that September 11 
increased investors’ risk aversion but also reversed the trend of the risk return relationship. 
Finally, the authors mention the similarities of financial markets’ price performance during 
historical crisis. In many cases, they observe financial markets bouncing back after a stage of 
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panic. This observation is in line with other studies on the September 11 attack (see for 
instance Chen and Siems (2004), Maillet and Michel (2005) or Doherty, Lamm-Tennant and 
Starks (2003)). 
As September 11 had a significant impact on return and volatility on most international 
markets, the event has been suspected of generating a contagion effect. Studies from 
Mun (2005) and from Hon, Strauss and Soo-Keong (2004) confirm these suspicions. Hon, 
Strauss and Soo-Keong (2004) conduct an extensive analysis looking at the change in 
correlation between equity price of 25 international stock markets following September 11. 
Using a GARCH framework, Hon, Strauss and Soo-Keong find signs of contagion through a 
substantial increase in international market co-movements (plus 40 percent), post-September 
11. The increase in market correlation is especially significant between the U.S and European 
markets. Theses results are partially supported by Mun’s (2005). Mun (2005) investigates 
return and volatility correlations between the U.S, U.K, German and Japanese markets. Using 
a GARCH model and VAR analysis, Mun (2005) finds that only return correlations increased 
between the Japanese market and U.S markets, following September 11. Unlike Hon, Strauss 
and Soo-Keong (2004), Mun does not find other increases in correlation within his sample. 
Mun (2005) provides alternative evidence of international contagion with a volatility analysis. 
In the aftermath of the attack, volatility correlation increased significantly from the U.S 
market to the U.K and the German markets. Both Hon, Strauss and Soo-Keong (2004) and 
Mun (2005) suggest that September 11 had persistent effects and the changes it  triggered may 
be permanent. Either permanent or temporary, increased international integration can have a 
negative effect by reducing investors’ opportunities to lower financial risk through 
international diversification. 
Finally, in addition to the equity markets, the foreign exchange (FX) market also 
appears to have reacted to the September 11 attack. Mende (2006) observes abnormal  trading 
activities on the USD/EUR market on the day of the September 11 attack. On that day, the 
  37 
USD/EUR volatility and bid-ask spread increased dramatically. The crisis was short lived, 
however, as the trading variables were back to normal levels by the end of the day. Mende 
also studies the relationship between traded volume and price volatility on September 11 and 
the subsequent days. He finds a positive correlation between volume and volatility. On 
September 11, the volume volatility relationship intensified through the day. In addition to 
these findings, the Mende (2006) paper is also interesting because of its data set. While most 
studies use daily data, Mende uses intra day data. These high frequency data enable the 
detection of minor yet significant change in market behaviour. Such analyses could capture 
the impact of a relatively small catastrophic event.  An investigation could better isolate the 
price or volume effect of catastrophic events by targeting the time of day when the 
announcements regarding the event were made. 
 
2.3.2 Catastrophic Events and Financial Markets 
Terrorism and catastrophic events such as hurricanes, tsunamis and aviation crashes 
exhibit common characteristics. For financial markets, the events are exogenous shocks. 
These events are not finance or economic events per se; nonetheless, they have the ability to 
alter market activities significantly. They follow a random pattern and can create many 
casualties (Woo 2002). They are relatively rare and they have a low probability of occurring. 
There are however major uncertainty regarding when these events will occur and what their 
consequences will be (Kunreuther 2001). Empirical studies have identified a common pattern 
in stock market responses to extreme events. 
 
2.3.2.1 Natural Disasters 
Natural disasters, especially, are part of these catastrophic events that include large-
scale terrorism (Woo 2002). Doherty, Lamm-Tennant and Starks (2003) find striking 
similarities between the two types of events in their analysis of the United States insurance 
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stocks during September 11. They observe comparable share prices and volatility movements 
during the September 11 attack, during Hurricane Andrew and during the Northridge 
earthquake. They identify a specific pattern, which consists of a sudden drop in price followed 
by a recovery a few months later. They also find three firm-specific factors that affect price 
recovery in the short-term: the signalling policy, the actual losses and the growth rate. In 
linear regression models used for testing previous catastrophic events, firm public 
announcements and growth variables both exhibit positive coefficients. This result means that 
these factors have a positive influence on price. In contrast, the coefficient for losses is 
negative and significant, denoting the negative impact of losses on price of shares. Observing 
similar results during Hurricane Andrew, the Northridge earthquake and September 11, the 
study concludes on the predictability of price movements. Doherty et al.’s (2003) findings are 
corroborated by Cummins and Lewis’s (2003). Cummins and Lewis observe the same 
predictability in stock prices during the September 11 attack. In addition, their quantitative 
study identifies capitalisation as an additional key factor. Indeed, firms with strong financial 
ratings recovered more rapidly than did weak firms. These studies provide answers for the 
insurance sector but, so far, no study has formally identified such patterns in other industries, 
although, studies on the overall market reaction to September 11 suggest that the markets do 
recover over time (Chen and Siems 2004) . 
Liu, Longstaff and Pan (2002) study the theoretical impact of events risk, such as 
terrorist attacks, on investment strategies. Catastrophic events generate “price and volatility 
jumps”. These “jumps” induce changes in optimum portfolio weights. As a method, 
Liu et al. (2002) build a mathematical model for optimal portfolio weights, which 
incorporates event risk. With this model, they demonstrate that investors tend to hold less 
risky assets following a price jump that is induced by event risk. In contrast, investors do not 
necessarily adjust for risky assets when the events create a volatility jump. In fact in that case, 
“they may choose to hold more of the risky asset” (Liu, Longstaff, and Pan, 2002, p2). In an 
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intuitive interpretation of their model, the authors suggest that event risk triggers liquidity 
risk. While Liu, Longstaff & Pan’s model is attractive, it has not been yet tested on real- 
world data. Liquidity risk also appears to be enhanced during wartime. Collier and Gunning 
(1995, p235) explain this in term of the “incentive to avoid irreversible investment” in times 
of high uncertainty. To a some extent, catastrophes, terrorist events and possibly wars, 
produce similar portfolio behaviour. 
 
2.3.2.2 Man Made Catastrophes  
Studies on aerospace crashes provide an additional insight into market behaviour during 
catastrophic events. Two main articles that analyse the space shuttle Challenger crash of 
January 1986 and suggest the market is efficient in the aftermath of this catastrophic event. 
Blose, Bornkamp, Brier, Brown, & Frederick (1996) examine price and contagion effects of 
the Challenger crash on selected firms trading with NASA. They test whether the market 
accurately valued the effect of the crash on NASA contractors. They introduce a variable 
measuring firm percentage of sales to NASA. They find a negative AR for firms with a high 
degree of involvement with NASA. This finding can be interpreted as evidence of contagion 
effects within the group of contractors though they find that the contagion was limited over 
time. The market reacted to the release of the results of the official investigation identifying 
the producer of the piece that caused the crash. As the information became official, the market 
isolated the guilty contractor and the equity price of other contractors bounced back to their 
original level. The authors conclude that the market was able to distinguish between the 
NASA contractors and their industry counterparts.  
Maloney and Mulherin (2003) further examined the Challenger crash. They assess 
market efficiency by analysing the intraday volume and the stock price of NASA 
manufacturers. They find that the market identified the “guilty” manufacturer on the day of 
the crash. Moreover, the market accurately priced the cost of the crash for the manufacturer. 
  40 
The new valuation of the firm on the market matched the manufacturer’s losses. The speed 
and accuracy of the market is unexplained given that the results of the investigation on the 
cause of the crash were only released several months later. The authors suggest that perhaps 
private information identifying the guilty manufacturer were disseminated before the public 
announcement. Given these results on the Challenger crash, it would be of interest to 
investigate whether the market also prices - as accurately and rapidly - firm losses generated 
by terrorist attacks. 
 
2.3.2.3 Catastrophe Derivatives 
Some academics suggest the use of stock market derivatives to lower the risk premium 
generated by terrorism and by other catastrophes. Catastrophe bonds already exist but the use 
of these securities is marginal. Vaugirard (2002), Froot and Posner (2001), Gron and Sykes 
(2002) argue that businesses and investors exposed to dramatic events should use bonds or 
financial derivatives such as futures, so that the risk would be transferred to less risk-adverse 
agents. The currently traded catastrophe bonds enable investors to hedge against losses 
generated by turbulence in the financial markets. Campbell and Diebold (2002) say that a 
terrorist derivative could be a more efficient solution than insurance.  
In July 2003, the Policy Analysis Market (PAM) proposed the draft of a “terrorist 
future contract.” The PAM was not exactly a terrorist future contract but it was perceived as 
such. In fact, PAM was to be a futures contract based on the forecast of Middle East 
geopolitical stability, looking at political stability, military activities and economic growth. 
The PAM project was rapidly withdrawn after politicians claimed that using it would be 
“betting on terrorism”. Hanson (2006) provides a discussion on the PAM and the possible use 
of derivatives for terrorism. He explains that critics saw three main problems with the PAM. 
The first issue with the contract was how to encourage insiders with information to participate 
in the PAM. The second problem was the fear that the contract would encourage terrorist 
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activities. The third problem was the possible spread of misinformation through manipulative 
trades. Despite the failure of the PAM, Hanson (2006) argues that derivatives remain a viable 
solution. Hanson (2006) also discuss potential design issues in creating a terrorism based 
derivatives. These issues include, among others, potential market manipulation, decision 
selection bias and the moral hazard problem.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This research in the economics and finance literature provides evidence of the 
significant impact of terrorism on the economy and on financial markets. An attack such as 
September 11 generated on-the-ground costs comparable to those of major natural 
catastrophes. The mid and long-term implications can also be significant, with a disruption of 
trade and investments. For financial markets, the literature has investigated the aggregate 
market reaction to the event. It has shown that the attack caused negative abnormal returns 
and a surge in market volatility. Evidence was also found of significant price falls in the 
equity of firms in industries sensitive to terrorism. Finally, the literature suggests some 
similarities between the behaviour of the market following catastrophic events and terrorist 
attacks.  
The literature on terrorism is still limited and many aspects of the subject are still open 
to exploration. Events other than September 11 and countries other than the U.S could be 
investigated. Most financial studies investigate the market on an aggregate level. Yet, 
analyses of the cost of terrorism on a firm level and on sector levels are scarce. On a firm 
level, market efficiency could be evaluated as in the case of the Challenger crash, by assessing 
the shares of firms involved in the catastrophe. On a sector level, it would be of interest to 
estimate the change in equity in the various sectors to see if these changes illustrate the 
substitution effect suggested by Enders and Sandler (2006). This review of the literature also 
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shows a great disparity in the econometric methods used to estimate equity price responses to 
terrorism. Different estimation techniques generate diverse results, which are then difficult to 
compare. Moreover, many studies do not use robust estimation methods and consequently 
their results maybe questioned. The remainder of this thesis investigates these issues. This 
thesis also assesses the possible industry specific effects of terrorism and the efficiency of 
equity markets following the September 11 attack.   
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CHAPTER 3. TERRORISM AND MARKET EFFICIENCY: 
9/11 AND LISTED FIRMS TENANTS OF THE NEW YORK 
WORLD TRADE CENTER 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The September 11 terrorist attack generated considerable uncertainty regarding the 
future of the American economy. Like other catastrophic events, the attack also had a direct 
and immediate material impact on specific companies. These companies could be called the 
direct victims of the attack and include, among others, the tenants of the New York World 
Trade Center (WTC).  
This study investigates whether, in the wake of September 11, the stock market 
discriminated against those companies directly affected by the incident. It compares the 
equity returns of tenants of the WTC listed on the New York Stock Exchange to the equity 
returns of a control portfolio composed of firms that were not tenants of the Towers but were 
from the same industry segment. In the process, it assesses whether specific characteristics of 
a firm, such as size, leverage, performance and industry segment, also affected equity returns. 
The results from this study suggest that, overall, WTC tenants were discriminated against by 
investors as they experienced higher abnormal returns than other firms in their industry did. 
Moreover, a detailed analysis by industry reveals that equity returns of firms from terrorist-
sensitive or high profile industries - namely the travel and leisure and the finance industries - 
were more responsive to the events of September 11. The level of abnormal returns is not 
only dependent on the presence of the firms in the WTC. Results from cross-sectional 
regressions with financial and industry dummy variables indicate that firm financial 
  44 
performance, and industry segment play a crucial role in explaining variations in abnormal 
returns across the sample. 
 
 
3.2 Literature 
 
3.2.1 Catastrophic Events and Market Efficiency 
Market efficiency assumes that stock prices adjust to available information (Fama 
1970, 1991). Information represents any news that has an impact on the value of the firm. So 
far, research on catastrophic events has supported the theory of efficient markets in times of 
crisis. In many instances, stock prices adjust to news of a catastrophic event according to the 
degree of involvement of firms with the event.  
In the case of man-made catastrophic events, Hill and Schneeweis (1983) found that 
the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear incident in the United States, had a greater impact on 
nuclear than on non-nuclear public utility equity prices. Kalra, Henderson and Raines (1993) 
conducted a similar analysis around the 1986 Chernobyl (in the then U.S.S.R) nuclear reactor 
incident. During this event, the market did not discriminate between nuclear and non-nuclear 
firms, but it did penalise firms with mixed activities who were in the process of developing 
nuclear activities. The market appeared to make an accurate prediction; soon after the 
Chernobyl incident, the issue of nuclear energy became extremely controversial, generating 
complications for firms developing nuclear plans. In the case of the 1986 Challenger space 
shuttle crash, the market reacted by generating sustained negative abnormal returns for 
aerospace contractors who had significant links with NASA, leaving other contractors with 
only temporary abnormal losses (Blose et al. 1996). Looking within the group of NASA 
contractors, investors appeared to be even more astute as they rapidly identified the 
contractors that manufactured the shuttle component causing the crash (Maloney and 
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Mulherin 2003). In this case, the market appeared extremely efficient at using publicly 
available factual information  and possibly inside information.  
Equity markets have also proven to be efficient in the situation of natural catastrophes. 
Lamb (1998) conducted a study on insurance firms and hurricanes. Using the geography of 
insurance cover, Lamb (1998) found a significant link between the insurance firms degree of 
exposure to Hurricane Andrew and stock price performance of firms. Following the event, 
insurers covering the damaged area exhibited a statistically significant abnormal loss, which 
was not evident for other insurance firms.  
 
3.2.2 September 11, 2001 
The terrorist attack of September 11 in the U.S generated direct and immediate costs 
with the destruction of property and lives. “The 9/11 destruction of physical assets was 
estimated around $14 billion for private businesses” (Lenain, Bonturi and Koen 2002b, 
p 119). The WTC tenants were especially exposed and they endured most of these physical 
damages and losses. Given this high level of exposure, it seems plausible that investors 
singled out these firms for valuation adjustment. In this case, the tenant firms should 
experience above average negative equity abnormal returns.  
September 11 also had a broader economic impact, which extended beyond the tenants 
of the WTC. The event caused dramatic changes in U.S economic prospects, with a rise in 
uncertainty, increase in transaction costs and fall in consumer confidence (IMF 2001). Two 
elements however may have promoted market efficiency. The first was a one-week trading 
halt imposed on U.S stock markets from September 11th to 17th.  Trading halts are designed 
to preserve market efficiency by giving investors more time to evaluate the possible impact of 
major news releases (Hauser et al. 2006). The second element enhancing efficiency during the 
September 11 crisis was the broad distribution of the news regarding the attacks, meaning that 
most investors had access to the information concerning the event.  
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Finally, investor decision to discriminate against the WTC tenants could have 
depended on the use by WTC insurers of the “war” or “terrorism exclusion clauses”. U.S 
president George W. Bush described September 11 as an “acts of war” (Bush 2001). This 
announcement generated uncertainty since insurers or re-insurers could have used the 
statement to bar WTC claims by invoking the “war exclusion clause” (Greene 2001). During 
the week that followed the attack, industry representatives10 suggested that the exclusion 
clause would not be used, but no definitive announcement was made (Brostoff 2001). 
Development on this issue could have an impact on investors’ perception of the value of the 
WTC tenants firms. Insurance contracts represent a basic hedging instrument. If enforced, 
claims should have covered the losses generated by the attack, thus normalising the victims’ 
situation compared to the rest of their industries. However, should the insurance contracts be 
nullified, the tenants would have to bear the full cost of the attack with no compensation and 
investors would have been more likely to discriminate against these firms. 
 
 
3.3 Method 
 
3.3.1 Data 
Co Start Group Inc. has provided the list of WTC tenants forming the basis of this 
research. The WTC had 327 tenants, 50 of which were companies listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange11. These 50 companies have been screened so that the sample used in this 
study only includes firms who have had no significant financial announcements prior to the 
event. This filtering was made using Factiva to verify that dividends, capital issues, 
repurchase of securities, mergers and divestitures  had not been  announced over the 15 days 
                                                 
10
 Announcements made by the American Insurance Association, the National Association of Mutual Insurance 
Companies, the Alliance of American Insurers, the National Association of Independent Insurers. 
11
 Five additional tenants are listed on NASDAQ but they are not included in the research.  
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prior to the event. After this filter was applied, 34 companies remained and they constitute our 
sample of tenant firms. Appendix 3.1 contains a list of tenant firms. 
The WTC firms are placed into portfolios according to their industry segment. This 
breakdown is done to take into account the possible industry-specific effects of September 11. 
It enables comparison of the returns of tenant firms relative to the returns of firms from the 
same segment and, therefore, similar fundamental economic prospects. The WTC tenants 
represent eight industries: finance; industrial; retail; IT; telecom: leisure and travel; media; 
and insurance. Firms from the industrial classification are sub-divided into two portfolios of 
large and small industrial firms. This division was undertaken because of the variation in size 
of industrial firm tenants of the WTC. The IT and telecom industries firms are grouped into 
one portfolio to avoid having a single-firm portfolio12. Ultimately, there are eight tenant 
portfolios.  
A control portfolio is also created for each tenant portfolio. Each control portfolio 
contains a sample of 20 firms from the same industry as those in the tenant portfolio. None of 
the control firms is resident in the WTC. The firms in the control portfolio are selected from 
the constituent list of the appropriate DataStream sector indices. If the indices contained more 
than 20 firms, the portfolio was trimmed down by selecting only those firms whose size was 
closest to the mean size of the corresponding tenant portfolio. Appendix 3.1 contains a list of 
control firms. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Only one tenant belongs to the Technology industry. 
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3.3.2 Abnormal Returns 
Firm and portfolio performance is measured through the calculation of equity 
abnormal returns, using mean adjusted returns as discussed by Brown and Warner (1985). 
Chen and Siems (2004) used this technique in their study on the effects of September 11 on 
international capital markets. A parametric t-test (Brown and Warner 1980; 1985) and non-
parametric ranking test (Corrado and Zivney 1992) are used to assess the statistical 
significance of the abnormal returns. The non-parametric test requires few assumptions 
regarding the sample distribution, and provides results that are more robust than the results of 
the parametric t-test. The non-parametric results help to evaluate parametric test results. 
Referring to Campbell and Wasley (1993), Hamill, Opong and McGregor (2002) recommend 
the use of both parametric and non-parametric tests. The non-parametric test used in this study 
is the Corrado and Zivney (1992) ranking test originally developed by Charles Corrado 
(1989). Compared to the original method from 1989, the 1992 technique presents the 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for Abnormal Returns 
This table present the size and the descriptive statistics of 1-day abnormal returns of tenant and control 
portfolios. The size indicates the number of firms per portfolio. The descriptive statistics include the mean, 
standard deviation, maximum, minimum, skewness, kurtosis and results from Jarque-Bera test of 1-day 
abnormal returns estimated from October 28, 1999 through September 28, 2001.  
Panel A: WTC Tenant Portfolios 
Descriptive Statistics Portfolio # of Firms Mean Std. Dev Max Min Skew Kurt J-Bera 
Finance 12 -0.0010 0.0181 0.0670 -0.0747 0.13 4.82 35.80 
Industrial large 4 -0.0001 0.0209 0.0771 -0.0840 -0.01 4.84 35.94 
Industrial small 2 -0.0021 0.0224 0.0727 -0.0813 0.07 4.70 31.05 
Retail 3 -0.0014 0.0276 0.1059 -0.1261 -0.57 6.61 152.01 
IT Telecom 4 -0.0004 0.0232 0.0638 -0.0665 0.02 3.21 0.47 
Leisure 2 -0.0031 0.0397 0.1218 -0.4719 -6.47 78.71 62681.04 
Media 2 -0.0012 0.0346 0.1530 -0.1391 0.05 6.14 105.04 
Insurance 8 -0.0014 0.0276 0.1059 -0.1261 -0.57 6.61 152.01 
Panel B: Control Portfolios 
Descriptive Statistics Portfolio # of Firms Mean Std. Dev Max Min Skew Kurt J-Bera 
Finance 20 -0.0013 0.0176 0.0572 -0.0515 0.36 4.02 16.67 
Industrial large 20 -0.0007 0.0140 0.0475 -0.0746 -0.46 6.65 150.45 
Industrial small 20 -0.0004 0.0159 0.0560 -0.1134 -1.23 12.78 1079.64 
Retail 20 0.0001 0.0193 0.0809 -0.1125 -0.33 7.97 266.78 
IT Telecom 20 -0.0004 0.0209 0.0776 -0.0606 0.46 4.00 19.70 
Leisure 20 -0.0012 0.0212 0.0543 -0.2424 -5.77 67.83 46075.95 
Media 20 -0.0008 0.0152 0.0616 -0.0714 -0.15 5.81 84.77 
Insurance 20 0.0001 0.0193 0.0809 -0.1125 -0.33 7.97 266.78 
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advantage of adjusting for missing returns. In a comparative analysis, Hamill, Opong, 
McGregor (2002) found the Corrado and Zivney (1992) ranking test performed better than 
most of the popular parametric and non-parametric tests and they recommended its use in 
combination with a mean adjusted return model. The test has been commonly used in event 
studies: examples can be found in Pacini and Marlett (2001); Hillison and Pacini (2004); 
Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006), among others. The remainder of this section details the two 
techniques mentioned above.  
 
3.3.2.1 Mean Adjusted Returns 
The Brown and Warner (1985) mean adjusted return is used in  the calculation of  the 
portfolio abnormal return on event day t. The abnormal return is the deviation of firm equity 
return on day t from an expected return generated by a mean of returns calculated on a pre-
event period (3.1). The mean is estimated over a 239 days estimation period starting 244 days 
prior to the event day t and closing 6 days before the event.  
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
Where, 
tiA ,   = Mean adjusted abnormal return for firm i on day t. 
tiR ,   = Return for firm i on day t. 
tiR ,  = Mean return for firm i on from day -244 till day -6. 
 
The calculation of cumulative abnormal return was performed as:    
    ∑
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 tiCAR ,  = Cumulative abnormal returns for firm i from day t till day t+5. 
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3.3.2.2 Standardised Excess Returns t-test 
 The standardised excess return t–test (Brown and Warner 1985) is used to the level of 
statistical significance of portfolio abnormal returns on event day 0. The test used the mean 
adjusted returns of portfolio firm constituent tiA , . Event day 0 is defined as the first day of 
trading following the announcement of the September 11 terrorist attack.  
 For the t-test, the portfolio constituent firms abnormal returns for day 0 are pooled into 
the t-test to obtain level of statistical significance of the portfolio abnormal return for day 0 
(3.4): 
           (3.4) 
Where, 
 0,pt  = Brown and Warner t-value indicating the level of statistical significance of 
the portfolio p abnormal return estimated for day 0.  
0,iA   = Estimated mean adjusted abnormal return for firm i for day 0. 
N  = Number of firms in the portfolio. 
 
In the calculation, each firm’s abnormal return estimated for event day 0 is 
standardised ( ) 0,0, / ii ASA . ( ) 0,iAS  is the standard deviation; it uses firm i mean adjusted 
abnormal returns estimated over 238 days prior to the event day (3.5): 
           (3.5) 
Where, 
( ) 0,iAS   = Standard of deviation of firm i mean adjusted abnormal return for day 0. 
tiA ,   = Estimated mean adjusted abnormal return for firm i for day t. 
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3.3.2.3 Rank Test 
 The Corrado and Zivney (1992) non-parametric tests is used in association with the 
standardised excess return t–test (Brown and Warner 1985). To assess the level of statistical 
significance of abnormal returns of the portfolio on day 0, the ranking test compares portfolio 
constituent firms day 0 abnormal returns to a corresponding samples of 249 abnormal returns.  
For each firm constituent of the portfolio, a sample of 249 mean adjusted abnormal 
returns is estimated. The sample includes abnormal returns calculated starting 244 days prior 
to event day 0 and closing 5 days after the event. Firm abnormal return from day 0 is also 
included in the sample. For each firm, the estimated abnormal returns are then compare and 
assign a rank. The ranking follows an ascending order, so that, the largest negative abnormal 
return takes a ranking value of 1 and the largest positive abnormal returns takes a ranking 
value of 250 (3.6):       
       (3.6) 
Where 
 tiK ,  = Rank value of tiA ,  estimated mean adjusted abnormal return for firm i for 
day t. 
 
The ranking value is adjusted for thin trading and firm missing returns (3.7). The adjustment 
is made by dividing the ranking value by one plus the firm number of daily returns available 
for the estimation of the abnormal returns corresponding to the ranking value. 
 
                   (3.7) 
Where, 
tiU ,  = Thin trading adjusted ranking values of firm i ranking value corresponding 
to the mean adjusted abnormal return estimated for day t. 
( )tititi mKU ,,, 1 +=
( ) 5 -244,...,       ,rank
,,
+== tAK titi
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tim ,  = Number of non-missing returns used for the calculation of firm i mean 
adjusted abnormal return for day t. 
 
The thin trading adjusted ranking values of firm from the portfolio are then computed in the 
Corrado t-test formula (3.8). Firms ranking values corresponding to abnormal return 
estimated for event day 0 are subtracted ½. ½ corresponds to the approximate mean value of 
tiU ,  sample.  
   (3.8) 
Where 
 0,pT  = Corrado t-value providing the level of statistical significance of the portfolio 
abnormal return estimated for day 0.  
 0,iU  = Thin trading adjusted ranking values of firm i abnormal return estimated for 
day 0. 
N  = The number of firms in the portfolio. 
 
( ) 0,pKS  is the standard of deviation calculated using the 250 ranking values of all the firms 
constituent of the portfolio: 
( ) ( )( )  2112501 5244 1 , 20,    UMKS t Mi titp t∑ ∑+−= = −=   (3.9) 
Where 
( ) 0,pKS  = Standard of deviation of portfolio p for day 0. 
 tM  = The number of non-missing returns in the cross-section of N firms on day t. 
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3.3.3 Cross Sectional Regressions 
This cross sectional analysis was inspired by Bradford and Robinson’s paper (1997) and 
evaluates the relationship between abnormal returns and the firms’ specific characteristics. It 
contains ordinary least square regressions of firm abnormal returns on financial and industry 
variables. A variable accounting for tenancy in the WTC is also included. The abnormal 
returns are the estimates of mean adjusted abnormal return for September 11 of firm 
constituent of the tenant and the control portfolios. The financial variables are the natural log 
of firm equity market value (proxy for size), the ratio of net income over total asset (proxy for 
performance) and the ratio of total liabilities over total assets (proxy for leverage). Total 
assets and total liabilities are based on book values. The industry variables are eight dummy 
variables accounting for firm industry segment. The industry dummy are binary variables 
taking a value of one when the firm is part of the industry and zero otherwise. The tenant 
dummy is also a binary variable; it takes a value of one when the firm is a tenant in the WTC 
and zero otherwise. White Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are used in statistical 
tests. 
 Three regressions are estimated, based on two different models and using three 
different samples of firms. The first model includes the dummy tenant and the regression 
based on this model uses the full sample of tenant and control firms. The model is presented 
as follows: 
iiT
j
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1
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(3.10) 
Where, 
0,iAR   = Estimated mean abnormal returns for tenant and control firm i on 
event day 0. 
iTD ,   = Tenant dummy variable accounting for firm i residency in the WTC.  
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ihFinV ,,  = Financial variable h for firm i. There are three financial variables: the log of 
market value, the total income over total assets and the total liabilities over total assets.    
ijIndD ,,  = Industry dummy variable j for firm i. There are eight industry variables: the 
finance, the large industrial, the small industrial, the retail, the media and the insurance 
industry.   
 
The second regression model does not contain a dummy tenant. The samples used for the 
regression based on this second model use restricted samples containing either the tenant 
firms or the control firms. The model is presented as follows: 
i
j
ijIndjilityTotalLiabiieTotalIncomieMarketValui eDVVVAR +++++= ∑
=1
,,4,2,3,21 ββββα   (3.11) 
Where, 
0,iAR   = Estimated mean abnormal returns for tenant or control firm i on event day 0. 
ieMarketValuV ,  = Natural log of market value of firm i. 
ieTotalIncomV ,  = Ratio total income over its total assets of firm i. 
ilityTotalLiabiV , = Ratio total liabilities over its total assets of firm i. 
 
 
3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Abnormal Returns 
Table 3.2 shows the abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
recorded on a tenant portfolio containing all the firms that were WTC tenants, and on a 
control portfolio containing all the firms that were not. The control portfolio is weighted, 
taking into account the number of tenant firms per industry.  
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These results show that both tenant and control portfolios experienced negative AR on 
September 17 (day 0) and over the week that followed (days 0 to 4). On September 17, the 
tenant portfolio exhibited a -8.80 percent AR and the control portfolio exhibited -7.04 
percent. The difference in AR between the two portfolios is -1.76 percent. This AR 
differential is statistically significant and suggests that investors did single out the WTC 
tenants in their analysis of the impact of September 11. The discrimination between the two 
groups appears only temporary as the results on the CAR still show a more negative CAR for 
the tenant portfolio, with a -17.67 percent CAR against -15.74 percent CAR for the control 
portfolio, but the difference between the CAR is not statistically significant. Clarification over 
the possible use of a war or a terrorist exclusion clause by insurers could have contributed to 
the lack of significance in the CAR differential.  
Table 3.3 provides a detailed study of the AR and CAR. It shows the AR and CAR 
estimated for tenant and for control firms, grouped into industries. The firms are divided into 
a tenant and a control group, and then distributed into eight industry portfolios. The 
breakdown of firms by industry reveals that AR and CAR are statistically significant for most 
WTC tenants, but the size of the fall in equity returns varies greatly depending on the 
industry. The difference in AR and CAR between tenant and control portfolios is also 
dependant on the industry in which the firm operates. 
 
Table 3.2 Aggregate Abnormal Return for Tenant and Non Tenant Firms 
This table shows 1-day and 5-day abnormal returns estimated for portfolio of WTC tenant and 
portfolio of non-tenant firms around September 17, 2001. 
Portfolio AR CAR 
Tenant -8.80* -17.67* 
 (0.029) (0.016) 
Control -7.04* -15.74* 
 (0.033) (0.026) 
Differential -1.76* -1.93 
  (0.031) (0.021) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.3 Abnormal Return per Industry Segment 
This table contains estimates of 1-day and 5-day abnormal returns of tenant and control portfolios following 
the September 11 attack with portfolios of firm organised according industry. Abnormal return level of 
statistical significance estimated with a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test. 
Industry Portfolio AR CAR 
Finance Tenant -7.47*^ -16.87*^ 
  (0.025) (0.053) 
 Control -5.15*^ -12.69*^ 
  (0.027) (0.055) 
 Differential -2.32* -4.18* 
  (0.008) (0.019) 
Large Industrial Tenant 5.70* -2.16 
  (0.034) (0.077) 
 Control -7.46*^ -16.28*^ 
  (0.027) (0.047) 
 Differential 13.16* 14.13* 
  (0.021) (0.046) 
Small Industrial Tenant -8.13*^ -25.98*^ 
  (0.026) (0.062) 
 Control -11.34*^ -23.59*^ 
  (0.027) (0.054) 
 Differential -2.87 -2.40 
  (0.025) (0.038) 
Retail Tenant -12.61*^ -18.18*^ 
  (0.036) (0.080) 
 Control -11.25*^ -17.60*^ 
  (0.027) (0.077) 
 Differential -1.36 -0.58 
  (0.019) (0.039) 
Telecom, IT Tenant -5.55* -8.97* 
  (0.033) (0.071) 
 Control -3.37* -8.45* 
  (0.027) (0.079) 
 Differential -2.18 -1.06 
  (0.017) (0.032) 
Leisure and Travel Tenant -47.19*^ -70.33*^ 
  (0.031) (0.077) 
 Control -24.24*^ -35.63*^ 
  (0.027) (0.055) 
 Differential -22.94* -34.70* 
  (0.020) (0.053) 
Media Tenant -13.66*^ -16.45*^ 
  (0.037) (0.081) 
 Control -7.14*^ -14.69*^ 
  (0.027) (0.053) 
 Differential -6.52* -1.76 
  (0.025) (0.053) 
Insurance Tenant -5.89*^ -12.03*^ 
  (0.020) (0.046) 
 Control -4.86*^ -13.69*^ 
  (0.027) (0.046) 
 Differential -1.03 1.67 
  (0.007) (0.016) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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During the week of September 17th to September 21st, all portfolios experienced 
negative AR and CAR. The large industrial-firm tenant portfolio was the only exception with 
positive AR and insignificant CAR. On the first day of the week, the AR ranges from -4.86 
percent for the insurance control firms to -47.19 percent for the leisure and travel tenant firms. 
Over the week, the CAR range from -8.45 percent for the IT and telecom control firms to 
-70.33 percent for the leisure and travel tenant firms. The difference between the AR of the 
tenants and the control portfolio is statistically significant for four industries: the finance, the 
industrial (large firms), the leisure and travel, and the media industries. During the week, the 
difference between the portfolios weakened and became statistically significant in only three 
industries.  
The contrast between the AR and CAR of tenants and the control portfolios is most 
obvious in the leisure and travel industry, with differentials of -22.94 percent and -34.70 
percent respectively. These results signify that investors were looking closely at these firms 
and their involvement in the catastrophe. Looking at the portfolios’ AR and CAR, overall the 
industry appears extremely vulnerable to terrorism. Compared to all other portfolios tested in 
this study, the tenant and control portfolios representing the leisure and travel industry both 
have the largest AR and CAR. The media portfolios also exhibit high AR but the differential 
between the tenant and control groups is not sustained over the week, and the difference 
between their CAR is insignificant. 
The finance industry is one of the most important groups in the sample. In this study, 
the finance tenant portfolio represents the largest tenant portfolio with 12 firms. In terms of 
returns, this tenant portfolio constantly underperformed compared to its control portfolio. 
Moreover, unlike most of the other industries, the gap between the tenant and control 
portfolio did increase over time, from -2.32 percent AR differential on September 17th to 
-4.18 percent CAR differential by the end of the week. At the time of the September 11 
attack, the WTC hosted many high profile U.S and international finance firms. Among the 
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victims of the WTC were employers of finance firms who accounted for 79 percent of the 
civilian casualties (Johnston and Nedelescu 2006). The visibility of the firms, the large 
number of casualties and the industry links with the stock market could explain why investors 
singled out this group.    
The performance of the large industrial tenant firm portfolio is at odds with the rest of 
the industries tested. The portfolio exhibits positive AR of 5.70 percent in contrast with its 
control which shows negative AR of -7.46 percent. The tenant portfolio CAR is not 
statistically significant while the control firm portfolio exhibit a statistically significant fall of 
-16.28 percent. The presence in this tenant portfolio of the aerospatiale and defence 
equipment manufacturer Raytheon could explain this positive performance. The defence firms 
tend to outperform the market in time of war or conflict. Overall, only WTC tenant firms 
from the finance, the retail and the media industries appear to have been subject to negative 
discrimination by investors.  
 
3.4.2 Cross Sectional Regression with Firms Characteristics 
 The cross sectional regression uses firms AR from the tenant and control portfolios as 
the dependant variable to assess the importance of firm specific characteristics. For this cross- 
sectional analysis, data were only available for 181 firms, 32 tenant firms and 149 control 
firms. Alternative regressions were also performed using CAR as a dependant variable but 
they provided less significant results.  The analysis is presented in Appendix 3.2.  
The financial variables are based on “Ohlson’s construct of a firm’s financial 
conditions” (Bradford and Robison 1997) . These variables represent a measure of the firms’ 
size, leverage and performance using as proxies the natural log of equity market value, the 
total liabilities to total assets and the total income to total assets respectively. In addition to 
financial variables, the analysis includes dummy variables accounting for firm residence in 
the WTC and industry segment. To avoid near singular matrix, the IT and telecom industry 
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dummy variable is excluded from the regressions. No data were available for tenant’s firms in 
the Leisure and Travel industries. Finally, note that the cross sectional regression is 
multifactor regression and it estimates partial coefficients that are net of any effect from other 
variables present in the regression. Consequently, the cross sectional analysis estimates may 
be different from the abnormal return analysis estimates (section 3.4.1).  
Table 3.4 presents the results of the cross sectional regression analysis of AR. The 
variables in the regressions explain around 30 percent of the variation in firm AR on 
September 17th  2001. Results from the regression on the complete sample, including tenant 
and control firms, indicates that relative to control firms, tenant firms have larger negative AR 
overall. The dummy tenant is statistically significant and has a coefficient of -0.181. 
Multiplied with the financial or the industry dummies, the dummy tenant does not appear 
statistically significant. Only tenant firms from the large industrial portfolio appear to have 
AR statistically different from their industry counterpart not resident in the WTC. Results 
from the regression on the restricted sample holding only the tenant firms AR show that none 
of the variables tested is statistically significant. 
Variable coefficients from regressions, on the full sample of firms and on the restricted 
sample of control firms, indicate that among the three financial variables, only firms’ 
performance has a statistically significant effect on the AR. Net income has a positive 
coefficient of 0.143 suggesting that firm performance had a positive impact on firms AR. The 
industry dummies coefficient indicates that being part of the industrial (small firms), the retail 
and the leisure and travel or the media industry also explain the size of the September 11 AR.  
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Table 3.4 Cross Sectional Regressions of Firms Abnormal Return  
Estimates of ordinary least squares regressions of 1-day abnormal returns on the specific characteristics of 
firms, including residency in the WTC, financial statement data, and industry segment. The dependant variable 
for model 1 is the 1-day abnormal return of firms tenant in the WTC and of control firms not tenant in the 
WTC. The dependant variable for model 2 is the 1-day abnormal return of control firms not tenant in the WTC. 
The dependant variable for model 1 is the 1-day abnormal return of firms tenant in the WTC. Abnormal returns 
are measured over one trading day following the announcement of the September 11 terrorist attack. 
 Dependant Variables 
 Abnormal Returns 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent Variables 
Tenant and 
Control 
(n=181) 
Tenant 
Firms 
(n=32) 
Control 
Firms 
(n=149) 
Intercept 0.058 -0.124 0.058 
 (0.055) (0.075) (0.054) 
Dummy tenant -0.181*   
 (0.086)   
Financial Variables    
Firm size - Log of market value -0.024 0.008 -0.024 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Dummy tenant*Firm size - Log of market value 0.033   
 (0.018)   
Firm leverage - total liabilities to total assets -0.015 0.003 -0.015 
 (0.027) (0.040) (0.026) 
Dummy tenant*Firm leverage - total liabilities to total assets 0.019   
 (0.044)   
Firm performance - Total income to total assets 0.143* 0.362 0.143* 
 (0.059) (0.245) (0.057) 
Dummy tenant*Firm performance - Total income to total assets 0.218   
 (0.224)   
Industry dummy variables    
Finance Firm -0.024 -0.007 -0.024 
 (0.018) (0.039) (0.017) 
Dummy tenant*Finance firm 0.017   
 (0.039)   
Large industrial firm -0.035 0.116 -0.035 
 (0.025) (0.074) (0.024) 
Dummy tenant*Large industrial firm 0.151*   
 (0.069)   
Small industrial firm -0.074* -0.006 -0.074* 
 (0.018) (0.037) (0.018) 
Dummy tenant*Small industrial firm 0.069   
 (0.037)   
Retail firms -0.103* -0.079 -0.103* 
 (0.022) (0.055) (0.021) 
Dummy tenant*Retail firm 0.024   
 (0.053)   
Media firm -0.032* -0.072 -0.032* 
 (0.016) (0.089) (0.015) 
Dummy tenant*Media firm -0.040   
 (0.080)   
Insurance firm -0.018 0.022 -0.018 
 (0.019) (0.035) (0.019) 
Dummy Tenant*Insurance firm 0.040   
 (0.037)   
Leisure and travel firm -0.214*  -0.214* 
 (0.041)  (0.040) 
Global F-value 5.29* 2.13 8.58* 
Adjusted R-square 0.323 0.248 0.339 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Consistent with the results obtained in the previous section, firms belonging to the travel and 
leisure industries suffered the highest AR. The industry dummy coefficient indicates that the 
travel and leisure firms experienced negative AR of -22 percent. Tenant firms belonging to 
the travel and leisure industry are not present in the sample due to missing variables, and only 
travel and leisure control firms are included. The retail industry also experienced 
exceptionally high AR of around -10 percent. 
The cross-sectional regression analysis confirms that investors differentiated between 
WTC tenants and other firms. Looking at the entire sample of firms tested for this study, AR 
from the September 11 attack appear dependant on firm financial performance and industry 
segment. In the analysis, firm income variable has a positive impact in AR and the results 
found on industry dummies confirm AR dependence on industries. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigates the equity price movements of NYSE listed firms resident in 
the New York WTC at the time of the September 11 terrorist attack. It assesses whether 
investors identified these tenant firms and differentiated them from their industry 
counterparts. It compares AR of the tenant firms to AR of a control group and finds that 
overall the tenant firms have larger negative AR. This finding suggests that the market was 
efficient following the September 11 attack since the involvement of firms in the incident did 
have an impact on equity prices. It appears that insurance cover did not prevent investors 
from discriminating against WTC tenants. The trading halt may have contributed to the 
market efficiency post event. This result is in line with the literature as it confirms that equity 
markets are efficient following catastrophic events. 
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Further investigation enabled the identification of additional firm specific 
characteristics that influenced the AR. Firms’ industry segment appears to be a significant 
factor in the size of AR and on the differential between the AR of tenant and control firms. 
The cross sectional analysis reveals that following September 11, firms’ AR were mostly 
dependent on their financial performance and industry segment. The significant relationship 
between firms’ industry segment and  AR suggests that September 11 had an industry specific 
effect. These results constitute evidence of the potential industry differential effect of 
terrorism.   
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Appendix 3.1 
Table 3.1.1 Constituent Firms of Tenant Portfolios: Equity Listed Tenants of WTC 
Name Listed under (if applicable) SFE /Data Stream matching industry or sector 
ABN-AMRO, Inc. Netherlands ADR Financial Services 
American Express Bank 
International  Financial Services 
Atlantic Bank of New York National Bank Greece SA Financial Services 
Banco Latino Americano de  Financial Services 
Bank of America Corporation  Financial Services 
Salomon Smith Barney Citigroup Inc. Financial Services 
JP Morgan Chase & Co.  Financial Services 
Lehman Brothers  Financial Services 
Morgan Stanley  Financial Services 
Oppenheimer Funds, Inc. Oppenheimer Funds, Inc. Financial Services 
TD Waterhouse Group, Inc. The Toronto-Dominion Bank Financial Services 
Union Bank of California UnionBanCal Corporation Financial Services 
Channel 4 (NBC) General Electric Industrial Goods and Services (large) 
Channel 47 (WNJU) General Electric Industrial Goods and Services (large) 
FedEx Corporation  Industrial Goods and Services (large) 
Raytheon Company  Industrial Goods and Services (large) 
Xerox Document Company Xerox Corporation Industrial Goods and Services (small) 
Adecco SA ADR Industrial Goods and Services (small) 
Thermo Electron Corp.  Industrial Goods and Services (small) 
Ann Taylor Loft  Retail 
Borders Books & Music Borders Group, Inc. Retail 
Johnston & Murphy Genesco Inc Retail 
Alliance Consulting Safeguard Scientifics Telecommunication and technology 
AT&T Corporation  Telecommunication and technology 
Dow Jones & Company, Inc.  Telecommunication and technology 
Verizon Communications Inc.  Telecommunication and technology 
Avis Cendant Corporation Travel and Leisure 
U.S Airways Group Inc.  Travel and Leisure 
Channel 2 (WCBS) CBS corp. Media 
Channel 11 (WPIX) Time Warner (64 percent) Media 
A I G Aviation Brokerage, Inc. American International Group Insurance 
Allstate Insurance Company  Insurance 
AON Corporation  Insurance 
Hartford Steam Boiler American International Group Insurance 
ITT Hartford Insurance Group  Insurance 
Marsh U.S.A inc. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. Insurance 
Partner Reinsurance Corp. Partner Re Insurance 
RLI Insurance Company  Insurance 
SCPIE Companies SCPIE Holdings Inc. Insurance 
Seabury & Smith Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc. Insurance 
Original Source: CNN with Tenant List provided by CoStar Group, Inc. 
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Table 3.1.2 List of Constituent Firms of  Control Portfolios: DataStream Sector Indices 
Constituents 
Financial Services Industrial Goods and Services Large Firms 
Industrial Goods 
and Services 
Small Firms 
Retail 
AG EDWARDS 3M ALLIED WASTE INDS. ABERCROMBIE & 
FITCH 
AMERICREDIT AUTOMATIC DATA PROC. CONVERGYS AUTONATION 
BLACKROCK 'A' BOEING COOPER INDS. AUTOZONE 
CAPITAL ONE FINL. BURL.NTHN.SANTA FE C CRANE BARNES & NOBLE 
COUNTRYWIDE FINL. CATERPILLAR CUMMINS CARMAX 
E-TRADE FINL. DANAHER DELUXE CHICOS FAS 
EATON VANCE NV. DEERE 
DONNELLEY RR & 
SONS 
CLAIRES STORES 
EQUIFAX EMERSON ELECTRIC EQUIFAX DOLLAR GENERAL 
FEDERATED INVRS.'B' FIRST DATA GENUINE PARTS 
FAMILY DOLLAR 
STORES 
FRANK.RES. GENERAL DYNAMICS GOODRICH FOOT LOCKER 
FREDDIE MAC HONEYWELL INTL. GRAINGER W W H & R BLOCK 
GOLDMAN SACHS GP. ILLINOIS TOOL WKS. ITT INDUSTRIES ITT EDUCATIONAL SVS. 
MELLON FINL. IMS HEALTH MCDERMOTT INTL. MICHAELS STORES 
MERRILL LYNCH & CO. LOCKHEED MARTIN NAVISTAR INTL. NORDSTROM 
MGIC INVT PITNEY-BOWES PALL OFFICE DEPOT 
MOODYS ROCKWELL AUTOMATION PARKER-HANNIFIN SAKS 
RAYMOND JAMES FINL. TEXTRON ROBERT HALF INTL. SERVICE CORP.INTL. 
SLM TYCO INTL. RYDER SYSTEM SERVICEMASTER 
STATE STREET UNITED TECHNOLOGIES SABRE HDG. TIFFANY & CO 
STUDENT LN. WASTE MAN. THOMAS & BETTS WILLIAMS SONOMA 
Source: Thomson DataStream 
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Table 3.1.2 (cont.) List of Constituent Firms of Control Portfolios: DataStream Sector 
Indices Constituents 
Telecommunication 
and Technology Travel and leisure Media Insurance 
AMDOCS ALASKA AIR GROUP ARBITRON ACE 
AMERICAN TOWER 'A' BRINKER INTL. BELO ALLEGHANY 
BELLSOUTH CARNIVAL CABLEVISION SYS. AMBAC FINANCIAL 
CA CHOICE HOTELS INTL. CLEAR CHL.COMMS. ARTHUR J GALLAGHER 
CENTURYTEL CONT.AIRL.B GANNETT BERKLEY W R 
CITIZENS COMMS. DARDEN RESTAURANTS GETTY IMAGES BROWN & BROWN 
CROWN CASTLE INTL. GTECH HOLDINGS GRAY TELEVISION 'A' CHUBB 
DST SYS. HARRAHS ENTM. HARTE-HANKS COVANTA HOLDING 
ELECTRONIC DATA 
SYSTEMS 
HILTON HOTELS INTERPUBLIC GP. EVEREST RE GP. 
HARRIS INTL.GAME TECH. KNIGHT-RIDDER 
HANOVER INSURANCE 
GROUP 
HEWLETT-PACKARD MARRIOTT INTL.'A' LIBERTY MEDIA SR.A HCC IN.HDG. 
INGRAM MICRO 'A' MGM MIRAGE MCGRAW-HILL LOEWS 
LEUCADIA NATIONAL OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE NEW YORK TIMES 'A' MBIA 
LEXMARK INTL.GP.A ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES OMNICOM GP. OLD REPUBLIC INTL. 
MCAFEE SABRE HDG. SCRIPPS E W PMI GROUP 
MOTOROLA SOUTHWEST AIRLINES TRIBUNE RADIAN GP. 
NCR 
STARWOOD HTLS.& RESORTS 
WWD.PAIRED CERTS.'B' 
UNIVISION COMMS.'A' 
REINSURANCE 
GP.AMER. 
QWEST COMMS.INTL. STATION CASINOS VIACOM 'A' TRANSATLANTIC HDG. 
SPRINT NEXTEL WENDY'S INTL. WALT DISNEY UNITRIN 
UNITED STATES 
CELLULAR 
YUM! BRANDS WASHINGTON PST.'B' XL CAP.'A' 
Source: Thomson DataStream 
 
Table 3.1.3 List of Tenant Firms Excluded from the Sample 
Name Listed under (if applicable)  Provided industry 
Channel 5 (WNYW) News Corp Cable/Television 
Provident Financial Management Provident Financial Group. Financial Institutions 
Washington Mutual, Inc.  Financial Institutions 
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.  Information & Delivery Services 
Continental Insurance Company Financial corp. Insurance 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.  Insurance 
American Airlines  Transportation 
Delta Air Lines Inc   Transportation 
Source: CNN with Tenant List provided by CoStar Group, Inc. 
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Appendix 3.2 
Table 3.2.1 Cross Sectional Regressions of Firms Cumulative Abnormal Return  
Estimates of ordinary least squares regressions of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns on the specific 
characteristics of firms, including residency in the WTC, financial statement data, and industry segment. The 
dependant variable for model 1 is the 5-day abnormal return of firms tenant in the WTC and of control firms not 
tenant in the WTC. The dependant variable for model 2 is the 5-day abnormal return of firms tenant in the WTC. 
The dependant variable for model 3 is the 5-day abnormal return of control firms not WTC tenant. 
 Dependant Variables 
 
Abnormal share returns on first five 
trading days 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent Variables 
Tenant and 
Control 
Firms 
Tenant 
Firms 
Control 
Firms 
Intercept -0.063 -0.346* -0.063 
 (0.096) (0.175) (0.094) 
Dummy tenant  -0.282   
 (0.182)   
Financial Variables    
Firm size - Log of market value -0.005 0.037 -0.005 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Dummy tenant*Firm size - Log of market value 0.042   
 (0.031)   
Firm leverage - total liabilities over total assets -0.036 0.051 -0.036 
 (0.045) (0.092) (0.044) 
Dummy tenant*Firm leverage - total liabilities over total assets 0.088   
 (0.093)   
Firm performance - Total income over total assets 0.265* 0.390 0.265* 
 (0.094) (0.365) (0.092) 
Dummy tenant*Firm performance - Total income over total assets 0.125   
 (0.336)   
Industry dummy variables    
Finance Firm -0.052* -0.064 -0.052 
 (0.033) (0.064) (0.033) 
Dummy tenant*Finance firm -0.012   
 (0.066)   
Large industrial firm  -0.082* 0.064 -0.082 
 (0.038) (0.138) (0.037) 
Dummy tenant*Large industrial firm 0.146   
 (0.128)   
Small industrial firm -0.151* -0.147* -0.151* 
 (0.041) (0.054) (0.041) 
Dummy tenant*Small industrial firm 0.004   
 (0.063)   
Retail firms -0.114* -0.110 -0.114* 
 (0.037) (0.115) (0.036) 
Dummy tenant*Retail firm 0.003   
 (0.108)   
Media firm -0.053 -0.196 -0.053 
 (0.032) (0.205) (0.031) 
Dummy tenant*Media firm -0.143   
 (0.184)   
Insurance firm -0.042 0.012 -0.042 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.037) 
Dummy Tenant*Insurance firm 0.054   
 (0.058)   
Leisure firm -0.285*  -0.285* 
 (0.065)  (0.063) 
Global F-value 3.18* 1.21 5.18* 
Adjusted R-square 0.195 0.057 0.220 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 4. TERRORISM AND INDUSTRY SPECIFIC EFFECTS: 
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Terrorism has an overall negative impact on national economies (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003), Lenain, Bonturi and Kohen (2002b), Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides 
(2004), Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004)). The September 11 attack stands as an example where 
international stock markets reflected the direct costs of an attack combined with possible 
changes in economic prospects. Post-September 11, the U.S  the Spanish and the U.K capital 
markets recorded abnormal returns of -7.15 percent, -4.79 percent  and -5.29 percent 
respectively (Chen and Siems 2004). Despite these negative returns, it is reasonable to assume 
that the terrorist attacks did not have the same impact on all industrial sectors. “Some 
activities and sectors are more vulnerable to attacks than others” (Bruck and Wickstrom 2004, 
p. 295). While some industries or sectors received the full impact of attacks, others may have 
been relatively unaffected. Some sectors may have even benefited from the uncertainty as the 
crisis could have resulted in an increase in demand for their goods or services. Enders and 
Sandler (2006, p. 204) suggest that in large economies terrorism will lead to a substitution 
effect “from sector vulnerable to terrorism to relatively safe area.” They suggest that price 
will encourage  the re-allocation of capital (Enders and Sandler 2006). Finally, as suggested 
by the optimal portfolio strategy developed by Liu, Longstaff & Pan (2002), it is expected 
that in times of uncertainty, funds are moved from risky segments of the market to less risky 
segments.  
This research measures the reactions of the industrial sectors of the United States, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom to three major terrorist attacks. For each country, 10 industry 
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portfolios and 29 sector portfolios are tested for abnormal return and abnormal volume in the 
wake of the attacks. This study is conducted over time and across countries to test if industries 
and sectors are sensitive to local and overseas terrorist attacks. The local but also the foreign 
terrorist events assessed could have an impact on the markets. The events that are being 
assessed were initially attributed to the same terrorist network, the Al-Qaeda13. Potential Al-
Qaeda activities have important political implications for the U.S and for most Western 
countries and they may have an impact on their equity markets event if the attacks are lead 
overseas. The network is considered the most dangerous terrorist group for Western countries, 
the U.S authorities have designated the organisation as the principal target of its ‘war on 
terrorism’ (Kondrasuk, Bailey and Sheeks, 2005). The Madrid and the London bombings 
could represent follow-up events from the 11 September attack. If considered Al-Qaeda 
attacks, the event would then suggested the organisation had transnational14 features and the 
ability to find new ‘soft’ targets. If not attributed to Al-Qaeda, the attacks were still reminder 
of the 11 September attack and sustained the perception of the level of risk that is linked to 
terrorist activities. Moreover, after the September 11 attack, correlation between major 
financial markets has increased (Hon, Strauss and Soo-Keong Yong 2004). Finally, even 
though the attacks are spread over time they could still have an effect consistent with the 
argument that countries “do not become desensitized to terror” (Eldor and Melnick 2004). 
This study is motivated by the fact that, while there have been studies on international 
equity markets or specific industries, there has been no formal analysis of the impact of 
terrorism on multiple industrial sectors. Results provided have some implication for 
diversification of equity portfolios across industries and sectors to minimise the negative 
impact of the terrorist threat.  
                                                 
13
 The attacks were performed by suspected Al-Qaeda partisans, in the case of the Madrid bombing however no 
conclusive evidence was found regarding the link between Al-Qaeda and the terrorist organisation responsible 
for the attack. 
14
  “Terrorism is translational when an incident in one country involves perpetrators, victims, institutions, 
governments or citizens of another country” (Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 7). 
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Results from this study show that terrorism has industry-specific effects, which, 
depending on the industries, generate uneven abnormal returns and volume. The analysis 
identifies the consumer services industry and within it, the travel and leisure sector, as being 
highly sensitive to terrorism. In contrast, the health care industry tends to remain neutral 
following terrorist assaults. In many instances, industry portfolios displaying high abnormal 
return also hold abnormal volume. A panel regression analysis also confirms a positive 
relationship between portfolio absolute value of abnormal return and abnormal volume. 
 
 
4.2 Literature 
 
4.2.1 Exposure to Terrorism 
Some businesses are considered more risky than others because of their perceived or 
real exposure to terrorism. Firms can be especially exposed to terrorism due to the ways 
terrorists conduct their attacks. Even though terrorists’ plans are dynamic, terrorists can 
sometime show preference for particular targets or techniques. For instance, in the September 
11 attack, the Madrid and the London bombings, terrorists have used transportation utilities to 
conduct their assault. As a result, the public and investors have associated transportations with 
terrorism and the sector has been perceived as particularly exposed to terrorist attack. It is 
believed that the fear of flying caused by September 11 attack “reduced airline demand by 30 
percent” (Ito and Lee 2005 in Enders and Sandler 2006, p. 206). Research on the U.S equity 
market has confirmed the negative impact of September 11 on U.S airline stocks (Carter and 
Simkins 2004; Drakos 2004). Since the attacks, other sectors have been identified as highly 
vulnerable to terrorism, as in the case of the Utility industry which the United States 
Government considered to be one of the “high risk targets” (Marlett et al. 2003, p. 52). The 
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increased insecurity and the state of war also lead to terrorist attacks having longer term, and 
more indirect, effects on industries. 
 
4.2.2 War and Military Conflicts 
Terrorism has various effects on industries because of its war-like features. A terrorist 
attack like September 11 can create a condition in countries similar to that of being at war. 
This condition may direct attention to industries providing essential goods and services such 
as health care, oil or basic materials. The uncertainty generated by this insecurity can also 
weaken confidence and delay consumption of non-essential goods and services. Following the 
September 11 attack in the U.S, consumer confidence fell dramatically (IMF 2001). This fall 
could have triggered a negative price response in the Consumer services and Consumer good 
equity portfolios. On a sectoral level, the Tourism and the travel sector experienced a negative 
demand shock post September 11 (Drakos 2004). The transportation industry is historically 
sensitive to military conflicts; in the past, wars have had a negative impact on the 
Transportation sector. During the first Iraq war, U.S transportation firms exhibited negative 
abnormal returns (Bradford and Robison 1997). Yet, firms dealing with the defence or oil 
industries appeared immunised from the event. While conflict can generate negative abnormal 
returns in some sectors, it can energise others. This can be true in the case of sectors offering 
security goods and services. During military conflicts and political events, defence firms tend 
to experiences positive abnormal returns (McDonald and Kendall 1994). 
 
4.2.3 Catastrophic Events and Specific Industries 
In their studies of catastrophic events, researchers focus on industries that appear 
especially responsive to this type of events. These industries include not only Insurance, and 
Defence but also Airline or Tourism. These studies on a specific industry show that industries 
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react differently to catastrophic events. An example of research on the Insurance industry is 
provided by Yamori and Kobayashi (2002). They observe that natural disasters can have 
either positive or negative impact on insurance firms (Yamori and Kobayashi 2002). Doherty, 
Lamm-Tennant and Starks (2003) find that September 11 had a negative impact U.S 
insurance stock prices. An example of a study on the defence industry is presented by Berrebi 
and Klor (2006). Berrebi and Klor investigate the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on 
price movements of Israeli firms listed on the U.S markets. Isolating the defence firms from 
the rest of the market, they show that the conflict has a positive impact on defence related 
firms while it has a negative impact on the rest of the market. These studies represent only a 
sample of the literature but they illustrate the industry differential effect of catastrophic 
events.   
Strategy models on optimal portfolio investment suggest that terrorism has an industry 
differential effect. These models demonstrate that ‘event risk’ induces change in the optimal 
portfolio. When a price jump occurs post event, investors rebalance their portfolios by 
reducing their holding of risky assets and increasing their share of less risky assets (Liu 
Longstaff, and Pan 2002). In the context of this chapter, the theory could imply a shift from 
terrorist sensitive sectors to less sensitive sectors.  
 
4.2.4 Volume 
An investigation on equity-traded volumes complements the analysis of equity 
price movements. “Tests of market response based on both volume and share price reaction 
are more reliable and precise than tests based on either metric alone” (Pacini et al. 2005). 
Analysis of the volume provides insight into the expectation of individual market participant. 
Indeed, “trading volume reflects changes in the expectations of individual investors while 
price reflects changes in the expectations of the market as a whole” (Karpoff 1987; in Pacini 
et al. 2005, p. 48). 
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Very few studies have evaluated the empirical impact of catastrophic events on 
equity trading volume. Volume is more often studied in the context of regulatory changes in 
regulation, earning announcement, takeovers or mergers (Collett 2004; Olibe 2001; Olibe and 
Cready 2002; Pacini et al. 2005). Nevertheless, some studies have examined the level of 
trading of shares following catastrophic events. Using a generalised least square method, and 
a Corrado rank test, Pacini and Marlett (2001) examined the price and volume  effect  on 
insurance firms  by the creation of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.  After the creation 
of the fund, insurers share price displayed negative abnormal returns and abnormal increases 
in trading volume. In a study on the 1986 Challenger space shuttle crash, Maloney and 
Mulherin (2003) found especially high volumes in the share trades from manufacturing firms 
involved with the construction of the shuttle. The volume effect appeared more significant for 
the manufacturer of the faulty component responsible for the crash (Maloney and Mulherin 
2003).  
The literature suggests that the relationship between abnormal share price and 
abnormal volume is unclear. Abnormal returns can occur independently of abnormal volume 
and vice versa (Olibe 2001). The literature suggests a more significant relationship between 
price volatility and abnormal volume (Smirlock and Starks 1988). Most empirical studies 
identify a positive correlation between volume and absolute value of price change (Karpoff 
1987; Olibe 2001; Olibe and Cready 2002; Pacini et al. 2005; Smirlock and Starks 1988). 
Some external factors do influence this price-volatility-volume relationship. First, the 
precision of the information provided to the market plays a role and lower quality information 
can corrupt the relationship (Barron and Karpoff 2004). Second, the relationship appears more 
significant in the context of the release of bad news (Collett 2004). Several trading theory 
models attempt to explain the price-volume relationship. The sequential information arrival 
model represents one of the fundamental theories on volume.  According to the model, the 
highest volumes will come from generalised pessimistic (or optimist) views amongst traders 
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(Copeland 1976). This theory could explain abnormal price-volume in the context of 
terrorism, since terrorists aim at having a psychological impact on the overall population.  
According to the literature, terrorism can trigger abnormal returns on equity markets 
on an aggregate level. Terrorism also does appear to have an industry differential effect on the 
economy. Sharing characteristics with traditional military conflicts, terrorism seems to 
weaken the transportation industry while strengthening the defence sector. Given its impact 
on equity markets and on the economy, terrorism is likely to have an industry differential 
effect on the equity markets. It is also likely that terrorism has a volume effect. In the context 
of catastrophic events, abnormal prices volatility has been associated with abnormal traded 
volumes (Pacini and Marlett 2001, Maloney and Mulherin 2003). This chapter formally 
investigates if terrorism has an industry differential effect and a volume effect in equity 
markets. 
 
 
4.3 Method 
 
4.3.1 Data 
4.3.1.1 Events and Markets 
This study looks at three equity markets and three events: the U.S, the Spanish and the 
U.K markets following the 2001 September 11 attack, the 2004 Madrid bombing and the 2005 
London bombings. The selection of the countries and events is based on the common 
characteristic of markets, the origin and the scale of the attacks.  
The U.S, the U.K and the Spanish markets are all well developed and have comparable 
levels of efficiency. Stock return synchronicity scores from Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) are 
respectively 57.9 percent for the U.S, 63.1 percent for the U.K, and 67 percent for the Spanish 
markets. These results suggest a comparable level of market efficiency. These countries have 
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also been selected because they have all experienced a terrorist attack from the same terrorist 
organisation. All three attacks were organised by terrorists suspected of belonging to the 
terrorist network Al-Qaeda (Anonymous 2004) (BBC 2004). The group is part of a new wave 
of terrorism15 targeting western interests, and each of its attacks has implications for western 
countries. The events tested also represent major terrorist events. The September 11 attack, 
the Madrid bombing and the London bombing caused significant loss of life. Outside of 
conventional warfare, the September 11 terrorist attack is the deadliest assault in United 
States history (Anonymous 2004). The March 11, 2004 Madrid bombing is the biggest 
terrorist attack Spain has ever experienced (BBC 2004). The July 7th, 2005 London bombing 
“caused more deaths and casualties than previous terrorist attacks on the city” (Quinault 
2005). 
 
4.3.1.2 Portfolios 
The industry and sector portfolios used in this research are equally weighted portfolios 
of firm constituents of DataStream industry and sector indices. The creation of the portfolios, 
rather than the direct use of the returns from the DataStream indices, was necessary because 
of the event study method: the non-parametric Corrado ranking test requires individual share 
returns. For abnormal return and abnormal volume calculations, the data collected from 
DataStream consist of firm daily closing price and daily turnover by volume. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 describe the industry and sector portfolios. The tables provide the 
FTSE16 industry code of the firms making up the portfolios as well as the number of firms per 
portfolio. The descriptive statistics consist of the average data statistics over three different 
periods. Each period corresponds to an event window of 255 days around the terrorist attack 
tested.  
                                                 
15
 The term “new wave of terrorism” was introduced by (Rapoport, 2001) 
16
 FTSE is an independent company owned by The Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Abnormal Returns 
This table presents the size and the descriptive statistics of 1-day abnormal returns of 43 industry and sector portfolios. 
The table indicates the number of firms per portfolio. The descriptive statistics include the mean, standard deviation 
maximum, minimum, skewness, kurtosis and results from Jarque-Bera test of 1-day abnormal returns estimated over a 
255 day event windows around the event. The characters of the name of portfolio indicate the portfolio FTSE industry 
classification. Names in capital bold characters represent industry portfolios. Names in strait characters are super sector 
or sector portfolios. 
Panel A: U.S Portfolios 
Descriptive Statistics FTSE 
Code Portfolio 
# of 
Firms Mean Max Min Std. Dev Skew Kurt J-Bera 
500 Oil 67 -0.0004 0.0307 -0.0185 -0.0052 0.14 2.05 4.51 
530 Oil and Product 31 -0.0003 0.0344 -0.0143 -0.0077 0.16 2.09 4.24 
1000 Basic Materials 42 0.0002 0.0253 -0.0291 -0.0047 -0.25 3.36 76.30 
1300 Chemical 24 0.0002 0.0257 -0.0295 -0.0022 -0.21 3.18 51.03 
1733 Forestry 2 0.0003 0.0509 -0.0373 0.0020 0.17 3.44 46.67 
1750 Industrial Metal 11 0.0002 0.0353 -0.0393 -0.0169 -0.55 4.86 337.01 
1770 Mining 5 0.0003 0.0476 -0.0352 -0.0074 0.02 3.16 28.56 
2000 Industrials 143 0.0000 0.0229 -0.0210 -0.0001 -0.04 2.37 8.16 
2300 Construction & Mat 16 0.0003 0.0318 -0.0146 -0.0031 -0.02 2.64 11.91 
2710 Aerospace Defence 10 -0.0003 0.0246 -0.0148 -0.0006 0.08 2.22 3.00 
2727 Diversified Industries 13 0.0000 0.0275 -0.0285 0.0002 -0.13 3.05 38.51 
2750 Industrials Engineering 22 0.0003 0.0260 -0.0224 -0.0014 -0.08 2.55 17.87 
2770 Industrial Transport 15 -0.0002 0.0279 -0.0184 -0.0033 -0.02 2.20 5.50 
2790 Support Services 31 0.0000 0.0255 -0.0184 0.0000 0.00 2.30 5.88 
3000 Consumer Goods 80 0.0002 0.0192 -0.0194 -0.0002 -0.17 3.23 59.51 
3300 Automobile and Parts 8 0.0002 0.0376 -0.0304 -0.0025 -0.19 5.36 327.72 
3530 Beverage 11 0.0004 0.0184 -0.0118 -0.0029 0.01 2.62 7.90 
3570 Food Product 17 0.0003 0.0210 -0.0118 -0.0025 -0.02 2.75 15.10 
3740 Leisure Goods 9 0.0001 0.0282 -0.0305 -0.0028 -0.16 2.70 20.60 
3760 Personal goods 12 -0.0001 0.0246 -0.0234 -0.0022 -0.05 2.88 33.75 
3780 Tobacco 3 0.0004 0.0507 -0.0413 -0.0124 -0.06 6.31 564.51 
4000 Health Care 68 0.0000 0.0209 -0.0240 0.0009 -0.21 2.60 10.67 
4530 Health Care Eq & Svs 44 0.0000 0.0209 -0.0240 0.0009 -0.21 2.60 10.67 
4570 Pharmacy & Biotechnology 29 -0.0003 0.0372 -0.0325 -0.0006 -0.09 2.54 8.09 
5000 Consumer Services 122 0.0002 0.0322 -0.0410 0.0021 -0.29 5.45 381.39 
5300 Retail 66 0.0004 0.0339 -0.0317 -0.0001 -0.03 3.12 40.89 
5330 Food & Drug Retail 12 0.0003 0.0222 -0.0210 -0.0003 -0.30 3.53 43.21 
5500 Media 26 -0.0002 0.0417 -0.0315 0.0040 0.11 3.25 35.83 
5700 Travel & Leisure 28 0.0001 0.0284 -0.0720 0.0026 -1.70 21.20 11797.64 
6000 Telecom 12 0.0000 0.0371 -0.0179 0.0001 0.15 2.71 15.88 
7000 Utilities 49 -0.0001 0.0259 -0.0241 -0.0021 -0.23 4.60 167.78 
7530 Electricity 30 0.0000 0.0292 -0.0270 -0.0025 -0.24 4.40 157.08 
7570 Gas Water Multi Utility 19 -0.0002 0.0219 -0.0207 -0.0009 -0.05 3.83 74.65 
8000 Financial 196 0.0001 0.0198 -0.0139 0.0001 0.02 2.65 9.09 
8300 Banks 55 0.0001 0.0220 -0.0134 0.0015 0.10 2.51 6.73 
8530 Non life Insurance 44 0.0001 0.0265 -0.0114 -0.0058 0.08 3.24 30.94 
8570 Life Insurance 9 0.0001 0.0242 -0.0248 -0.0056 -0.23 3.39 40.19 
8730 Real Estate 50 0.0003 0.0132 -0.0113 -0.0084 -0.30 3.12 59.76 
8770 General Financial 38 0.0000 0.0322 -0.0204 0.0030 0.12 2.66 13.86 
8990 Equity Investment Inst 10 0.0002 0.0245 -0.0230 -0.0050 -0.18 3.27 32.74 
9000 Technology 85 -0.0002 0.0655 -0.0284 0.0055 0.23 2.39 15.36 
9530 Software and Computer Svs 29 0.0000 0.0572 -0.0304 0.0050 0.13 2.62 12.79 
9570 Technology Hardware & Eq 57 -0.0002 0.0708 -0.0302 0.0056 0.25 2.30 13.26 
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Table 4.1 (cont.) Summary Statistics of Abnormal Returns 
Panel B: Spain Portfolios 
Descriptive Statistics FTSE 
Code Portfolio 
# of 
Firms Mean Max Min Std. Dev Skew Kurt J-Bera 
500 Oil 2 0.0001 0.0491 -0.0012 -0.0023 1.56 14.49 2590.11 
530 Oil and Product 2 0.0002 0.0491 -0.0012 -0.0012 1.60 14.97 2778.48 
1000 Basic Materials 8 0.0007 0.0179 -0.0181 -0.0028 -0.29 4.66 112.40 
1300 Chemical 1 0.0016 0.0417 0.0334 -0.0142 0.18 3.00 8.45 
1733 Forestry 5 0.0005 0.0271 -0.0151 -0.0019 0.09 5.88 217.06 
1750 Industrial Metal 2 0.0006 0.0291 -0.0084 -0.0025 0.17 3.17 17.96 
1770 Mining 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2000 Industrials 21 0.0007 0.0133 -0.0229 -0.0026 -1.37 10.27 1263.77 
2300 Construction & Mat 10 0.0008 0.0256 -0.0397 -0.0035 -1.82 14.36 2711.37 
2710 Aerospace Defence 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2727 Diversified Industries 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2750 Industrials Engineering 5 0.0007 0.0171 -0.0209 -0.0023 -0.35 5.16 163.50 
2770 Industrial Transport 2 0.0000 0.0206 -0.0149 -0.0012 -0.05 4.17 69.36 
2790 Support Services 4 0.0009 0.0427 -0.0052 -0.0003 0.70 6.85 323.44 
3000 Consumer Goods 15 0.0006 0.0097 -0.0168 -0.0038 -0.77 8.44 735.95 
3300 Automobile and Parts 1 0.0013 0.0605 -0.0148 0.0023 0.51 5.07 133.48 
3530 Beverage 2 0.0005 0.0218 -0.0028 -0.0059 0.20 2.67 10.55 
3570 Food Product 5 0.0007 0.0158 -0.0105 -0.0026 0.02 4.16 70.11 
3740 Leisure Goods 2 0.0014 0.0308 -0.0174 -0.0002 0.24 3.22 27.75 
3760 Personal goods 3 0.0005 0.0264 -0.0220 -0.0031 -0.02 3.99 58.06 
3780 Tobacco 2 0.0002 0.0153 0.0066 -0.0015 -0.38 4.24 39.62 
4000 Health Care 4 0.0002 0.0270 -0.2133 0.0066 -7.36 103.68 167449.02 
4530 Health Care Eq & Svs 4 0.0002 0.0270 -0.2133 0.0066 -7.36 103.68 167449.02 
4570 Pharmacy & Biotechnology 2 0.0003 0.0368 -0.0787 0.0034 -2.25 20.27 5508.43 
5000 Consumer Services 7 0.0011 0.0298 -0.0339 -0.0022 -0.10 5.59 221.22 
5300 Retail 2 0.0007 0.0347 -0.0280 -0.0030 0.16 5.46 182.11 
5330 Food & Drug Retail 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
5500 Media 2 0.0015 0.0643 -0.0376 -0.0023 0.28 3.37 47.00 
5700 Travel & Leisure 3 0.0010 0.0584 -0.0292 -0.0035 0.42 6.54 336.06 
6000 Telecom 1 0.0003 0.0263 -0.0185 -0.0013 -0.15 2.50 6.24 
7000 Utilities 7 0.0004 0.0155 -0.0164 -0.0053 -0.25 3.72 65.10 
7530 Electricity 5 0.0003 0.0157 -0.0211 -0.0053 -0.32 4.25 104.34 
7570 Gas Water Multi Utility 2 0.0006 0.0216 -0.0072 -0.0029 0.24 2.65 11.79 
8000 Financial 23 0.0005 0.0231 -0.0189 -0.0012 0.16 10.75 1219.36 
8300 Banks 13 0.0005 0.0112 -0.0202 -0.0001 -0.60 6.54 350.20 
8530 Non life Insurance 2 0.0004 0.0206 -0.0086 -0.0025 0.03 2.25 1.79 
8570 Life Insurance 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
8730 Real Estate 5 0.0006 0.0871 -0.0094 -0.0093 2.61 25.05 8592.04 
8770 General Financial 1 0.0004 0.0256 -0.0121 -0.0055 -0.02 2.49 5.33 
8990 Equity Investment Inst 1 0.0001 0.0187 -0.0137 -0.0018 -0.23 4.14 68.51 
9000 Technology 4 0.0015 0.0434 -0.0254 0.0004 0.38 3.21 29.94 
9530 Software and Computer Svs 1 0.0005 0.0457 -0.0299 0.0026 0.28 3.55 41.80 
9570 Technology Hardware & Eq 3 0.0018 0.0559 -0.0202 -0.0006 0.61 3.64 59.39 
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Table 4.1 (cont.) Summary Statistics of Abnormal Returns 
Panel C: U.K Portfolios 
Descriptive Statistics FTSE 
Code Portfolio 
# of 
Firms Mean Max Min Std. Dev Skew Kurt J-Bera 
500 Oil 12 -0.0001 0.0255 -0.0191 -0.0022 -0.30 7.07 466.93 
530 Oil and Product 9 0.0000 0.0333 -0.0132 -0.0018 0.45 6.47 506.02 
1000 Basic Materials 17 0.0001 0.0214 -0.0192 -0.0013 -0.20 3.32 66.18 
1300 Chemical 8 0.0000 0.0317 -0.0243 0.0003 -0.10 4.86 223.52 
1733 Forestry 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1750 Industrial Metal 10 0.0003 0.0266 -0.0236 -0.0001 -0.34 5.34 343.03 
1770 Mining 8 -0.0001 0.0248 -0.0173 -0.0061 -0.11 2.61 12.14 
2000 Industrials 86 0.0002 0.0167 -0.0170 -0.0025 -0.56 5.44 374.87 
2300 Construction & Mat 12 0.0005 0.0149 -0.0229 -0.0011 -0.57 5.32 288.26 
2710 Aerospace Defence 9 0.0001 0.0247 -0.0227 -0.0006 -0.50 7.06 734.96 
2727 Diversified Industries 2 0.0001 0.0445 -0.0720 -0.0114 -0.68 6.94 792.74 
2750 Industrials Engineering 13 0.0005 0.0244 -0.0217 -0.0017 -0.38 5.10 278.98 
2770 Industrial Transport  8 0.0003 0.0208 -0.0157 -0.0026 -0.23 4.62 143.08 
2790 Support Services 35 0.0001 0.0157 -0.0154 -0.0021 -0.34 4.25 164.30 
3000 Consumer Goods  39 0.0003 0.0142 -0.0165 -0.0021 -0.65 4.76 256.35 
3300 Automobile and Parts 2 0.0010 0.0698 -0.0379 0.0034 0.65 10.97 1511.98 
3530 Beverage  4 0.0004 0.0195 -0.0196 -0.0024 -0.25 3.65 59.23 
3570 Food Product 11 0.0004 0.0139 -0.0176 -0.0003 -0.51 3.98 110.11 
3740 Leisure Goods  1 -0.0012 0.1248 -0.0585 0.0067 0.48 5.31 205.28 
3760 Personal goods  2 0.0003 0.0385 -0.0914 -0.0019 -2.18 30.96 25642.28 
3780 Tobacco  3 0.0001 0.0286 -0.0225 0.0025 0.05 4.67 130.14 
4000 Health Care  75 -0.0001 0.0219 -0.0234 0.0008 -0.20 2.58 10.15 
4530 Health Care Eq & Svs  6 -0.0001 0.0219 -0.0234 0.0008 -0.20 2.58 10.15 
4570 Pharmacy & Biotechnology 10 -0.0002 0.0366 -0.0468 -0.0018 -0.71 9.08 844.90 
5000 Consumer Services  84 -0.0002 0.0139 -0.0122 -0.0041 -0.43 3.57 65.73 
5300 Retail  33 0.0004 0.0238 -0.0167 -0.0029 -0.22 4.75 206.83 
5330 Food & Drug Retail  5 0.0002 0.0287 -0.0128 0.0000 0.13 4.25 119.18 
5500 Media  25 -0.0002 0.0227 -0.0187 -0.0007 -0.17 2.74 30.82 
5700 Travel & Leisure 23 0.0002 0.0195 -0.0262 -0.0043 -0.62 6.66 671.86 
6000 Telecom  5 0.0002 0.0537 -0.0218 0.0068 0.41 2.62 21.58 
7000 Utilities  11 -0.0002 0.0153 -0.0090 -0.0053 -0.11 2.24 6.83 
7530 Electricity  4 -0.0001 0.0218 -0.0196 -0.0032 -0.15 3.17 35.19 
7570 Gas Water Multi Utility  7 -0.0002 0.0175 -0.0051 -0.0054 0.00 2.36 4.96 
8000 Financial  151 0.0000 0.0163 -0.0160 -0.0018 -0.38 4.04 132.26 
8300 Banks  8 -0.0001 0.0365 -0.0330 0.0037 -0.06 3.77 73.44 
8530 Non life Insurance 11 -0.0005 0.0335 -0.0520 -0.0003 -1.44 13.98 4134.20 
8570 Life Insurance 6 0.0002 0.0361 -0.0253 0.0002 -0.20 3.98 94.00 
8730 Real Estate  28 0.0002 0.0136 -0.0116 -0.0035 -0.51 6.52 569.46 
8770 General Financial 21 0.0000 0.0201 -0.0150 -0.0006 -0.13 3.07 40.76 
8990 Equity Investment Inst 77 0.0000 0.0163 -0.0161 -0.0028 -0.23 3.21 46.27 
9000 Technology  17 -0.0002 0.0500 -0.0417 0.0048 0.13 2.62 9.64 
9530 Software and Computer Svs 13 -0.0003 0.0448 -0.0446 0.0042 0.10 2.95 19.23 
9570 Technology Hardware & Eq 4 -0.0002 0.0790 -0.0564 0.0066 0.14 2.54 7.81 
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics of Abnormal Volumes 
This table presents the size and the descriptive statistics of 1-day abnormal volumes of 43 industry and sector portfolios. 
The table indicates the number of firms per portfolio. The descriptive statistics include the mean, standard of deviation, 
maximum, minimum, skewness, kurtosis and results from Jarque-Bera test of 1-day abnormal volumes estimated over a 
255 days event window around the event. The characters of the name of portfolio indicate the portfolio FTSE industry 
classification. Names in capital bold characters represent industry portfolios. Names in strait characters are super sector 
or sector portfolios. 
Panel A: U.S Portfolios 
Descriptive Statistics FTSE 
Code Portfolio 
# of 
Firms Mean Max Min Std. Dev Skew Kurt J-Bera 
500 Oil 67 0.0002 1.0950 -0.7392 0.1978 0.85 8.91 474.11 
530 Oil and Product 31 -0.0001 1.0763 -0.7762 0.2143 0.75 7.64 294.92 
1000 Basic Materials 42 0.0013 1.0019 -0.6935 0.1919 0.80 9.47 907.19 
1300 Chemical 24 0.0018 1.0500 -0.8190 0.2002 0.67 9.51 738.23 
1733 Forestry 2 0.0005 1.4850 -0.9199 0.3294 0.66 5.83 140.65 
1750 Industrial Metal 11 0.0011 1.2419 -0.7970 0.2677 0.67 6.44 288.91 
1770 Mining 5 0.0002 1.1658 -0.8932 0.3046 0.51 4.25 31.00 
2000 Industrials 143 0.0003 1.1871 -0.7111 0.1775 1.39 14.99 1889.98 
2300 Construction & Mat 16 0.0006 1.2399 -0.7094 0.2157 0.82 8.25 407.92 
2710 Aerospace Defence 10 0.0011 1.5430 -0.6924 0.2348 1.42 12.30 1201.54 
2727 Diversified Industries 13 -0.0001 1.2131 -0.7965 0.2082 0.84 9.48 549.04 
2750 Industrials Engineering 22 0.0002 1.1740 -0.7536 0.2182 0.80 8.42 438.40 
2770 Industrial Transport  15 0.0004 1.1233 -0.8005 0.2321 0.65 7.15 279.55 
2790 Support Services 31 0.0002 1.2162 -0.7435 0.1933 1.17 12.30 1162.65 
3000 Consumer Goods  81 0.0003 1.1302 -0.7059 0.1770 1.08 13.01 1334.26 
3300 Automobile and Parts 8 0.0015 1.0043 -0.9502 0.2398 0.34 6.37 158.16 
3530 Beverage  11 0.0002 1.1787 -0.8293 0.2669 0.45 5.71 117.87 
3570 Food Product 17 0.0001 1.1652 -0.7465 0.2038 0.82 9.51 600.73 
3740 Leisure Goods  9 0.0019 1.2978 -0.8183 0.2472 0.43 6.94 224.78 
3760 Personal goods  12 0.0005 1.1819 -0.6923 0.2183 0.71 7.85 364.11 
3780 Tobacco  3 -0.0005 1.5170 -1.1013 0.3349 0.60 5.48 89.79 
4000 Health Care  62 -0.0003 1.1731 -0.6798 0.1785 1.20 13.27 1425.15 
4530 Health Care Eq & Svs  44 -0.0003 1.1731 -0.6798 0.1785 1.20 13.27 1425.15 
4570 Pharmacy & Biotechnology  29 0.0000 1.1433 -0.6452 0.2004 0.90 8.90 485.35 
5000 Consumer Services  122 0.0004 1.1122 -0.6804 0.1752 1.16 13.77 1646.59 
5300 Retail  66 -0.0002 1.1827 -0.7058 0.1903 0.95 11.51 983.89 
5330 Food & Drug Retail  12 -0.0008 1.1082 -0.7187 0.2240 0.53 6.66 223.18 
5500 Media  26 0.0013 1.0264 -0.7257 0.1999 0.77 9.16 591.24 
5700 Travel & Leisure 28 0.0011 1.1992 -0.6900 0.2015 1.05 10.09 628.05 
6000 Telecom  12 -0.0009 0.9948 -0.6735 0.2128 0.53 5.86 150.89 
7000 Utilities  48 -0.0006 1.1066 -0.7225 0.1870 0.88 10.30 669.41 
7530 Electricity  30 0.0003 1.1271 -0.7141 0.1992 0.79 8.84 457.93 
7570 Gas Water Multi Utility  18 -0.0019 1.1418 -0.8142 0.2005 0.70 8.79 402.57 
8000 Financial  196 0.0005 1.1260 -0.7225 0.1792 1.17 13.18 1447.22 
8300 Banks  55 0.0000 1.1548 -0.8012 0.2015 0.90 10.46 830.72 
8530 Non life Insurance 44 -0.0003 1.1730 -0.7142 0.2144 1.13 10.11 691.92 
8570 Life Insurance 9 -0.0013 1.0885 -0.7991 0.2554 0.43 5.14 82.97 
8730 Real Estate  50 0.0028 1.1346 -0.7112 0.2180 0.70 7.35 289.66 
8770 General Financial 38 -0.0008 1.1430 -0.7278 0.2026 0.99 10.14 778.96 
8990 Equity Investment Inst 10 -0.0009 1.0396 -0.7499 0.2385 0.43 5.26 91.99 
9000 Technology  85 0.0002 1.0585 -0.6719 0.1962 0.86 9.51 682.96 
9530 Software and Computer Svs 29 0.0001 1.0590 -0.6998 0.2045 0.74 9.10 596.89 
9570 Technology Hardware & Eq 57 0.0002 1.0662 -0.7186 0.2049 0.77 8.22 439.13 
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Table 4.2 (cont.) Summary Statistics of Abnormal Volumes 
Panel B: Spain Portfolios 
Descriptive Statistics FTSE 
Code Portfolio 
# of 
Firms Mean Max Min Std. Dev Skew Kurt J-Bera 
500 Oil 2 0.0001 1.6771 -2.2936 0.5441 -0.13 4.15 29.96 
530 Oil and Product 2 -0.0001 1.6771 -2.2936 0.5404 -0.14 4.18 30.23 
1000 Basic Materials 8 -0.0019 1.3753 -1.4596 0.4365 -0.03 3.71 9.84 
1300 Chemical 1 0.0014 3.6435 -2.3201 1.0025 0.60 3.77 26.08 
1733 Forestry 5 -0.0027 1.7152 -1.7877 0.5655 -0.07 3.57 5.87 
1750 Industrial Metal 2 -0.0016 1.4369 -1.5366 0.4955 -0.05 3.33 2.16 
1770 Mining 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2000 Industrials 21 -0.0013 0.8214 -1.0581 0.2804 -0.27 4.19 26.71 
2300 Construction & Mat 10 -0.0001 1.0558 -0.9692 0.3334 0.03 3.56 8.49 
2710 Aerospace Defence 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2727 Diversified Industries 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
2750 Industrials Engineering 5 -0.0070 1.8352 -2.1623 0.5487 -0.13 4.64 44.31 
2770 Industrial Transport  2 -0.0019 1.5434 -1.5845 0.4799 -0.01 3.45 2.50 
2790 Support Services 3 -0.0065 2.1542 -2.1857 0.6064 0.07 4.16 17.08 
3000 Consumer Goods  15 0.0030 1.0683 -1.2405 0.3378 -0.13 3.95 11.19 
3300 Automobile and Parts 1 0.0127 4.2506 -5.0233 1.2986 -0.31 5.89 136.22 
3530 Beverage  2 -0.0052 3.1024 -4.1964 1.1111 -0.32 4.26 25.99 
3570 Food Product 5 0.0017 1.4257 -1.6750 0.4375 -0.25 4.13 16.77 
3740 Leisure Goods  1 -0.0019 1.7659 -1.5834 0.5882 0.05 3.15 2.66 
3760 Personal goods  3 0.0027 2.1018 -1.5251 0.6045 0.30 3.60 8.87 
3780 Tobacco  2 0.0001 2.3971 -2.0708 0.6899 0.19 3.83 10.28 
4000 Health Care  4 -0.0087 1.4754 -1.5965 0.4942 0.09 3.57 4.30 
4530 Health Care Eq & Svs  4 -0.0087 1.4754 -1.5965 0.4942 0.09 3.57 4.30 
4570 Pharmacy & Biotechnology  2 -0.0077 1.8530 -1.5701 0.4635 0.30 4.86 50.40 
5000 Consumer Services  7 -0.0014 1.1302 -1.1692 0.3717 -0.03 3.69 5.92 
5300 Retail  2 -0.0010 2.6845 -2.8303 0.8524 0.08 3.86 12.29 
5330 Food & Drug Retail  0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
5500 Media  2 -0.0021 1.3251 -1.2667 0.4306 0.23 3.35 5.16 
5700 Travel & Leisure 3 -0.0012 1.3503 -1.5742 0.4388 0.02 3.67 6.05 
6000 Telecom  1 0.0011 1.5388 -1.6308 0.3912 0.02 5.72 145.93 
7000 Utilities  7 -0.0041 1.2168 -1.0382 0.3461 0.00 3.94 27.43 
7530 Electricity  5 -0.0053 1.5798 -1.2183 0.3921 0.21 4.32 36.46 
7570 Gas Water Multi Utility  2 -0.0012 1.7856 -1.7207 0.4934 -0.07 4.29 27.65 
8000 Financial  22 0.0025 0.7123 -0.7653 0.2598 -0.15 3.07 2.87 
8300 Banks  13 0.0050 0.8034 -0.9143 0.2923 -0.04 3.35 2.65 
8530 Non life Insurance 2 -0.0024 2.4978 -2.5695 0.7424 0.03 4.06 17.09 
8570 Life Insurance 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
8730 Real Estate  5 -0.0025 1.7144 -1.6041 0.5574 0.13 3.51 4.00 
8770 General Financial 1 0.0061 3.4983 -3.2209 0.9687 -0.03 4.15 20.00 
8990 Equity Investment Inst 1 -0.0005 4.2923 -4.3238 1.3301 0.12 3.89 10.73 
9000 Technology  4 -0.0009 1.2984 -1.3778 0.4593 0.08 3.37 3.91 
9530 Software and Computer Svs 1 0.0004 1.6688 -1.3913 0.5263 0.14 3.18 3.88 
9570 Technology Hardware & Eq 3 -0.0001 1.6530 -1.4457 0.5113 0.22 3.75 15.19 
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Table 4.2 (cont.) Summary Statistics of Abnormal Volumes 
Panel C: U.K Portfolios 
Descriptive Statistics 
Portfolio # of Firms Mean Max Min Std. Dev Skew Kurt J-Bera 
Oil 12 -0.0005 1.2107 -1.5477 0.4384 -0.20 3.51 11.34 
Oil and Product 9 -0.0015 1.2458 -1.6134 0.4086 -0.22 4.30 30.16 
Basic Materials 16 0.0013 1.1667 -1.2594 0.3652 -0.07 3.89 12.47 
Chemical 8 0.0008 1.6252 -1.5081 0.5349 0.10 3.29 1.70 
Forestry 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Industrial Metal 8 0.0005 1.6112 -1.8260 0.4505 -0.14 4.31 24.20 
Mining 7 0.0017 1.1942 -1.4983 0.3963 -0.11 3.93 13.63 
Industrials 71 -0.0009 0.9466 -1.4519 0.2800 -0.49 6.70 227.39 
Construction & Mat 8 -0.0032 1.6083 -1.4352 0.5148 0.00 3.29 4.04 
Aerospace Defence 7 0.0002 1.6931 -1.9656 0.4898 -0.08 4.26 19.89 
Diversified Industries 2 0.0027 1.9031 -2.9249 0.6636 -0.60 5.59 166.23 
Industrials Engineering 11 -0.0031 1.4975 -1.8963 0.5258 -0.03 3.81 13.60 
Industrial Transport  8 -0.0032 1.5888 -1.6262 0.5723 0.01 3.12 2.79 
Support Services 28 -0.0002 1.1679 -1.6638 0.3465 -0.37 5.34 67.77 
Consumer Goods  35 -0.0025 0.9412 -1.7761 0.2979 -0.89 8.47 442.58 
Automobile and Parts 2 -0.0116 3.1851 -3.4390 1.0713 0.01 3.66 8.66 
Beverage  3 0.0014 1.2221 -1.5453 0.4108 -0.10 3.78 9.62 
Food Product 10 -0.0010 1.4256 -1.7777 0.4565 -0.28 4.68 61.68 
Leisure Goods  1 -0.0005 3.1503 -3.0616 1.0654 0.19 3.43 4.33 
Personal goods  1 -0.0005 3.5289 -3.2883 1.0694 0.01 3.68 7.65 
Tobacco  3 -0.0022 1.8585 -2.0421 0.4789 0.00 5.51 91.00 
Health Care  75 -0.0003 1.1678 -0.6622 0.1776 1.22 13.28 1421.20 
Health Care Eq & Svs  4 -0.0003 1.1678 -0.6622 0.1776 1.22 13.28 1421.20 
Pharmacy & Biotechnology  10 0.0001 1.1756 -1.6147 0.3828 -0.15 4.38 29.85 
Consumer Services  84 -0.0012 0.7917 -1.4054 0.2658 -0.66 7.05 283.06 
Retail  28 -0.0024 0.8889 -1.4426 0.3025 -0.44 5.22 81.30 
Food & Drug Retail  4 -0.0011 1.1057 -1.8528 0.4170 -0.43 5.07 97.76 
Media  19 0.0013 1.0780 -1.2255 0.3539 -0.15 3.98 22.86 
Travel & Leisure 21 -0.0019 1.0466 -1.7395 0.3584 -0.55 6.11 172.54 
Telecom  5 0.0002 1.1313 -1.5659 0.3672 -0.29 4.93 62.88 
Utilities  11 0.0000 0.7419 -1.3899 0.3188 -0.55 5.00 78.24 
Electricity  4 0.0017 1.3144 -1.7478 0.4332 -0.12 4.18 17.87 
Gas Water Multi Utility  7 -0.0010 0.8819 -1.3735 0.3559 -0.43 4.41 49.17 
Financial  123 0.0005 0.7616 -1.2754 0.2449 -0.58 7.33 358.73 
Banks  8 0.0014 1.1224 -1.2080 0.3160 -0.19 4.65 42.11 
Non life Insurance 10 0.0052 1.8370 -1.7327 0.6036 0.06 3.18 1.96 
Life Insurance 6 -0.0044 1.4653 -1.8633 0.4385 -0.20 4.88 49.05 
Real Estate  23 0.0009 1.2061 -1.8240 0.4269 -0.30 4.48 42.25 
General Financial 13 -0.0057 1.1093 -1.9729 0.4173 -0.41 4.94 57.43 
Equity Investment Inst 64 0.0016 0.9062 -1.0758 0.2680 -0.18 4.50 34.11 
Technology  15 -0.0006 1.4718 -1.5929 0.4208 -0.17 4.21 27.58 
Software and Computer Svs 11 -0.0004 1.5712 -1.7066 0.4725 -0.17 4.01 19.23 
Technology Hardware & Eq 4 -0.0010 1.4466 -1.7926 0.5302 -0.17 3.48 6.76 
  81 
4.3.2 Abnormal Returns and Volumes Methodology 
Abnormal performance is calculated with mean adjusted returns as discussed by 
Brown and Warner (1985). A parametric t-test (Brown and Warner 1985) and a non-
parametric ranking test (Corrado and Zivney 1992) are used to assess the statistical 
significance of abnormal returns and volumes. Chapter 3 section 3.3.2 provides details of the 
techniques. Daily returns and daily volume analysis follow the same method, though the 
ensuing discussion is couched in terms of abnormal returns. 
 
4.3.3 Panel Data Methodology 
A panel data analysis is used to evaluate the relationship between returns and volumes. 
The analysis is based on abnormal returns of countries’ sector portfolios or their abnormal 
volumes using each of three events. Fixed effects panel analysis includes multiple dummy 
variables that “allow for the effects of those omitted variables that are specific individual 
cross sectional units but stay constant over time” (Hsiao 2003, p. 30) (4.1).  
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Where 
apAR ,   = Value of abnormal return for sector portfolio p on attack a. 
apAV ,   = Abnormal volume for sector portfolio p on attack a. 
aCountryD ,  = Dummy representing the nationality of the portfolios p.  
 
 The link between price volatility is also investigated. For this evaluation the regression 
is estimated using absolute value of portfolio abnormal returns.  
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where,  
apAR ,   = Absolute value of abnormal return for sector portfolio p on attack a. 
apAV ,   = Abnormal volume for sector portfolio p on attack a. 
aCountryD ,  = Dummy representing the nationality of the portfolios p.  
 The regressions are calculated using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method 
initiated by Zellner (1962) for cross sectional panel data. The technique is designed to correct 
for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in cross equation residuals. 
 
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Abnormal Returns 
 Tables 4.3 to 4.9 contain the abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) of the U.S, the Spain and the U.K industry and sector portfolios following September 
11, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. The industry portfolios’ results are 
presented first, followed by the sector portfolio results. The sector portfolios are smaller 
portfolios representing specific industry segments.  
 
4.4.1.1 Local Attacks and Industry Portfolios 
 This section discusses the tests performed on ten industry portfolios following local 
and international attacks. In the tables, sets of industry portfolios are sorted starting with the 
portfolio showing the largest negative AR or CAR.  
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Abnormal Returns 
Table 4.3 provides a record of country industry portfolio AR following Al Qaeda’s 
terrorist attacks in three countries. On the first trading day following the announcement of 
local attacks, almost all portfolios display statistically significant negative AR according to 
traditional t-tests. Only two British portfolios show neutral or positive reaction to the event.  
Indeed, the Health Care portfolio experiences insignificant AR, while the Consumer services 
records small yet statistically significant AR. 
Table 4.3 Industry Portfolios Abnormal Return following Local Terrorist Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of 10 U.S, Spanish and U.K 10 industry portfolios 
following the September 11 attack, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Abnormal returns are 
measured over one trading day following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model 
provides mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric 
t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according 
to the size of AR. 
U.S Indices 
September 11 Attack 
Spanish Indices 
Madrid Bombing 
U.K Indices 
London Bombing 
Industry AR Industry AR Industry AR 
Mean Value -5.29*^ Mean Value -1.54* Mean Value -1.04* 
 (0.030)  (0.018)  (0.015) 
Consumer Services  -11.68*^ Consumer Services  -3.08* Consumer Goods  -1.83*^ 
 (0.032)  (0.019)  (0.014) 
Basic Materials -8.44*^ Telecom  -2.02 Telecom  -1.58* 
 (0.025)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
Technology  -6.24* Technology  -1.81 Financial  -1.54* 
 (0.055)  (0.015)  (0.010) 
Consumer Goods  -5.97*^ Basic Materials -1.67* Industrials -1.46* 
 (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
Industrials -5.92*^ Oil -1.54*^ Basic Materials -1.38* 
 (0.030)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
Financial  -4.16*^ Utilities  -1.39* Oil -1.14* 
 (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.017) 
Health Care  -3.73*^ Consumer Goods  -1.27* Utilities  -1.04* 
 (0.033)  (0.013)  (0.010) 
Oil -2.70* Industrials -1.15* Technology  -1.01* 
 (0.029)  (0.016)  (0.020) 
Telecom  -2.29* Financial  -1.00* Health Care  0.13 
 (0.029)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Utilities  -1.78* Health Care  -0.48 Consumer Services  0.44* 
  (0.020)   (0.038)   (0.017) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
 
While other industries exhibit negative AR, AR varies across industries and countries.  The 
U.S industries react most with an overall AR of -5.29 percent following September 11. The 
Spanish and the U.K markets are more resilient to their local attacks. They display AR of -
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1.54 percent and -1.04 percent respectively. Perhaps, the scale of the September 11 event can 
explain the larger U.S AR. Indeed, the attack caused more damage than either the Madrid 
attack or the London bombing.  
The Consumer services industry is the most sensitive to the attacks across each of 
the countries. This industry exhibits the largest negative AR in both the U.S and the Spanish 
markets. However, in contrast, the Consumer services industry in the U.K responds positively 
to the attack, exhibiting small but positive AR. The Basic Materials, the Telecom and the 
Technology industries are the next most responsive industries. For example, the Basic 
Materials industry is in the top five of industries by way of the most negative AR, with the 
largest negative AR occurring on September 11 (-8.44 percent). Following the Madrid and the 
London bombings, this industry recorded AR of -1.38 percent and -1.67 percent respectively. 
The Telecom and the Technology industries rank in the top three of the most adversely 
affected industries in at least two of the three markets investigated.  
Compared to other industries, the Consumer Goods,   Industrial,   Financial,   Oil 
and the Utility industries appear to be moderately sensitive to terrorism. They exhibit 
statistically significant AR, which are around the average for the sample. Results on the 
Health Care portfolios suggest the industry is the least responsive to local terrorist attacks. On 
average, this industry portfolio AR is constantly smaller and less significant than of other 
industries. 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Table 4.4 displays industries’ CAR calculated over five trading days following local 
terrorist attacks. Comparison of the CAR and the AR indicates whether the equity losses or 
profits lasted over time. Results from the U.S and the Spanish markets show consistent and 
persistent negative abnormal performance over the week. On both markets, the CAR grew at 
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twice the size of the AR suggesting that the attacks had a lasting impact. The CAR rankings 
of industry portfolio follow the same order as the AR rankings reported on Table 4.3. The 
Consumer services, the Basic Materials and the Technology portfolios still bear the largest 
losses. In contrast, with the U.S and the Spanish portfolios, the CAR of the British portfolios 
do not follow the pattern of the AR. On the U.K market, industries negative CAR are on 
average smaller than the negative AR, suggesting that the negative returns generated by the 
London Bombing were only temporary. After five days of trading, more than half of the U.K 
industry portfolios earn positive CAR.  
 
Table 4.4 Industry Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Return following Local Terrorist Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns of 10 U.S, Spanish and U.K industry 
portfolios following the September 11 attack, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Cumulative 
abnormal returns are measured over five trading day following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown 
and Warner model provides mean adjusted cumulative abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance 
estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in 
ascending order according to the size of CAR. 
U.S Indices 
September 11 Attack 
Spanish Indices 
Madrid Bombing 
U.K Indices 
London Bombing 
Industry CAR Industry CAR Industry CAR 
Mean Value -13.56*^ Mean Value -3.98*^ Mean Value 0.04 
 (0.064)  (0.038)  (0.039) 
Basic Materials 
-20.62*^ Consumer Services -6.59*^ Oil -1.63 
 (0.054)  (0.043)  (0.009) 
Consumer Services 
-19.69*^ Technology -5.35* Utilities  -1.26* 
 (0.070)  (0.058)  (0.016) 
Technology 
-17.90*^ Utilities -4.76*^ Consumer Goods  -1.11* 
 (0.117)  (0.026)  (0.032) 
Industrials 
-16.75*^ Telecom -4.66 Consumer Services  -0.75 
 (0.064)  (0.026)  (0.007) 
Consumer Goods 
-14.56*^ Oil -4.30*^ Health Care  0.21 
 (0.050)  (0.025)  (0.030) 
Oil 
-13.95*^ Basic Materials -3.65* Industrials 0.29 
 (0.064)  (0.028)  (0.003) 
Health Care 
-11.77*^ Consumer Goods -3.60*^ Financial  0.50 
 (0.071)  (0.028)  (0.190) 
Financial 
-10.19*^ Industrials -3.52*^ Technology  0.98 
 (0.044)  (0.038)  (0.098) 
Utilities 
-6.34* Financial -3.36*^ Basic Materials 1.15 
 (0.045)  (0.029)  (0.007) 
Telecom 
-3.81* Health Care -0.04 Telecom  2.05 
  (0.060)  (0.085)   (0.002) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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 Overall, the U.S and the Spanish markets appear to react to local terrorist attacks in a 
similar manner. Relative to their market, the different U.S and Spanish industries display 
comparable level of response local terrorist attacks. The events also appeared to have a lasting 
effect on both markets. However, the U.K market does not react in the same manner to its 
local terrorist attack. There is evidence that the event did not have a lasting impact on industry 
portfolios.  
 
4.4.1.2 Local Attack and Sector Portfolios 
 The breakdown of industries into sectors enables identification of the industry 
segments that are most or least responsive to attacks. Sets of 28 sector portfolios are available 
for this cross-country analysis. Some of the sector portfolios only hold one or two firms and 
this is often the case for the Spanish portfolios. As a consequence, the test statistics and, in 
particular, the Corrado test, are less reliable for these sectors. For the sake of consistency, the 
Corrado degrees of significance are still displayed in the tables regardless of portfolio size.  
 
High Abnormal Returns 
 Table 4.5 reports the sector portfolios that have what seems the ten largest 
negative AR during the local terrorist attacks (for the complete list of AR per sector see 
Appendix 4.1, Tables 4.14 through to 4.16). In the three markets investigated, the Travel and 
Leisure, and the Leisure Goods sectors experience what appears to be the largest AR. The 
tourism and airline firms are part of the Travel and Leisure sectors and they may be driving 
the portfolios abnormal loss. The tourism and airline businesses are suspected to be extremely 
vulnerable to terrorism. Post September 11, these sectors experienced a negative demand 
shock (Drakos 2004). Since the sectors are part of the consumer services industry, these AR 
explain the negative performance of the Consumer services portfolios.  
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Table 4.5 Ten Sector Portfolios with Extreme Negative Abnormal Return following Local 
Terrorist Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of the 10 sector portfolios exhibiting the largest negative 
abnormal returns following the September 11 attack, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Abnormal 
returns are measured over one trading day following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner 
model provides mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a 
parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order 
according to the size of AR. 
U.S Indices 
September 11 Attack 
Spanish Indices 
Madrid Bombing 
U.K Indices 
London Bombing 
Sector # of Firms AR Sector 
# of 
Firms AR Sector 
# of 
Firms AR 
28 -21.82*^ 2 -4.53*^ 1 -3.13 Travel & 
Leisure 
 (0.027) 
Media 
 (0.024) 
Leisure Goods 
 (0.020) 
11 -11.60*^ 3 -3.61*^ 23 -2.90*^ Industrial 
Metal 
 (0.025) 
Travel & Leisure 
 (0.018) 
Travel & 
Leisure 
 (0.014) 
66 -8.91*^ 2 -3.59* 4 -2.46*^ Retail 
 (0.036) 
Industrial Metal 
 (0.015) 
Beverage 
 (0.009) 
26 -8.52*^ 2 -2.84*^ 13 -2.12* Media 
 (0.031) 
Leisure Goods 
 (0.015) 
Industrials 
Engineering 
 (0.014) 
24 -8.51* 3 -2.81* 28 -2.09* Chemical 
 (0.022) 
Personal goods 
 (0.016) 
Real Estate 
 (0.012) 
9 -8.39*^ 2 -2.19 8 -1.94* Leisure 
Goods 
 (0.029) 
Pharmacy & 
Biotech 
 (0.020) 
Industrial 
Transport 
 (0.016) 
12 -7.27*^ 1 -2.16* 10 -1.81* Personal 
Goods 
 (0.024) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments 
 (0.008) 
Industrial 
Metal 
 (0.012) 
15 -6.75*^ 2 -1.85*^ 33 -1.79* Industrials 
Engineering 
 (0.024) 
Tobacco 
 (0.012) 
Retail 
 (0.017) 
15 -6.17*^ 2 -1.76* 6 -1.75* Industrial 
Transport 
 (0.027) 
Non life Insurance 
 (0.013) 
Life Insurance 
 (0.013) 
38 -5.86*^ 3 -1.76 9 -1.75* General 
Financial 
 (0.029) 
Technology 
Hardware & Eq 
 (0.029) 
Aerospace 
Defence 
 (0.011) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
 
Following the travel related sector, the Industrial metal and the Media sector also 
report some the negative AR. The Media sector seems however less sensitive to terrorism than 
the Industrial metal sector. The British Media portfolio is not included among the portfolio 
with largest AR following the London bombing. Some sectors - Personal Goods, Retail, 
Industrial Engineering and Industrial Transport - also exhibit statistically significant negative 
AR following at least two events. This would suggest that these sectors are relatively 
responsive to local terrorist event. 
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Small and Positive Abnormal Returns 
Table 4.6 details the five sector portfolios with the smallest negative or positive AR. 
There is little consistency in these results and no clear pattern across countries. Only the 
Health Care equipment and services and the General financial portfolios are consistently 
neutral in their reaction to the attacks. These sector portfolios experienced no statistically 
significant response to either the Madrid or the London bombings. The Banks and the 
Tobacco sectors exhibited positive AR following September 11 though this is not repeated for 
the Spanish and the U.K terrorist attacks.  
 
According to the literature, positive returns are expected from the Defence firms 
during conflict. The Defence and Aerospatiale Sector portfolio contains, amongst others, 
airline and defence firms. Following September 11, the U.S Aerospace and Defence portfolios 
experienced positive but insignificant AR. No test was conducted on the Spanish portfolios 
since data were not available. The British portfolio was accessible and calculation shows 
negative AR of -1.75 percent statistically significant with the traditional t-test but not 
Table 4.6 Sector Portfolios with the Smallest Negative Abnormal Return or Positive Abnormal 
Return following Local Terrorist Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of the 10 sector portfolios exhibiting the largest positive 
or smallest negative abnormal returns following the September 11 attack, the Madrid bombing and the London 
bombing. Abnormal returns are measured over one trading day following the announcement of terrorist event. 
The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance 
estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in 
ascending order according to the size of AR. 
U.S Indices 
September 11 Attack 
Spanish Indices 
Madrid Bombing 
U.K Indices 
London Bombing 
Sector # of Firms AR Sector 
# of 
Firms AR Sector 
# of 
Firms AR 
3 2.75*^ 1 0.74 21 -0.13 Tobacco 
 (0.022) 
General 
Financial 
 (0.012) 
General 
Financial 
 (0.014) 
55 1.49* 1 -0.03 10 -0.23 Banks 
 (0.020) 
Chemical 
 (0.021) 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology 
 (0.018) 
10 0.56 2 -0.23 4 -0.34 Aerospace 
Defence 
 (0.022) 
Beverage 
 (0.024) 
Technology 
Hardware & Eq 
 (0.026) 
10 0.40 5 -0.24 6 -0.77 Equity Investment 
Instruments 
 (0.020) 
Real Estate 
 (0.024) 
Health Care Eq 
& Services 
 (0.013) 
5 -0.16 2 -0.31 2 -0.80 Mining 
 (0.035) 
Health Care Eq 
& Services 
 (0.057) 
Personal Goods 
 (0.017) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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significant when applying the Corrado test (see Appendix 4.1, Table 4.16). These 
cross-country results do not enable a determination of whether the sector responds positively 
or negatively to terrorist attacks. A more detailed analysis, looking at sub-sectors and 
segregating defence firms from non-defence firms, should provide more conclusive results. 
A detailed cross-country analysis of sectors AR reveals that local terrorist attacks 
generate negative returns for firms in the travel and the leisure related sectors. Although not 
as systematic, the attacks also generate negative AR in the media and the industrial metal 
sectors. In line with results observed at an industry level, the Health Care sector appears 
relatively immune to local attacks, with the Health Care equipment and services sector often 
displaying no statistically significant AR. The general financial services sector is also quite 
resilient to terrorist attacks. 
 
4.4.1.3 Foreign Attacks at Industry Portfolios Level 
 Tables 4.7 to 4.9 report the reaction of the industry-portfolio share market   to terrorist 
attacks by Al-Qaeda in foreign countries. They show the sensitivity of these portfolios to 
foreign attacks and identify cross-country, country and event specific patterns in industry 
reaction to these events.  
 Overall, the AR generated by foreign attacks have lower levels of statistical 
significance than the AR generated by local attacks. Brown and Warner t-test identify a 
number of statistically significant AR though the Corrado test rarely confirms these results. In 
the interpretation of results, the parametric test is prioritised as the non-parametric Corrado 
tests can lack statistical power. 
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The Effect of Foreign Attacks on U.S Industry Portfolios 
 Table 4.7 reports the U.S industry portfolio AR recorded following the Madrid and the 
London bombings.  The results indicate that U.S industry equity returns did not react in a 
similar manner to the two events. For the most part, the U.S portfolios responded positively to 
the Madrid bombing and negatively to the London bombing. 
 
Table 4.7 U.S Industry Portfolios Abnormal Return following the Madrid and the London 
Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of 10 U.S industry portfolios exhibiting abnormal 
returns following the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Abnormal returns are measured over one 
trading day following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean 
adjusted abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the 
non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of 
AR. 
Madrid Bombing London Bombing 
Industry AR Industry AR 
Mean Value 0.32 Mean Value -1.35* 
 (0.016)  (0.018) 
Consumer Services -0.02 Consumer Goods -1.78*^ 
 (0.017)  (0.015) 
Telecom 0.12 Financial -1.67*^ 
 (0.015)  (0.014) 
Health Care 0.16 Oil -1.63* 
 (0.017)  (0.018) 
Financial 0.22* Telecom -1.63* 
 (0.012)  (0.018) 
Technology 0.22 Consumer Services -1.50* 
 (0.021)  (0.021) 
Industrials 0.27* Health Care -1.36* 
 (0.016)  (0.020) 
Consumer Goods 0.38 Technology -1.31* 
 (0.015)  (0.027) 
Basic Materials 0.50 Utilities -1.15* 
 (0.019)  (0.013) 
Utilities 0.53* Industrials -1.04* 
 (0.011)  (0.019) 
Oil 0.82* Basic Materials -0.42 
  (0.018)   (0.019) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
 
 The Madrid bombing had a statistically significant impact on only four U.S industries. 
The Financial, the Industrial, the Utilities and Oils portfolios display small positive AR. The 
Oil industry has highest AR with a value of 0.82 percent. Unlike post September 11, the 
Consumer Services portfolio recorded not statistically significant AR. In contrast, the London 
bombing had a negative and significant effect on most U.S industries. The Consumer Goods, 
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the Financial and the Oil industries display what seems the largest losses with AR ranging 
from -1.78 percent to -1.63 percent. The strong economic ties between the U.S and the U.K 
could explain these results.  
 
The Effect of Foreign Attacks on Spanish Industry Portfolios 
 Table 4.8 presents the Spanish industry portfolio AR following foreign attacks. The 
U.S and the Spanish industries behave in similar ways. For both the U.S and the Spanish 
markets, following September 11 and Madrid bombings respectively, the industry most 
affected was the Consumer Services industry.  
Table 4.8 Spanish Industry Portfolios Abnormal Return Following the September 11 Attack and 
the London Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of 10 Spanish industry portfolios exhibiting abnormal returns 
following the September 11 attack and the London bombing. Abnormal returns are measured over one trading day 
following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal 
returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank 
test In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of AR. 
September 11 Attack London Bombing 
Industry AR Industry AR 
Mean Value -4.69* Mean Value -1.50* 
 (0.022)  (0.018) 
Consumer Services -13.23*^ Technology -2.50* 
 (0.028)  (0.025) 
Technology -7.53*^ Consumer Services -2.32*^ 
 (0.028)  (0.019) 
Basic Materials -6.53* Utilities -2.19*^ 
 (0.022)  (0.013) 
Telecom -5.78* Consumer Goods -2.13*^ 
 (0.026)  (0.013) 
Industrials -5.55*^ Basic Materials -2.06* 
 (0.019)  (0.015) 
Consumer Goods -3.98* Telecom -2.03 
 (0.020)  (0.013) 
Utilities -3.40* Industrials -1.73* 
 (0.016)  (0.016) 
Financial -2.44* Financial -1.58* 
 (0.018)  (0.014) 
Health Care -1.96 Oil -1.13 
 (0.022)  (0.012) 
Oil 3.47*^ Health Care 2.69*^ 
  (0.016)   (0.038) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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The parallels between the two countries are evident in other industry portfolios. The 
Consumer Services,   Technology and the Basic Materials industries held some of the largest 
AR on the Spanish market following September 11 and the Madrid bombing and on the U.S 
industries following September 11. Following the London bombing, most Spanish industries 
display negative AR with the Consumer Services and the Technology portfolios being the 
most sensitive to the event. 
Following the two foreign attacks tested, the Oil and the Health Care sectors exhibited 
either positive or non-significant AR. The two industries appear relatively immune to the 
terrorist attacks. This is especially the case for Health Care, the only portfolio that did not 
record significant AR following September 11. 
 
The Effect of Foreign Attacks on U.K Industry Portfolios 
Table 4.9 presents AR for British industry portfolios following terrorist events. 
The Health Care industry ranks as one of the least affected industries. It shows no statistically 
significant AR following September 11 and the London bombing, and experiences relatively 
insignificant negative AR following the Madrid bombing.  
A parallel can also be drawn with the Oil industries, which in both the Spanish 
and the U.K markets, the portfolios exhibit positive AR following September 11. In contrast, 
the British Telecom industry appears highly sensitive to terrorist events. It exhibits large 
negative AR following all attacks including the London bombing, with AR are of -6 percent 
following September 11 and -3 percent following the Madrid attack. The Technology industry 
records negative AR but only following foreign attacks. The general reaction of British 
industry portfolios to foreign terrorist events is negative, with high levels of statistical 
significance according to traditional t test. 
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Overall, the U.S, Spanish and the U.K industry portfolios reacted negatively to the 
foreign terrorist attacks tested in this study. The positive reaction of U.S industry to the 
Madrid bombing is the only exception. The industries most sensitive to foreign attack are the 
Telecom, Technology and Consumer services industries. The least sensitive industry is Health 
Care. While the sizes of AR are on average smaller and less significant, these results appear 
quite similar to those observed following local terrorist attacks.  
Table 4.9 U.K Industry Portfolios Abnormal Return following the September 11 Attack 
and the Madrid Bombing  
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of 10 U.K industry portfolios exhibiting abnormal 
returns following the September 11 attack and the Madrid bombing. Abnormal returns are measured over one 
trading day following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean 
adjusted abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the 
non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of 
AR 
September 11 Attack Madrid Bombing 
Industry AR Industry AR 
Mean Value -2.45* Mean Value -1.84* 
 (0.026)  (0.019) 
Technology -5.98* Telecom -3.04* 
 (0.045)  (0.026) 
Telecom -5.55* Technology -2.98* 
 (0.041)  (0.028) 
Financial -3.27* Oil -2.86* 
 (0.014)  (0.018) 
Basic Materials -2.78* Industrials -2.00* 
 (0.023)  (0.018) 
Consumer Goods -2.75* Financial -1.90* 
 (0.021)  (0.013) 
Utilities -2.45* Basic Materials -1.60* 
 (0.017)  (0.021) 
Industrials -2.06* Consumer Goods -1.43* 
 (0.020)  (0.016) 
Consumer Services -1.05* Utilities -1.40*^ 
 (0.024)  (0.012) 
Health Care -0.04 Health Care -1.35* 
 (0.034)  (0.021) 
Oil 1.39* Consumer Services 0.16 
  (0.020)   (0.016) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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September 11, the Madrid Bombing, the London Bombing, Why the Different Industry 
Effects?  
Across markets, similarities but also differences can be observed when comparing in 
the industry effects of the September 11 attack, the Madrid bombing and the London 
bombing. The relationship between the stock markets and the chronology of the events may 
explain why the industry differential effect did vary for each event.  
Following September 11, the industry response of the U.S, the Spanish and the U.K 
markets appears relatively similar. Across markets, Consumer services, Technology and Basic 
materials experienced some of the largest AR This industry co-movement may have been the 
results of the Spanish and the U.K market anticipating the U.S equity market reaction. The 
U.S stock market is a dominant market. According to (McCarthy and Najand 1995), the U.S 
stock market has such influence that it leads other international stock markets. In a specific 
study in industry co-movement on international markets, Meric, Ratner and Meric (2008) 
observed that U.S sectors returns have a significant influence on U.K sectors returns.  
In a similar manner to September 11, the Madrid bombing also triggered statistically 
significant AR in the Consumer services and the Technology industry across markets but the 
size of the AR appears smaller than that following the September 11 attack. The reactions of 
foreign markets to the event were mixed. The U.S market seemed almost non-responsive 
while the U.K market appeared to react quite strongly. The geographical proximity and the 
economic ties between the two European Union members could explain the strong influence 
of the Madrid bombing over the U.K market. 
 During the London crisis, the pattern of industry AR differed from the pattern 
observed following the previous attacks. In the London event, Consumer services and 
Telecom still experienced statistically significant negative AR, yet it was the Consumer goods 
and Financial industries which appeared to be the most sensitive to the bombing. The attack 
had a significant impact on the Spanish and U.S markets. London is one of the main 
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international financial centres. On the wholesale financial markets, the U.K financial services 
sector held in 2005 the largest market share of cross-border bank lending, foreign equity 
turnover, foreign exchange dealing and international bonds (Cooper 2007). Of all European 
countries, the U.K receives the highest level of Foreign Direct Investment (Cooper 2007). The 
major role of the U.K in international finance may explain why the London attack had a 
relatively strong impact on the U.S and Spanish markets. It may also justify the significant 
negative AR observed across markets.  
Finally, the chronology of the attacks may also be a key reason for the heterogeneous 
response of industries across countries. Post September 11, most Western economies and their 
financial markets may have already adjusted to terrorist risk. As a result, equity markets may 
have considered the Madrid and the London bombings as ‘normal’ events. Moreover, the 
market’s response to the bombings may be limited or be different from the one observed 
following the September 11 attack because the bombing generated less damage than 
September 11.  
 
4.4.2 Abnormal Volumes 
Table 4.10 presents the results from tests for abnormal volumes (AV) of shares traded 
in the industry portfolios. We focus on volume traded on the first day of trading following a 
local terrorist attack. The event dates match those used for the AR analysis presented in 
Table 4.3. For foreign attacks, Table 4.11 shows the AV recorded for the Spanish and the U.K 
markets following September 11. These results are presented because September 11 was the 
most significant of the terrorist attacks covered by this study and it expected to have a 
significant effect on the traded volume on foreign markets.  
The AV of Industry portfolios are sorted starting with the portfolios showing the 
largest positive AV. Corrado t-tests are used to detect statistically significant AV. The non-
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parametric test is chosen over the over the traditional Brown and Warner t-test calculation 
because of the non-normality of volume data.  
 
4.4.2.1 Local attacks and September 11 
 
Local attacks 
Results displayed in Table 4.10 indicate that, depending on the markets, some 
portfolios did experience statistically significant AV, following the local terrorist attack. The 
volume effect is mostly significant for the U.S and the Spanish markets. The level of trade 
was exceptionally high following September 11 on the U.S market. Nine of the ten U.S 
portfolios exhibit statistically significant AV. The financial, the consumer services, and the 
industry portfolios exhibit the highest AV with plus 62.78 percent and 56.39 percent, 53.28 
percent respectively. The increase in volume traded in the Consumer services portfolio results 
matches the extreme AR observed previously in Table 4.3. The Telecom and the Utilities 
industries have insignificant AV. These industries also display very low AR (see Table 4.3). 
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Table 4.10 Industry Portfolios Abnormal Volume following Local Terrorist Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal volumes of 10 U.S, Spanish and U.K industry portfolios 
following the September 11 attack, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Abnormal volumes are 
measured over one trading day following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model 
provides mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using the non-
parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of AV. 
U.S Indices 
September 11 Attack 
Spanish Indices 
Madrid Bombing 
U.K Indices 
London Bombing 
Industry AV Industry AV Industry AV 
Mean Value 37.21^ Mean Value 31.55 Mean Value -6.73 
 [2.02]  [1.62]  [0.44] 
Financial 62.78^ Health Care 74.66 Consumer Goods -6.73 
 [3.02]  [1.04]  [1.18] 
Consumer Services 56.39^ Telecom 55.57^ Basic Materials 11.32 
 [2.43]  [1.64]  [0.32] 
Oil 53.28^ Basic Materials 51.23^ Telecom 10.56 
 [2.85]  [1.56]  [0.85] 
Industrials 45.43^ Consumer Services 31.98 Consumer Services 9.54 
 [2.53]  [1.56]  [1.50] 
Health Care 33.72^ Oil 28.36 Utilities 6.04 
 [2.15]  [0.90]  [0.59] 
Basic Materials 29.49^ Financial 26.15^ Health Care 2.43 
 [1.79]  [4.54]  [0.07] 
Consumer Goods 28.60 Technology 23.80 Financial -7.02 
 [1.37]  [1.17]  [0.42] 
Technology 27.94 Utilities 13.34 Oil -13.44 
 [1.54]  [1.48]  [0.58] 
Telecom 24.04 Industrials 10.92 Industrials -16.64 
 [1.60]  [1.36]  [-0.65] 
Utilities 10.43 Consumer Goods -0.54 Technology -42.51 
  [0.93]   [0.71]   [-0.40] 
^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Corrado t values are in square brackets. 
 
Following the Madrid bombing, AV on the Spanish market also seem to follow AR. 
The Health Care, the Telecom, and the Consumer services portfolios all show large AR and 
also record high AV. Not all AV are statistically significant. Industries with lower AR such as 
the Consumer Goods, Industrial, and Utilities, also have low AV. On the U.K market, no 
portfolio exhibits statistically significant AV but the portfolios AV size does appear linked to 
the AR. Cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) have also been tested for the local attacks; 
results are presented in Table 4.2.2, Appendix 4.2.  
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The Effect of September 11 on Volume 
Table 4.11 shows the industry portfolio AV from the Spanish and the U.K 
markets at the time of September 11. September 11 has a volume effect on the Spanish 
industry portfolios that exhibit high AR, particularly the Consumer Services, the Technology 
and the Basic Materials industries. Volume traded on U.K industry portfolios does not appear 
abnormally high following September 11. The U.K market remained quite stable in 
comparison to the other markets when focusing on share volumes. 
  
Overall, the assessment of trading volume reveals that terrorism can have an effect 
on the volume of shares traded: the effect varies with the market and the industry. The AV are 
especially significant on the U.S and the Spanish markets. Further, AR and AV appeared to be 
Table 4.11 U.K and Spanish Industry Portfolios Abnormal Volume following the 
September 11 Attack 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal volumes of 10 Spanish and U.K industry portfolios following 
the September 11 attack. Abnormal volumes are measured over one trading day following the announcement 
of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of 
statistical significance estimated using the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted 
in ascending order according to the size of AV 
Spanish Indices U.K. Indices 
Industry AV Industry AV 
Mean Value 48.00 Mean Value -25.00 
  [1.49]   [0.04] 
Consumer Services  110.00^ Consumer Goods  14.00 
 [2.59]  [0.88] 
Technology  93.00^ Basic Materials 12.00 
 [2.33]  [0.41] 
Basic Materials 93.00^ Health Care  0.00 
 [2.34]  [-0.14] 
Financial  85.00^ Telecom  -11.00 
 [1.97]  [-0.14] 
Health Care  42.00 Utilities  -22.00 
 [1.46]  [-0.61] 
Oil 41.00 Industrials -25.00 
 [1.35]  [-0.19] 
Telecom  13.00 Consumer Services  -34.00 
 [0.84]  [-0.33] 
Consumer Goods  12.00 Oil -36.00 
 [1.34]  [0.36] 
Utilities  
-3.00 Financial  -42.00 
 [0.21]  [0.12] 
Industrials 
-14.00 Technology  -101.00 
 [0.41]  [-0.51] 
^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Corrado t values are in square brackets. 
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linked with many of the high AR industries also being identified as high AV industries. An 
analysis of the impact of foreign attacks on the local market was also performed for the 
Madrid and the London bombings but very few indices display significant AV or CAV 
(results are presented in Appendix 4.2 Table 4.2.2 and Table 4.2.3).  
 
 
4.5 Panel Regression of Abnormal Returns and Abnormal Volumes 
 
 This section reports the results of a panel data analysis. It presents the results from 
regressions of AR and AV and from regressions of (|AR|) and AV. These panel regressions 
evaluate the relationship between sector portfolios AR or AR volatility (|AR|) and volumes, in 
the context of the local terrorist events. Twenty-eight sector portfolios are included in the 
analysis over the three attacks; this gives a total panel size of 253 observations. The 
regression was also performed using CAR and CAV, as well as a regression using absolute 
value of abnormal return (|CAR|) and CAV; the results are presented following the 1-day 
analysis. 
 
4.5.1 Panel Regression of Abnormal Returns 
Table 4.12 presents the results of the panel regression with sector portfolios AR 
and AV. The adjusted R² of 0.42 suggests the AR and AV are related. The relationship is 
statistically significant for the U.S and the U.K. sector portfolios following September 11. 
The regression coefficients are negative indicating that high negative abnormal returns are 
linked to high volumes. Following September 11, the U.S and the U.K. market present 
coefficient of 0.07 and 0.035 respectively. For the U.K. portfolio, the relationship between 
AR and AV is also negative following the event but this result is not statistically significant. 
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The U.K portfolio results for September 11 become significant when analysing 5 days CAR 
and CAV.  
 
 Results on 5-days CAR and CAV reported in Table 4.13. This analysis indicates a 
negative and significant link between return and volume for the U.K and the Spanish market 
the week following September 11. The coefficient is also negative for the U.S market but it is 
no longer statistically significant. These results substantiate the relationship suggested by a 
comparative analysis of the results for industry portfolio AR and AV, where sector portfolios 
exhibiting high negative AR also display high AV. There are also consistent with Pacini and 
Marlett (2001) findings on the price and volume effects of the creation of the Florida 
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.  This observation is tempered by results found for the Spanish 
Table 4.12 Panel Regression of Sector Portfolios Abnormal Returns Regressed on Sector 
Portfolio Abnormal Volumes 
Panel regression estimate of 1-day abnormal returns on the 1-day abnormal volumes of U.S, Spanish and U.K 
sector portfolios. The abnormal returns and volumes have been estimated over 1 day following the September 
11 attack, the Madrid and the London bombing. Dummy variable account for the multiple intercepts the country 
and the terrorist event. 
 
 
 
Independent Variables Dependant Variables 
AV AR 
 U.S Indices Spanish Indices U.K Indices 
September 11 attack    
Intercept -0.005 -0.020 -0.017 
    
Coefficient -0.070* -0.035* -0.017 
 (0.032) (0.010) (0.012) 
Madrid Bombing    
Intercept 0.010 0.002 0.000 
    
Coefficient -0.001 0.005 -0.005 
 (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) 
London Bombing    
Intercept 0.024 0.002 0.004 
    
Coefficient -0.015 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
    
General Intercept -0.02*   
Global F-value 11.74*   
Adjusted R-square 0.421   
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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market following its local terrorist attack. Following the Madrid bombing, Spanish portfolios 
regression coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating a positive relationship 
between sectors CAR and CAV following the Madrid Bombing. 
  
4.5.2 Panel Regression of Absolute Abnormal Returns 
The panel analysis of absolute abnormal returns (|AR|) and AV reported in Table 4.14, 
displays an adjusted R² value of 0.51. This value suggests that the model identifies a link 
between the abnormal returns volatility and volumes. The link between the variables is 
significant following September 11. Regression coefficients of the U.S and the Spanish 
sectors indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship between │AR│ and AV 
with coefficient value of 0.075 and 0.034 respectively. The positive relationship indicates that 
the size of AV increases with price volatility. The coefficient is also positive in the U.K 
Table 4.13 Panel Regression of Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns Regressed 
on Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volumes 
Panel regression estimate of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns on the 5-day-cumulative abnormal volumes of 
U.S, Spanish and U.K sector portfolios. The cumulative abnormal returns and volumes have been estimated 
over 5 days following the September 11 attack, the Madrid and the London bombing. Dummy variable account 
for the multiple intercepts the country and the terrorist event 
 
 
 
Independent Variables Dependant Variables 
CAV CAR 
 U.S Indices Spanish Indices U.K Indices 
September 11 attack    
Intercept -0.034 -0.022 -0.046 
Coefficient -0.125 -0.051* -0.056* 
 (0.085) (0.017) (0.021) 
Madrid Bombing    
Intercept 0.020 -0.021 -0.005 
Coefficient 0.004 0.011* 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
London Bombing    
Intercept 0.043 0.044 0.020 
Coefficient -0.014 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.005) 
    
General Intercept -0.02*   
Global F-value 20.31*   
Adjusted R-square 0.567   
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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market but the result is not statistically significant.  Other regression results suggest that there 
are no significant link between return volatility and volume following other terrorist events.  
 
 
 Table 4.15 presents the results of the panel analysis of absolute value of cumulative 
abnormal return (|CAR|) and CAV. This analysis with 5-day data indicates a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between absolute abnormal price changes and AV for the 
Spanish market the week that followed September 11. Finally, there is a positive link between 
price volatility and volume for the U.K market, with a regression coefficient of 0.006 
following the London bombing. The regression analysis indicates that the U.S and the 
Spanish portfolios exhibit an average positive and statistically significant relationship 
between │AR│ and AV, following the September 11 attack. The relationship is also positive  
Table 4.14 Panel Regression of Absolute Value of Sector Portfolios Abnormal Returns 
Regressed on Sector Portfolios Abnormal Volumes 
Panel regression estimate of absolute value of 1-day abnormal returns on the 1-day abnormal volumes of U.S, 
Spanish and U.K sector portfolios. The absolute of abnormal returns and the abnormal volumes have been 
estimated over 1 day following the September 11 attack, the Madrid and the London bombing. Dummy 
variable account for the multiple intercepts the country and the terrorist event. 
 
 
 
Independent Variables Dependant Variables 
AV |AR| 
 U.S Indices Spanish Indices U.K Indices 
September 11 attack 
   
Intercept 0.003 0.020 0.021 
 
   
Coefficient 0.075* 0.034* 0.006 
 (0.029) (0.008) (0.009) 
Madrid Bombing    
Intercept -0.009 -0.004 -0.003 
 
   
Coefficient 0.010 -0.003 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
London Bombing    
Intercept -0.017 -0.004 -0.007 
 
   
Coefficient -0.007 0.001 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) 
    
General Intercept 0.02*   
Global F-value 16.36*   
Adjusted R-square 0.510   
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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and significant for the U.K market the week following the London bombing. 
 These results support the finding presented in the literature and confirm a significant 
and positive relationship between price volatility and AV (Karpoff 1987; Olibe and Cready 
2002; Pacini et al. 2005; Smirlock and Starks 1988). Moreover, if the “arrival information 
model” (Copeland 1976) holds true, the results indicate that, following September 11, the 
American and the Spanish traders shared a pessimistic view while the British traders were 
divided. This interpretation however is tempered by results indicating a negative relationship 
between │AR│ and AV for the Spanish portfolios following the Madrid Bombing and for the 
U.K portfolios after September 11.  
Table 4.15 Panel Regression of Absolute Value of Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns Regressed on Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volumes 
Panel regression estimate of absolute value of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns on 5-day cumulative 
abnormal volumes of U.S, Spanish and U.K sector portfolios. The absolute value of cumulative abnormal 
returns and the cumulative abnormal volumes have been estimated over 5 days following the September 11 
attack, the Madrid and the London bombing. Dummy variable account for the multiple intercepts the country 
and the terrorist event. 
 
 
 
Independent Variables Dependant Variables 
CAV |CAR| 
 U.S Indices Spanish Indices U.K Indices 
September 11 attack 
   
Intercept 0.022 0.019 0.033 
 
   
Coefficient 0.125 0.046* 0.012 
 (0.085) (0.015) (0.019) 
Madrid Bombing    
Intercept -0.026 0.008 -0.008 
 
   
Coefficient 0.006 -0.011* -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
London Bombing    
Intercept -0.015 -0.013 -0.021 
 
   
Coefficient -0.011 -0.002 0.006* 
 (0.015) (0.006) (0.004) 
    
General Intercept 0.04*   
Global F-value 15.19*   
Adjusted R-square 0.490   
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This paper tested the reactions of various industry portfolios to recent terrorist 
attacks. From this study, it appears that terrorism has an industry differential effect. This 
observation is especially clear following local terrorist attack and following September 11. 
Portfolio reactions to other foreign terrorist events are generally smaller.  It is possible to 
identify some patterns across countries. The U.S and the Spanish industries tend to react to 
terrorist events in a similar way. The U.K industry responses to terrorist events are unlike 
those of either the U.S or the Spanish industries. They also appear more resilient, with smaller 
AR and insignificant CAR.  
Overall, most industries and sectors across countries displayed negative AR and 
CAR following local terrorist attacks. The Financial and especially the Health Care sectors 
are exceptions as their portfolios reaction are frequently small. On a sector level, for local 
attacks across countries, the Travel and Leisure, and the Leisure Goods sectors show negative 
AR. Unexpectedly, the Defence and Aerospace industry portfolio does not provided decisive 
results. The volume analysis identifies a volume effect for many industries. The size and 
significance of industry AV depend on the countries, the events and the industry, but in most 
cases, they corroborate with industry AR. The regression analysis confirms a negative 
relationship between AR and AV. The relationship is significant following September 11, 
with negative returns being linked to large volumes.  Following the event, return volatility 
was also associated with AV as markets show positive relationship between absolute value of 
AR and AV. These results provides some support to trading theory suggesting a positive 
relationship between absolute price change and amount of volume traded.  
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Appendix 4.1 
 
Table 4.1.1 Sector Portfolios Abnormal Return following Local Terrorist Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of the sector portfolios abnormal returns following the 
September 11 attack, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Abnormal returns are measured over one 
trading day following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted 
abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric 
Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of AR. 
U.S Indices September 11 Spanish Indices Madrid Bombing U.K Indices London Bombing 
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AR 
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AR 
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AR 
-5.06*  -1.32  -1.34*  Mean Value 
  
(0.028) 
Mean Value 
  
(0.131) 
Mean Value 
  
(0.014) 
-21.82*^ -4.53*^ -3.13   Travel & 
Leisure 28 (0.027) 
Media  2 
(0.024) 
Leisure Goods  
1 
(0.020) 
-11.60*** -3.61*^ -2.90*^ Industrial Metal 11 (0.025) Travel & Leisure 3 (0.013) 
Travel & Leisure 
23 (0.014) 
-8.91*^ -3.59*  -2.46*^ Retail  66 (0.036) Industrial Metal 2 (0.013) 
Beverage  
4 (0.009) 
-8.52*^ -2.84*^ -2.12*  Media  26 (0.031) Leisure Goods  2 (0.015) 
Industrials 
Engineering 13 (0.014) 
-8.51*  -2.81*  -2.09*  Chemical 24 (0.022) Personal goods  3 (0.016) 
Real Estate  
28 (0.012) 
-8.39*^ -2.19   -1.94*  Leisure Goods  9 (0.029) 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  2 (0.020) 
Industrial 
Transport  8 (0.016) 
-8.15*^ -2.16*  -1.81*  Diversified 
Industries 13 (0.022) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments 1 (0.008) 
Industrial Metal 
10 (0.012) 
-7.27*^ -1.85*^ -1.79*  Personal goods  12 (0.024) Tobacco  2 (0.012) 
Retail  
33 (0.017) 
-6.75*^ -1.76*  -1.75*  Industrials 
Engineering 22 (0.024) Non life Insurance 2 (0.013) 
Life Insurance 
6 (0.013) 
-6.17*^ -1.76   -1.75*  Industrial 
Transport  15 (0.027) 
Technology 
Hardware & 
Equipments  
3 
(0.029) 
Aerospace 
Defence 9 
(0.011) 
-5.86*^ -1.71   -1.74*  General 
Financial 38 (0.029) 
Service Water & 
Equipments 1 (0.016) 
Chemical 
8 
(0.014) 
-5.56 -1.57*  -1.73*  Construction & 
Materials 16 (0.029) 
Construction & 
Materials 10 (0.019) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments 77 (0.007) 
-4.76*^ -1.54*^ -1.67*^ Life Insurance 9 (0.022) Oil and Product 2 (0.012) 
Tobacco  
3 (0.009) 
-4.70*^ -1.52*  -1.66*  Support 
Services 31 (0.033) Electricity  5 (0.011) 
Media  
25 (0.014) 
-4.27*  -1.46*^ -1.63*^ Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  29 (0.038) 
Industrial 
Transport  2 (0.009) 
Banks  
8 
(0.009) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses.  
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Table 4.1.1 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Abnormal Return following Local Terrorist Attacks  
U.S Indices September 11 Spanish Indices Madrid Bombing U.K Indices London Bombing 
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AR 
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AR 
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AR 
-3.78*  -1.33*  -1.48   Technology 
Hardware & 
Equipments  
57 
(0.057) 
Banks  
13 
(0.012) 
Diversified 
Industries 2 
(0.018) 
-3.38*^ -1.05*  -1.36*  Real Estate  50 (0.012) 
Gas Water 
Multi Utility  2 (0.011) 
Support 
Services 35 (0.013) 
-3.16*^ -0.84   -1.33*  Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services  
44 
(0.031) 
Retail  2 
(0.009) 
Non life 
Insurance 11 
(0.016) 
-2.28*  -0.71*  -1.29*^ Food & Drug 
Retail  12 (0.026) Food Product 5 (0.009) 
Food & Drug 
Retail  5 (0.011) 
-2.25*  -0.64   -1.28*  Food Product 17 (0.020) 
Industrials 
Engineering 5 (0.014) 
Food Product 11 (0.013) 
-2.10*  -0.59   -1.22*  Oil and Product 31 (0.029) 
Support 
Services 4 (0.019) 
Service Water 
& Equipments 13 (0.019) 
-2.00*  -0.31   -1.18*  
Electricity  30 
(0.021) 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services  
2 
(0.057) 
Construction & 
Materials 12 
(0.013) 
-1.79*  -0.24   -1.09*  Beverage  11 (0.021) Real Estate  5 (0.024) 
Electricity  4 (0.011) 
-1.54   -0.23   -1.01*  Service Water & 
Equipments 29 (0.050) Beverage  2 (0.012) 
Gas Water 
Multi Utility  7 (0.010) 
-1.43*  -0.03   -1.01*  Gas Water Multi 
Utility  19 (0.019) Chemical 1 (0.021) 
Oil and Product 9 (0.017) 
-1.03*  0.74   -0.90   Non life 
Insurance 44 (0.021) 
General 
Financial 1 (0.012) 
Mining 8 (0.018) 
-0.16   - -0.80   Mining 5 (0.035) 
Aerospace 
Defence 0 
- 
Personal goods  2 (0.017) 
0.40   - -0.77   Equity 
Investment 
Instruments 
10 
(0.020) 
Food & Drug 
Retail  0 
- 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services  
6 
(0.013) 
0.56   - -0.34   Aerospace 
Defence 10 (0.022) 
Life Insurance 0 
- 
Technology 
Hardware & 
Equipments  
4 
(0.026) 
1.49*  - -0.23   Banks 55 (0.020) 
Diversified 
Industries 0 - 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  10 (0.018) 
2.75*^ - -0.13   Tobacco  3 (0.022) Mining 0 - 
General 
Financial 21 (0.014) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1.2 Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Return following Local Terrorist 
Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 5-day abnormal returns of the sector portfolios cumulative abnormal 
returns following local terrorist event. Cumulative abnormal returns are measured over five trading days 
following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted 
abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-
parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of 
the CAR. 
U.S Indices  
September 11  
Spanish Indices 
 Madrid Bombing  
U.K Indices  
London Bombing  
Sector CAR  Sector CAR  Sector CAR  
-13.14*^ -3.70* 0.02*  Mean Value 
(0.060) 
Mean Value 
(0.149) 
Mean Value 
(0.028) 
-33.88*^ -8.47*^ -3.58 ^ Travel & Leisure (0.059) 
Service Water & 
Equipments (0.032) 
Tobacco  
-(1.819) 
-31.53*^ -7.76*^ -3.26^ Industrial Metal (0.056) Leisure Goods  (0.045) 
Beverage  
-(1.978) 
-20.95*^ -6.82*  -3.24   Diversified 
Industries (0.048) Travel & Leisure (0.045) 
Leisure Goods  
-(0.735) 
-19.36*^ -6.54  -2.39*  Leisure Goods  (0.059) Media  (0.053) 
Oil and Product 
-(1.131) 
-19.08*^ -6.30*^ -1.90*  Industrial Transport  (0.059) Retail  (0.031) 
Gas Water Multi 
Utility  
-(1.376) 
-19.03*^ -5.52*  -1.82*  Chemical (0.047) Industrial Metal (0.027) 
Non life 
Insurance 
-(1.137) 
-18.09*^ -5.31*^ -1.34*  Industrials 
Engineering (0.050) Personal goods  (0.033) 
Travel & Leisure 
-(1.104) 
-17.24*^ -4.94*^ -1.24   Construction & 
Materials (0.067) Electricity  (0.022) 
Food Product 
-(1.144) 
-16.34*^ -4.32   -0.46   
Personal goods  
(0.051) 
Technology 
Hardware & 
Equipments  (0.066) 
Construction & 
Materials 
(0.030) 
-15.78*^ -4.30*^ -0.27*  Media  (0.067) Oil and Product (0.025) 
Media  
(0.014) 
-15.73*^ -4.28*^ -0.16   Retail  (0.076) 
Gas Water Multi 
Utility  (0.021) 
Electricity  
-(0.348) 
-14.78 -4.27*^ -0.12   Support Services (0.071) 
Construction & 
Materials (0.048) 
Aerospace 
Defence (0.032) 
-14.74*^ -3.85*  0.03*  General Financial (0.060) Support Services (0.041) 
General 
Financial 
-(0.347) 
-14.67*^ -3.81  0.04*  Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  (0.083) Tobacco  (0.025) 
Support Services 
(0.149) 
-13.44*^ -3.81   0.07   Oil and Product (0.064) 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  (0.044) 
Industrial Metal 
(0.133) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1.2 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Return following Local Terrorist 
Attacks 
U.S Indices 
September 11 
Spanish Indices 
Madrid Bombing 
U.K Indices 
London Bombing 
Sector CAR Sector CAR Sector CAR 
-12.00*^ -3.64* 0.09* 
Food & Drug Retail (0.059) Real Estate (0.048) 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services (0.730) 
-11.68*^ -3.62 0.13* Life Insurance (0.046) General Financial (0.021) 
Service Water & 
Equipments (0.177) 
-10.42*^ -3.59*^ 0.24 Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services (0.066) 
Non life Insurance (0.025) Industrial Transport (0.242) 
-9.99*^ -3.47*^ 0.30* Food Product (0.042) Banks (0.025) Real Estate (0.402) 
-7.77*^ -2.80 0.40 Gas Water Multi 
Utility (0.041) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments (0.018) 
Industrials 
Engineering (0.234) 
-7.63* -2.62 0.85* Aerospace Defence (0.048) 
Industrials 
Engineering (0.032) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments (0.499) 
-7.26*^ -2.39*^ 0.91 Real Estate (0.027) Food Product (0.020) Food & Drug Retail (0.854) 
-7.11*^ -1.43 0.96* Beverage (0.044) Industrial Transport (0.021) Mining (0.230) 
-6.11 -0.70 1.10* 
Mining 
(0.083) 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services (0.127) 
Retail 
(1.161) 
-5.67* -0.25 1.26 Tobacco (0.044) Beverage (0.023) Chemical (1.131) 
-5.65* -0.11 1.39 Technology 
Hardware & 
Equipments (0.121) 
Chemical (0.028) Banks (0.956) 
-5.42* - 1.64* Electricity (0.047) Mining - 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology (0.507) 
-3.04* - 1.69 Equity Investment 
Instruments (0.044) Aerospace Defence - Personal goods (0.995) 
-3.03* - 1.73* Service Water & 
Equipments (0.108) 
Diversified 
Industries - Life Insurance (1.106) 
-2.57* - 2.24 Non life Insurance (0.048) Food & Drug Retail - 
Diversified 
Industries (0.953) 
-0.87 - 3.73 
Banks (0.044) Life Insurance - 
Technology 
Hardware & 
Equipments (1.597) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1.3 Sector Portfolios Abnormal Return following the September 11 Attack 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of the sector portfolios abnormal returns following 
the September 11 attack. Abnormal returns are measured over one trading days following the announcement 
of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of 
statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the 
table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of the AR. 
U.K Indices Spanish Indices 
Sector # of Firms AR  Sector # of Firms AR  
-2.73  -8.46* Mean Value 
  (0.022) 
Mean Value 
  (0.135) 
-11.40*^ -14.67*^ Technology Hardware 
& Equipments  4 (0.059) Retail  2 (0.030) 
-9.47*^ -14.10*^ Banks  8 (0.020) Travel & Leisure 3 (0.032) 
-6.78*  -10.47*^ Non life Insurance 11 (0.019) Media  2 (0.032) 
-6.68*^ -10.22*  Life Insurance 6 (0.018) Chemical 1 (0.033) 
-4.90*  -9.21*^ Retail  33 (0.023) 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  2 (0.026) 
-4.83*  -9.17*^ Media  25 (0.024) Personal goods  3 (0.026) 
-4.81*  -7.99*^ 
Food & Drug Retail  5 
(0.016) 
Technology 
Hardware & 
Equipments  
3 
(0.028) 
-4.57*  -7.66*  Travel & Leisure 23 (0.021) General Financial 1 (0.020) 
-4.48*  -6.99*  General Financial 21 (0.021) 
Service Water & 
Equipments 1 (0.027) 
-4.32*  -6.51*  Service Water & 
Equipments 13 (0.040) Leisure Goods  2 (0.017) 
-4.25*  -6.13*^ Beverage  4 (0.016) Non life Insurance 2 (0.017) 
-4.22 -5.99*  Tobacco  3 (0.019) Industrial Metal 2 (0.021) 
-3.26*  -5.98*^ Support Services 35 (0.019) 
Industrials 
Engineering 5 (0.019) 
-3.18*^ -5.88*^ Mining 8 (0.024) Tobacco  2 (0.017) 
-3.15*^ -5.86*^ Electricity  4 (0.016) 
Construction & 
Materials 10 (0.018) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1.3 (cont.) Sectors Portfolio Abnormal Return following the September 11 Attack 
U.K Indices Spanish Indices 
Sector 
# of 
Firms AR Sector 
# of 
Firms AR 
-3.05*  -5.42*^ Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  10 (0.026) 
Gas Water Multi 
Utility  2 (0.018) 
-2.71*  -4.49*  Chemical 8 (0.022) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments 1 (0.018) 
-2.36*  -3.96*  Equity Investment 
Instruments 77 (0.011) 
Support Services 
4 (0.021) 
-2.31*  -3.52*^ Construction & 
Materials 12 (0.019) 
Food Product 5 (0.019) 
-2.26*  -3.20*^ Food Product 11 (0.020) 
Industrial Transport  
2 (0.016) 
-2.10*  -2.59*  Aerospace Defence 9 (0.015) 
Electricity  5 (0.015) 
-2.04*  -1.94*  Gas Water Multi 
Utility  7 (0.018) 
Real Estate  5 (0.019) 
-1.90*  -1.68*  Industrial Metal 10 (0.017) 
Banks  
13 (0.015) 
-1.67   -1.43   Diversified Industries 2 (0.025) 
Beverage  
2 (0.018) 
-0.97*  -0.02   
Real Estate  28 
(0.011) 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services  
2 
(0.019) 
-0.88   3.47*^ Industrials Engineering 13 (0.025) 
Oil and Product 
2 (0.016) 
-0.03   - Industrial Transport  8 (0.018) 
Mining 
0 
- 
0.44   - Health Care 
Equipment & Services  6 (0.015) 
Aerospace Defence 0 
- 
1.36*  - Personal goods  2 (0.028) 
Diversified 
Industries 0 
- 
2.51*^ - Oil and Product 9 (0.021) 
Food & Drug Retail  0 
- 
10.39*^ - Leisure Goods  1 (0.039) 
Life Insurance 
0 
- 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1.4 Sector Portfolios Abnormal Return following the Madrid Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of the sector portfolios abnormal returns following 
the Madrid Bombing. Abnormal returns are measured over one trading day following the announcement of 
terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of 
statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the 
table, portfolios are sorted in ascending order according to the size of the AR. 
U.S Indices U.K Indices 
Sector 
# of 
Firms AR  Sector 
# of 
Firms AR  
-1.05*  -1.92*  Mean Value 
  (0.018) 
Mean Value 
  (0.019) 
-3.31*^ -4.00  Leisure Goods  9 (0.019) Diversified Industries 2 (0.025) 
-2.41*^ -3.38  Tobacco  3 (0.017) 
Technology Hardware 
& Equipments  4 (0.022) 
-2.41*^ -3.33*  Life Insurance 9 (0.015) Life Insurance 6 (0.022) 
-2.10*^ -3.10*  Beverage  11 (0.014) Non life Insurance 11 (0.016) 
-2.03*^ -2.86*  General Financial 38 (0.018) 
Service Water & 
Equipments 13 (0.025) 
-2.02*^ -2.76*^ Travel & Leisure 28 (0.020) Banks  8 (0.014) 
-1.85*^ -2.73*  Food & Drug Retail  12 (0.018) Travel & Leisure 23 (0.017) 
-1.68*^ -2.63*^ Personal goods  12 (0.014) Oil and Product 9 (0.018) 
-1.67*^ -2.35*^ Oil and Product 31 (0.016) Mining 8 (0.020) 
-1.55*  -2.34*  Retail  66 (0.021) Industrial Transport  8 (0.019) 
-1.51*  -2.22*  Diversified Industries 13 (0.015) 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  10 (0.030) 
-1.50 -2.17*  Industrials Engineering 22 (0.019) Media  25 (0.019) 
-1.46*  -2.17*  Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  29 (0.024) 
Industrials 
Engineering 13 (0.020) 
-1.35*^ -2.01*  Aerospace Defence 10 (0.015) General Financial 21 (0.018) 
-1.22*^ -1.91*  Electricity  30 (0.013) Support Services 35 (0.017) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1.4 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Abnormal Return following the Madrid Bombing 
U.S Indices  U.K Indices 
Sector # of Firms AR  Sector 
# of 
Firms AR  
-1.22*  -1.88*  Health Care Equipment 
& Services  44 (0.019) 
Retail  33 (0.022) 
-1.21*^ -1.82*  Food Product 17 (0.012) 
Construction & 
Materials 12 (0.017) 
-1.10*  -1.80*  Construction & 
Materials 16 (0.024) 
Aerospace Defence 9 (0.016) 
-1.07*  -1.76*  Real Estate  50 (0.011) 
Industrial Metal 10 (0.019) 
-1.04*  -1.71*^ Gas Water Multi Utility  19 (0.011) 
Food & Drug Retail  5 (0.013) 
-1.02*  -1.67*  Support Services 31 (0.020) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments 77 (0.010) 
-0.86*  -1.57*  Media  26 (0.018) 
Health Care 
Equipment & Services  6 (0.018) 
-0.83   -1.57*^ Industrial Metal 11 (0.024) 
Gas Water Multi 
Utility  7 (0.011) 
-0.36^ -1.43*  Chemical 24 (0.016) 
Real Estate  28 (0.014) 
0.59   -1.21   Mining 5 (0.023) 
Leisure Goods  1 (0.037) 
0.73*  -1.09   Non life Insurance 44 (0.015) 
Electricity  4 (0.013) 
0.76*  -1.00   Equity Investment 
Instruments 10 (0.014) 
Food Product 11 (0.015) 
1.00*  -0.99   Industrial Transport  15 (0.016) 
Beverage  4 (0.011) 
1.09*  -0.93   Banks  55 (0.012) 
Personal goods  2 (0.018) 
1.74*  -0.89  Service Water & 
Equipments 29 (0.025) 
Chemical 8 (0.019) 
2.29*  -0.35   Technology Hardware 
& Equipments  57 (0.028) 
Tobacco  3 (0.012) 
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Table 4.1.5 Sector Portfolios Abnormal Return following the London Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of the sector portfolios abnormal returns following the  
London bombing. Abnormal returns are measured over one trading days following the announcement of 
terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of 
statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, 
industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of the AR. 
U.S Indices  Spanish Indices  
Sector # of Firms AR  Sector # of Firms AR  
0.36   -2.34* Mean Value 
  (0.016) 
Mean Value 
  (0.131) 
-0.53   -3.73  Tobacco  3 (0.013) Chemical 1 (0.021) 
-0.43  -2.92*  Media  26 (0.014) Real Estate  5 (0.015) 
-0.27   -2.88*  Life Insurance 9 (0.013) Retail  2 (0.015) 
-0.25   -2.84  Personal goods  12 (0.014) 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipments  3 (0.029) 
-0.22   -2.32*  Food Product 17 (0.012) Personal goods  3 (0.016) 
-0.01   -2.29 ^ Travel & Leisure 28 (0.017) Media  2 (0.024) 
0.01   -2.28*^ Health Care Equipment 
& Services  44 (0.015) Construction & Materials 10 (0.019) 
0.02   -2.20*  Industrial Transport  15 (0.018) Electricity  5 (0.011) 
0.08   -2.19   Industrials Engineering 22 (0.016) 
Health Care Equipment 
& Services  2 (0.057) 
0.11   -2.17*^ Diversified Industries 13 (0.013) Gas Water Multi Utility  2 (0.011) 
0.14   -2.06*^ Retail  66 (0.017) Leisure Goods  2 (0.015) 
0.19 -2.01   Food & Drug Retail  12 (0.016) General Financial 1 (0.012) 
0.24   -1.96  Non life Insurance 44 (0.014) Travel & Leisure 3 (0.018) 
0.28   -1.70^ Equity Investment 
Instruments 10 (0.012) 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  2 (0.020) 
0.29   -1.62*^ Support Services 31 (0.016) Food Product 5 (0.009) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1.5 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Abnormal Return following the London Bombing 
U.S Indices  Spanish Indices  
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AR  
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AR  
0.29   -1.62*  Mining 5 (0.022) 
Beverage  
2 (0.012) 
0.31   -1.61   Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  29 (0.019) 
Service Water & 
Equipments 1 (0.016) 
0.32   -1.48*  Chemical 24 (0.015) 
Industrials 
Engineering 5 (0.014) 
0.34   -1.34   Construction & 
Materials 16 (0.019) 
Non life Insurance 
2 (0.013) 
0.34*  -1.32   Real Estate  50 (0.012) 
Industrial Metal 
2 (0.013) 
0.38   -1.29   General Financial 38 (0.014) 
Tobacco  
2 (0.012) 
0.45   -1.13   Leisure Goods  9 (0.019) 
Oil and Product 
2 (0.012) 
0.45*  -1.08*  Electricity  30 (0.011) 
Banks  
13 (0.012) 
0.64*  -0.71   Gas Water Multi 
Utility  19 (0.011) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments 1 (0.008) 
0.67   -0.57   Aerospace Defence 10 (0.011) 
Industrial Transport  
2 (0.009) 
0.82*  0.00   Beverage  11 (0.014) 
Support Services 
4 (0.019) 
1.07   - Industrial Metal 11 (0.026) 
Mining 
0 
- 
1.10*  - Banks  55 (0.010) 
Aerospace Defence 
0 
- 
1.55*^ - Service Water & 
Equipments 29 (0.019) 
Diversified 
Industries 0 
- 
1.57*  - Oil and Product 31 (0.020) 
Food & Drug Retail  
0 
- 
2.06*  - Technology Hardware 
& Equipments  57 (0.022) 
Life Insurance 
0 
- 
Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses.  
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Table 4.1.6 Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Return following the September 11 
Attack 
This table contains estimates of 5-day abnormal returns of the sector portfolios cumulative abnormal returns 
following the September 11 attack. Cumulative abnormal returns are measured over five trading days 
following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted 
abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-
parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of 
the CAR. 
U.K Indices Spanish Indices 
Sector CAR  Sector CAR  
-4.52*  -12.77* Mean Value 
(0.052) 
Mean Value 
(0.135) 
-28.36*  -26.25*^ Non life Insurance (0.050) Travel & Leisure (0.024) 
-13.78*^ -20.63*^ Travel & Leisure (0.048) 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipments  (0.017) 
-9.24*^ -19.15*^ Diversified Industries (0.056) Leisure Goods  (0.017) 
-8.77*^ -16.94*^ Chemical (0.050) Pharmacy & Biotechnology  (0.026) 
-8.08*^ -14.81*^ Media  (0.057) Industrial Metal (0.021) 
-7.20*^ -12.62*^ Industrials Engineering (0.060) Retail  (0.030) 
-7.10*  -11.56*^ Food Product (0.047) Personal goods  (0.026) 
-7.01*^ -11.27*  Retail  (0.056) Media  (0.032) 
-6.99*  -10.53*^ Mining (0.053) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments (0.018) 
-6.91*^ -8.73*^ Life Insurance (0.037) Tobacco  (0.017) 
-6.90*^ -7.96*^ Aerospace Defence (0.038) Electricity  (0.015) 
-6.44 -7.86*^ Industrial Metal (0.042) Food Product (0.019) 
-6.26*^ -7.84*^ Equity Investment Instruments (0.029) Industrials Engineering (0.019) 
-5.68*  -7.80*  Industrial Transport  (0.043) Beverage  (0.018) 
-5.63*  -7.65*^ Real Estate  (0.029) Construction & Materials (0.018) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
 
  116 
 
Table 4.1.6 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Return following the September 
11 Attack 
U.K Indices Spanish Indices 
Sector CAR Sector CAR  
-5.60*  -7.47   General Financial 
(0.052) 
Chemical 
(0.033) 
-5.59   -6.92*^ Technology Hardware & 
Equipments  (0.139) 
Real Estate  
(0.019) 
-5.47*^ -6.18*^ Support Services (0.048) 
Non life Insurance 
(0.017) 
-5.17*  -6.11  Banks  (0.042) 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services  (0.019) 
-3.40*  -5.90   Construction & Materials (0.050) 
General Financial 
(0.020) 
-3.19*  -5.20*^ Oil and Product (0.047) 
Banks  
(0.015) 
-2.86   -4.63*  Electricity  (0.035) 
Oil and Product 
(0.016) 
-2.46   -4.29^ Service Water & Equipments (0.100) 
Gas Water Multi Utility  
(0.018) 
-1.99   -3.24   Beverage  (0.035) 
Industrial Transport  
(0.016) 
-1.93*  -1.45   Health Care Equipment & 
Services  (0.037) 
Support Services 
(0.021) 
-1.77   7.52   Pharmacy & Biotechnology  (0.061) 
Service Water & 
Equipments (0.027) 
1.18   - Gas Water Multi Utility  (0.034) 
Mining 
- 
2.46 ^ - Food & Drug Retail  (0.033) 
Aerospace Defence 
- 
2.59   - Personal goods  (0.059) 
Diversified Industries 
- 
3.87  - Tobacco  (0.035) 
Food & Drug Retail  
- 
14.52 ^ - Leisure Goods  (0.103) 
Life Insurance 
- 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses 
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Table 4.1.7 Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Return following the Madrid Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 5-day abnormal returns of the sector portfolios cumulative abnormal returns 
following the Madrid Bombing. Cumulative abnormal returns are measured over five trading days following the 
announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal returns with a 
level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test In 
the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of the CAR 
U.S Indices U.K Indices  
Sector CAR  Sector CAR  
-0.41   -2.71*  Mean Value 
(0.039) 
Mean Value 
(0.043) 
-3.38   -7.50   Tobacco  (0.043) 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipments  (0.096) 
-2.34*  -5.53*^ Life Insurance (0.031) Pharmacy & Biotechnology  (0.045) 
-1.99*  -5.20*^ Pharmacy & Biotechnology  (0.053) Oil and Product (0.045) 
-1.90  -5.14*^ Food & Drug Retail  (0.038) Life Insurance (0.049) 
-1.79*^ -4.72*  Beverage  (0.030) Service Water & Equipments (0.060) 
-1.61   -4.11*  Travel & Leisure (0.045) Mining (0.045) 
-1.53*  -3.93*  Food Product (0.025) 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services  (0.046) 
-1.25  -3.79*  Personal goods  (0.030) Non life Insurance (0.039) 
-1.03   -3.52*  Aerospace Defence (0.035) Media  (0.046) 
-1.00   -3.20*^ Mining (0.054) Travel & Leisure (0.039) 
-1.00   -2.93   Leisure Goods  (0.045) Personal goods  (0.045) 
-0.96 -2.83   Retail  (0.048) Industrials Engineering (0.050) 
-0.93  -2.67*  General Financial (0.041) Support Services (0.041) 
-0.61   -2.49*  Health Care Equipment & 
Services  (0.043) Real Estate  (0.034) 
-0.25   -2.48   Non life Insurance (0.032) Leisure Goods  (0.086) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1.7 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Return following the Madrid 
Bombing 
U.S Indices U.K Indices  
Sector CAR  Sector CAR  
-0.16   -2.47*  Technology Hardware & 
Equipments  (0.063) 
Retail  
(0.052) 
-0.05   -2.42*  Gas Water Multi Utility  (0.025) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments (0.025) 
-0.02   -2.40*  Service Water & Equipments (0.055) 
General Financial 
(0.042) 
0.03   -2.40  Media  (0.040) 
Chemical 
(0.044) 
0.12   -2.13*^ Industrial Metal (0.056) 
Gas Water Multi Utility  
(0.020) 
0.13   -2.03   Construction & Materials (0.054) 
Industrial Metal 
(0.047) 
0.24   -2.02   Banks  (0.026) 
Industrial Transport  
(0.045) 
0.27   -1.98^ Chemical (0.034) 
Beverage  
(0.024) 
0.27   -1.87   Support Services (0.046) 
Tobacco  
(0.025) 
0.30   -1.84  Real Estate  (0.024) 
Banks  
(0.028) 
0.32   -1.72   Oil and Product (0.036) 
Aerospace Defence 
(0.037) 
0.58   -1.69   Diversified Industries 
(0.033) 
Diversified Industries 
(0.057) 
0.59   -1.47   Equity Investment Instruments (0.030) 
Food & Drug Retail  
(0.028) 
0.72   -0.93   Electricity  (0.030) 
Food Product 
(0.034) 
1.64  -0.42   Industrial Transport  (0.037) 
Construction & Materials 
(0.041) 
2.05*  -0.05   Industrials Engineering (0.043) 
Electricity  
(0.025) 
Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
 
  119 
 
Table 4.1.8 Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Return following the London 
Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 5-day abnormal returns of the sector portfolios cumulative abnormal returns 
following the London Bombing. Cumulative abnormal returns are measured over five trading days 
following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted 
abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-
parametric Corrado rank test In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of 
the CAR 
U.S Indices  Spanish Indices  
Sector CAR  Sector CAR  
1.96*  0.38  Mean Value 
(0.016) 
Mean Value 
(0.142) 
-1.08*  -2.45   Health Care Equipment & 
Services  (0.015) Industrial Metal (0.030) 
0.20   -0.36   Life Insurance (0.013) Electricity  (0.027) 
0.24   0.01   Equity Investment Instruments (0.012) Beverage  (0.027) 
0.56   0.03   Non life Insurance (0.014) Banks  (0.020) 
0.68   0.08   Construction & Materials (0.019) Food Product (0.023) 
0.80   0.15   Mining (0.022) Non life Insurance (0.028) 
0.86   0.22   Aerospace Defence (0.011) Personal goods  (0.030) 
0.87   0.27   Tobacco  (0.013) Media  (0.030) 
1.01*  0.34   Food Product (0.012) Retail  (0.033) 
1.18*  0.67   Media  (0.014) Tobacco  (0.025) 
1.21   0.70   Oil and Product (0.020) 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services  (0.049) 
1.43 1.05   Retail  (0.017) Industrials Engineering (0.032) 
1.46   1.12   Food & Drug Retail  (0.016) Real Estate  (0.039) 
1.67*  1.52   Gas Water Multi Utility  (0.011) Gas Water Multi Utility  (0.018) 
1.88*  2.28*  Real Estate  (0.012) Construction & Materials (0.031) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.1.8 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Return following the 
London Bombing 
U.S Indices  Spanish Indices  
Sector CAR  Sector CAR  
1.89*  2.43   Electricity  
(0.011) 
General Financial 
(0.024) 
2.02*  2.53  Support Services (0.016) 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  (0.026) 
2.06*  3.09  Travel & Leisure (0.017) 
Equity Investment 
Instruments (0.016) 
2.30*  3.24*^ Pharmacy & Biotechnology  (0.019) 
Industrial Transport  
(0.019) 
2.32*  3.56  Diversified Industries (0.013) 
Service Water & 
Equipments (0.021) 
2.35*  3.92*  General Financial (0.014) 
Travel & Leisure 
(0.028) 
2.36*  4.55*  Beverage  (0.014) 
Leisure Goods  
(0.019) 
2.39*  5.66*  Industrial Transport  (0.018) 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipments  (0.045) 
2.48*  5.71*^ Banks  (0.010) 
Oil and Product 
(0.021) 
2.50*  8.37*  Industrials Engineering (0.016) 
Support Services 
(0.051) 
2.57*  9.02   Personal goods  (0.014) 
Chemical 
(0.077) 
2.61*  - Chemical (0.015) 
Mining 
- 
3.06  - Leisure Goods  (0.019) 
Aerospace Defence 
- 
3.56*  - Service Water & Equipments (0.019) 
Diversified Industries 
- 
4.46*  - Technology Hardware & 
Equipments  (0.022) 
Food & Drug Retail  
- 
5.85*  - Industrial Metal (0.026) 
Life Insurance 
- 
Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.1 Industry Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volume on Local Terrorist Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal volumes of the industry portfolios following 
local terrorist event. Cumulative abnormal volumes are measured over five trading days following the 
announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal volumes 
with a level of statistical significance estimated using the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, 
portfolios are sorted in ascending order according to the size of CAV 
U.S Indices 
September 11 Attack 
Spanish Indices 
Madrid Bombing 
U.K Indices 
London Bombing 
Industry CAV Industry CAV Industry CAV 
Mean Value 56.33^ Mean Value 9.76 Mean Value -19.09 
  [2.06]   [0.71]   [-0.46] 
Oil 76.76^ Industrials 100.34^ Basic Materials -19.09 
 [1.93]  [2.85]  [-0.17] 
Financial 68.39^ Utilities 53.93 Oil 24.89 
 [1.89]  [1.55]  [0.46] 
Industrials 62.10^ Financial 36.32 Utilities 22.78 
 [2.44]  [0.85]  [0.12] 
Health Care 58.62^ Technology 32.42 Health Care 1.50 
 [1.98]  [0.85]  [-0.28] 
Consumer Goods 58.35^ Health Care 10.60 Consumer Services -3.43 
 [2.50]  [-0.26]  [-0.30] 
Consumer Services 57.87^ Telecom 0.00 Consumer Goods -20.14 
 [1.04]  [1.06]  [-0.50] 
Basic Materials 54.87^ Basic Materials 0.00 Financial -21.68 
 [1.99]  [0.98]  [-0.27] 
Technology 49.87^ Consumer Services -1.79 Industrials -31.15 
 [2.48]  [0.23]  [-1.62] 
Utilities 48.82^ Consumer Goods -37.53 Telecom -43.29 
 [2.44]  [-0.51]  [-0.91] 
Telecom 27.70 Oil -96.70 Technology -66.33 
  [1.94]   [-1.02]   [-1.16] 
^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Corrado t values are in square brackets. 
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Table 4.2.2 U.S and U.K Industry Portfolios Abnormal Volume and Cumulative Abnormal 
Volume following the Madrid Bombing 
This table contains estimates of the 1-day and 5-day cumulative abnormal volumes of the U.S and the U.K 
industry portfolios following the Madrid Bombing. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted 
abnormal volumes with a level of statistical significance estimated using the non-parametric Corrado rank test 
In the table, portfolios are sorted in ascending order according to the size of AV 
U.S Indices U.K Indices 
Industry AV CAV Industry AV CAV 
Mean value 9.00 -10.00 Mean value 28.00 -6.00 
  [0.88] [-0.47]   [1.28] [-0.22] 
Telecom 24.00 -3.00 Telecom 114.00^ 36.00 
 [1.31] [-0.24]  [2.62] [1.07] 
Utilities 15.00 18.00 Technology 27.00 -8.00 
 [1.59] [0.62]  [1.45] [-0.84] 
Financial 15.00 -4.00 Consumer Services 27.00 -2.00 
 [1.30] [-0.45]  [1.43] [-0.14] 
Consumer Services 10.00 -8.00 Financial 25.00 -19.00 
 [1.10] [-0.45]  [1.50] [-0.14] 
Basic Materials 9.00 -11.00 Oil 24.00 -53.00 
 [1.03] [-0.53]  [1.08] [-1.09] 
Technology 6.00 -32.00 Industrials 22.00 3.00 
 [0.77] [-1.19]  [1.19] [-0.09] 
Consumer Goods 5.00 -17.00 Consumer Goods 20.00 9.00 
 [0.73] [-0.66]  [1.44] [0.17] 
Oil 2.00 -14.00 Utilities 8.00 20.00 
 [0.28] [-0.61]  [0.67] [0.50] 
Industrials 2.00 -16.00 Basic Materials 5.00 -40.00 
 [0.61] [-0.79]  [1.12] [-1.17] 
Health Care 
-6.00 -13.00 Health Care -4.00 -9.00 
 [0.12] [-0.59]  [0.27] [-0.48] 
^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Corrado t values are in square brackets. 
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Table 4.2.3 U.S and Spanish Industry Portfolios Abnormal Volume and Cumulative 
Abnormal Volume following the London Bombing 
This table contains estimates of the 1-day and 5-day cumulative abnormal volumes of the U.S and the Spanish 
industry portfolios following the London Bombing. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted 
abnormal volumes with a level of statistical significance estimated using the non-parametric Corrado rank test 
In the table, portfolios are sorted in ascending order according to the size of AV 
U.S Indices Spanish Indices 
Industry AV CAV Industry AV CAV 
Mean Value 2.00 -12.00 Mean Value 23.00^ 6.00 ^ 
  [0.42] [-0.48]   [1.72] [3.65] 
Telecom 20.00 -5.00 Oil 97.00^ -63.00 
 [0.78] [-0.19]  [1.99] [-1.48] 
Consumer Services 6.00 -7.00 Technology 59.00^ 61.00 ^ 
 [1.15] [-0.24]  [0.84] [34.83] 
Consumer Goods 6.00 -18.00 Consumer Services 59.00^ -8.00 ^ 
 [0.95] [-0.38]  [2.16] [-0.75] 
Oil 4.00 -10.00 Basic Materials 57.00^ -30.00 
 [0.46] [-0.38]  [1.86] [-0.75] 
Basic Materials 0.00 -32.00 Utilities 56.00^ 57.00 ^ 
 [0.41] [-1.17]  [2.50] [32.49] 
Health Care 
-2.00 -1.00 Financial 45.00^ -3.00 ^ 
 [0.42] [-0.16]  [5.06] [3.47] 
Financial 
-5.00 -9.00 Consumer Goods 45.00^ -5.00 
 [0.13] [-0.30]  [2.02] [0.18] 
Industrials 
-5.00 -9.00 Industrials 25.00 34.00 
 [0.03] [-0.37]  [1.35] [0.86] 
Utilities 
-6.00 -19.00 Health Care 22.00 31.00 
 [0.02] [-0.84]  [0.98] [-0.44] 
Technology 
-7.00 -9.00 Telecom -250.00 -11.00 ^ 
 [-0.13] [-0.31]  [-1.59] [-24.89] 
^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Corrado t values are in square brackets. 
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Table 4.2.4 Sector Portfolios Abnormal Volume following Local Terrorist Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal volumes of the sector portfolios following local terrorist event 
Abnormal volumes are measured over one trading day following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown 
and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal volumes with a level of statistical significance estimated 
using the non-parametric Corrado rank test. In the table, portfolios are sorted in ascending order according to the 
size of AV. 
U.S Indices  
September 11  
Spanish Indices  
Madrid Bombing  
U.K Indices 
 London Bombing 
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AV  
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AV  
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AV  
44.86^ -14.91  -1.34  Mean Value 794 
[1.949] 
Mean Value 
2405 
[0.259] 
Mean Value 
915 
[0.014] 
197.87^ 70.15  -3.13  Aerospace 
Defence 10 [3.776] 
Leisure Goods  1 
[0.895] 
Leisure Goods  
1 
[0.020] 
123.10^ 64.20^ -2.90^ Travel & 
Leisure 28 [3.948] 
Food & Drug 
Retail  5 [1.531] 
Food & Drug 
Retail  23 [0.014] 
110.83^ 41.75  -2.46  Non life 
Insurance 44 [3.961] Tobacco  3 [1.531] 
Tobacco  
4 [0.009] 
70.73^ 41.46  -2.12  Equity 
Investment and 
Insurance  
10 
[3.173] 
Beverage  3 
[1.124] 
Beverage  
13 
[0.014] 
70.17^ 36.66  -2.09  Life Insurance 9 [2.922] Banks  8 [1.518] 
Banks  
28 [0.012] 
69.00^ 18.36  -1.94  Real Estate  50 [2.819] Mining 7 [0.354] 
Mining 
8 [0.016] 
57.97^ 15.73  -1.81  Tobacco  3 [1.955] 
Oil and 
Product 9 [1.133] 
Oil and 
Product 10 [0.012] 
51.37^ 14.93  -1.79  Media  26 
[2.528] 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  10 [1.501] 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  33 [0.017] 
49.06^ 14.60  -1.75  Support 
Services 31 [2.633] 
Equity 
Investment 
and Insurance  
74 
[1.359] 
Equity 
Investment 
and Insurance  
6 
[0.013] 
44.64^ 10.38  -1.75  General 
Finance 38 [2.218] 
Food Product 10 
[1.200] 
Food Product 
9 
[0.011] 
44.32^ 8.14  -1.74  Oil and 
Product 31 [2.397] 
Electricity  4 
[0.729] 
Electricity  
8 
[0.014] 
41.48 7.82  -1.73  Food & Drug 
Retail  12 [2.233] Retail  33 [1.507] 
Retail  
77 [0.007] 
41.04 7.22  -1.67  Industrial 
Metal 11 [1.640] 
Travel & 
Leisure 23 [0.000] 
Travel & 
Leisure 23 [0.009] 
39.73  -0.83  -1.66  Diversified 
Industries 22 [0.674] 
Gas Water 
Multi Utility  7 [0.341] 
Gas Water 
Multi Utility  25 [0.014] 
38.64^ -2.12  -1.63  Industrial 
Transport  15 [1.531] 
Chemical 8 [-
0.177] 
Chemical 
8 
[0.009] 
^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Corrado t values are in square brackets. 
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Table 4.2.4 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Abnormal Volume following Local Terrorist Attacks  
U.S Indices September 11  Spanish Indices Madrid Bombing  U.K Indices London Bombing  
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AV  
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AV  
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AV  
37.12^ 18.08  -6.79  Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  29 [2.012] 
Service Water 
& Equipments 1 [0.612] 
Media  
23 [0.975] 
32.73^ 17.34^ -9.86  
Leisure Goods  9 
[2.123] 
Technology 
Health Water 
Equipments  
2 
[1.792] 
Life 
Insurance 6 
[0.548] 
32.15^ 13.24  -15.35  Chemical 24 [2.574] 
Industrial 
Transport  2 [0.379] 
Industrial 
Metal 8 [0.020] 
31.71^ 6.60  -15.47  Retail  66 [2.020] Leisure Goods  1 [0.379] 
Diversified 
Industries 2 [0.119] 
30.44^ 4.64  -19.39  Industrials 
Engineering 22 [1.729] Retail  2 [0.234] 
Construction 
& Materials 8 [-0.293] 
29.57^ 2.55  -20.44  
Construction & 
Materials 16 
[2.254] 
Personal 
goods  3 
[0.671] 
Technology 
Health 
Water 
Equipments  
4 
[-0.268] 
29.00^ -7.09  -20.57  Banks  55 [1.643] Banks  13 [0.862] 
Support 
Services 35 [-0.330] 
28.55  -7.10  -25.73  
Beverage  11 
[1.563] 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  2 [-0.010] 
Aerospace 
Defence 7 
[-0.350] 
26.10  -13.79  -49.30  
Food Product 17 
[1.305] 
Gas Water 
Multi Utility  2 [0.197] 
Service 
Water & 
Equipments 
13 
[-0.528] 
26.06  -13.80  -49.59  Technology 
Health Water 
Equipments  
57 
[1.325] 
Food Product 5 [-
0.093] 
Real Estate  
28 
[-0.499] 
22.65  -38.55  -56.74  Personal goods  12 [1.611] Beverage  2 [0.734] 
General 
Finance 21 [-0.319] 
21.06  - -57.51  Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services  
44 
[1.540] 
Aerospace 
Defence 0 
- 
Personal 
goods  1 
[-0.838] 
11.57 - -66.47  Electricity  30 [0.963] Life Insurance 0 - 
Non life 
Insurance 11 [-0.563] 
8.53  - -80.42  Gas Water 
Multi Utility  18 [0.718] Mining 0 - 
Industrials 
Engineering 11 [-0.871] 
-9.37  - -93.03  
Mining 5 
[-0.111] 
Diversified 
Industries 0 
- 
Health Care 
Equipment 
& Services  
4 
[-0.948] 
-19.33  - -124.84^ Service Water 
& Equipments 29 [-0.900] 
Food & Drug 
Retail  0 
- 
Industrial 
Transport  8 [-1.642] 
^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Corrado t values are in square brackets. 
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Table 4.2.5 Sector portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volume following Local Terrorist 
Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal volumes of the sector portfolios following 
local terrorist event. Cumulative abnormal volumes are measured over five trading day following the 
announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal 
volumes with a level of statistical significance estimated using the non-parametric Corrado rank test In 
the table, portfolios are sorted in ascending order according to the size of CAV 
U.S Indices September 11  Spanish Indices Madrid Bombing  U.K Indices London Bombing 
Sector CAV Sector CAV Sector CAV 
59.13^ 57.43  -28.82 Mean Value 
[1.827] 
Mean Value 
[0.460] 
Mean Value 
[-0.557] 
116.84^ 200.94  85.41  
Aerospace Defence 
[2.782] 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services  [1.387] 
Chemical 
[0.785] 
92.02^ 160.61  85.10  Travel & Leisure [2.675] Chemical [1.921] 
Leisure 
Goods  [0.838] 
85.28^ 106.28^ 57.27  Non life Insurance [2.337] Support Services [1.921] 
Tobacco  
[1.116] 
79.80^ 83.68  42.67  Food & Drug Retail  [2.470] General Finance [1.115] 
Food & Drug 
Retail  [1.042] 
79.18^ 82.37  18.41  Real Estate  [2.543] Beverage  [0.735] 
Electricity  
[0.545] 
69.28  79.75  10.73  Diversified 
Industries [0.647] Tobacco  [1.611] 
Industrials 
Engineering [-0.369] 
68.97^ 77.80  9.73  
Media  
[2.026] 
Non life Insurance 
[1.427] 
Equity 
Investment 
and Insurance  [0.170] 
66.38^ 77.79^ 8.89  Construction & 
Materials [2.467] Electricity  [1.980] 
Retail  
[0.337] 
66.30  73.74  3.60  Tobacco  [1.561] Industrial Metal [1.244] 
Oil and 
Product [0.122] 
66.22^ 73.11^ 2.79  Chemical [2.160] 
Industrials 
Engineering [1.752] 
Banks  
[0.150] 
66.02^ 70.38  -8.17  Industrial Transport  [1.902] 
Construction & 
Materials [1.570] 
Gas Water 
Multi Utility  [-0.164] 
65.81 62.45  -25.92  Personal goods  [2.030] 
Service Water & 
Equipments [1.102] 
Beverage  
[-0.553] 
64.96 55.83  -30.47  Equity Investment 
and Insurance  [2.155] Real Estate  [1.027] 
Life 
Insurance [-0.786] 
62.71^ 32.60  -33.58  Life Insurance [1.938] Industrial Transport  [0.883] 
Media  
[-0.270] 
61.31^ 25.56  -36.05  
General Finance 
[1.921] 
Media  
[0.701] 
Technology 
Health Water 
Equipments  [-0.464] 
^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Corrado t values are in square brackets. 
 
  127 
 
Table 4.2.5 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volume following Local 
Terrorist Attacks 
U.S  Indices September 11  Spanish Indices Madrid Bombing  U.K  Indices London Bombing  
Sector CAV Sector CAV Sector CAV 
60.86^ 17.40  -37.06  Beverage  
[1.944] 
Technology Health 
Water Equipments  [0.364] 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  [-0.766] 
59.84^ 16.85  -37.54  Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  [2.080] Banks  [0.851] 
Support 
Services [-1.144] 
57.62^ 1.27  -39.43  Support Services [2.223] Travel & Leisure [0.036] 
Mining 
[-0.976] 
53.95^ -5.72  -40.11^ Leisure Goods  [1.823] 
Gas Water Multi 
Utility  [0.036] 
Travel & 
Leisure [-3.920] 
53.92^ -33.74  -45.01  Food Product [1.746] Retail  [-0.328] 
Diversified 
Industries [-0.631] 
53.11^ -34.23  -48.54  Electricity  [1.851] Leisure Goods  [-0.506] 
Industrial 
Transport  [-1.079] 
51.26^ -84.57  -55.33  Banks  [1.779] 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  [-1.466] 
Food Product 
[-0.801] 
51.11^ -84.82  -64.42  Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services  [1.908] 
Food Product 
[-1.513] 
Industrial 
Metal 
[-1.532] 
49.31^ -92.59  -72.34^ Technology Health 
Water Equipments  [1.863] Personal goods  [-0.940] 
Aerospace 
Defence [-1.683] 
46.68^ -96.70  -75.65  Oil and Product [1.785] Oil and Product [-1.017] 
Service Water 
& Equipments [-0.994] 
42.20  0.00  -83.38  Industrials 
Engineering [1.567] Mining [0.000] 
General 
Finance [0.609] 
41.66^ - -85.23^ Gas Water Multi 
Utility  [1.669] Aerospace Defence - 
Real Estate  
[-1.833] 
41.28 - -88.62  
Retail  
[1.616] 
Diversified 
Industries 
- 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services  [-1.182] 
40.73  - -96.95^ Industrial Metal [0.950] Food & Drug Retail  - 
Non life 
Insurance [-1.770] 
38.04  - -101.05^ Mining [0.789] Life Insurance - 
Construction 
& Materials [-1.988] 
-4.99  - -195.00  Service Water & 
Equipments [-0.283] 
Equity Investment 
and Insurance  
- 
Personal 
goods  [-1.614] 
^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Corrado t values are in square brackets. 
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 Table 4.2.6 Sector Portfolios Abnormal Volume following the September 11 Attack 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal volumes of the sector portfolios following the September 
11 attack. Abnormal volumes are measured over one trading day following the announcement of terrorist 
event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal volumes with a level of statistical 
significance estimated using the non-parametric Corrado rank test. In the table, portfolios are sorted in 
ascending order according to the size of AV. 
Spanish Indices  U.K Indices  
Sector 
# of 
Firms AV Sector # of Firms AV 
48.85  -34.31  Mean Value 
 [1.223] 
Mean Value 
 [0.069] 
210.30^ 57.38 Retail  2 [2.253] Chemical 8 [1.415] 
110.18^ 44.68 Technology Health 
Water Equipments  3 [2.192] Oil and Product 9 [1.557] 
102.89^ 44.42  Real Estate  5 [2.204] Food Product 10 [1.557] 
101.61  24.39  Non life Insurance 2 [1.625] Life Insurance 6 [1.023] 
101.01  20.86  Chemical 1 [1.442] Beverage  3 [0.851] 
100.40  9.70  Equity Investment and 
Insurance  1 [1.209] Non life Insurance 10 [0.652] 
95.89^ 8.79^ Food Product 5 [3.023] Travel & Leisure 21 [4.851] 
89.37^ 7.32  Travel & Leisure 3 [1.682] 
Industrials 
Engineering 11 [0.502] 
83.38^ -1.35  Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  2 [1.886] Support Services 28 [0.135] 
75.29  -7.28  General Finance 1 [1.203] Food & Drug Retail  4 [-0.006] 
74.59^ -17.60  Banks  13 [2.159] 
Diversified 
Industries 2 [-0.094] 
73.81 -20.43  Industrials Engineering 5 [1.663] 
Gas Water Multi 
Utility  7 [-0.547] 
63.03 -24.19  Service Water & 
Equipments 1 [1.358] Electricity  4 [-0.473] 
57.68  -25.07  Support Services 3 [1.509] Banks  8 [-0.110] 
57.57^ -26.26  Leisure Goods  1 [1.557] Media  19 [-0.100] 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
 
  129 
 
Table 4.2.6 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Abnormal Volume following the September 11 
Attack 
Spanish Indices  U.K Indices  
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AV 
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AV 
56.17  -28.64  Tobacco  2 
[1.371] 
Technology Health 
Water Equipments  4 [-0.595] 
54.31^ -29.14  Construction & 
Materials 10 [1.941] Tobacco  3 [-0.659] 
51.75  -30.56  Personal goods  3 [1.283] General Finance 13 [-0.171] 
41.82  -32.81  Media  2 [1.501] 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  10 [-0.171] 
41.20  -43.31  Industrial Transport  2 [1.064] Mining 7 [-1.095] 
40.87  -43.96  Oil and Product 2 [1.303] Retail  28 [-0.769] 
23.85  -45.82  Industrial Metal 2 [0.264] 
Equity Investment and 
Insurance  64 [-0.063] 
6.92  -47.27 Electricity  5 [0.357] Industrial Metal 8 [-0.172] 
2.58  -49.06  Beverage  2 [0.916] 
Construction & 
Materials 8 [-0.634] 
1.33^ -58.37  Health Care Equipment 
& Services  2 [1.685] 
Aerospace Defence 7 
[-0.392] 
-29.28  -86.68  Gas Water Multi Utility  2 [-0.569] Leisure Goods  1 [-1.073] 
0.00  -97.00  Aerospace Defence 0 
[0.000] 
Real Estate  23 
[-0.061] 
0.00 -120.08  Life Insurance 0 [0.000] Industrial Transport  8 [-1.120] 
0.00  -127.22  Food & Drug Retail  0 [0.000] 
Service Water & 
Equipments 11 [-0.446] 
0.00  -149.57  Diversified Industries 0 [0.000] Personal goods  1 [-1.281] 
0.00  -218.77  Mining 0 
[0.000] 
Health Care Equipment 
& Services  4 [-0.125] 
 *Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.7 Sector Portfolios Abnormal Volume following the Madrid Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal volumes of the sector portfolios following the Madrid 
bombing. Abnormal volumes are measured over one trading day following the announcement of the 
event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal volumes with a level of statistical 
significance estimated using the non-parametric Corrado rank test. In the table, portfolios are sorted in 
ascending order according to the size of AV. 
U.S Indices  U.K Indices  
Sector 
# of 
Firms AV Sector 
# of 
Firms AV 
9.05  13.86  Mean Value 
  
[0.779] 
Mean Value 
  
[0.766] 
35.42  72.33^ Tobacco  3 [1.618] General Finance 21 [1.821] 
34.42^ 55.67^ Leisure Goods  9 [1.678] Industrial Transport  8 [1.423] 
29.97^ 53.19  Non life Insurance 44 [2.011] Tobacco  3 [1.423] 
26.27  50.38^ Electricity  30 [1.551] 
Service Water & 
Equipments 13 [1.679] 
22.93  45.78  Industrial Transport  15 [1.303] Media  23 [1.299] 
18.67  38.86^ Gas Water Multi 
Utility  18 [1.392] Food Product 10 [2.069] 
18.24  38.33  Banks  55 [1.383] 
Construction & 
Materials 8 [1.183] 
17.24  35.56  General Finance 38 [1.186] Banks  8 [1.475] 
15.65  34.26  Equity Investment and 
Insurance  10 [1.142] Electricity  4 [1.181] 
15.61  33.55  Retail  66 [1.240] Aerospace Defence 7 [0.808] 
14.23  32.54  Life Insurance 9 
[0.935] 
Life Insurance 6 
[1.495] 
12.05 29.82  Service Water & 
Equipments 29 [0.989] Support Services 35 [1.060] 
11.07 29.13  Chemical 24 [0.034] Industrial Metal 8 [0.744] 
10.61  26.05  Support Services 31 [0.984] 
Equity Investment 
and Insurance  74 [1.148] 
9.97  21.69  Industrials Engineering 22 
[1.423] 
Mining 7 
[0.920] 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.7 (cont.)  Sector Portfolios Abnormal Volume following the Madrid Bombing 
U.S Indices  U.K Indices  
Sector # of Firms AV Sector # of Firms AV 
9.21  20.17  Mining 5 [0.631] 
Travel & Leisure 23 [0.000] 
8.95  20.13  Oil and Product 31 [0.711] Personal goods  1 [0.561] 
7.94  17.64  Industrial Metal 11 [0.908] Retail  33 [0.884] 
4.53  13.27  Food & Drug Retail  12 [0.448] Oil and Product 9 [0.884] 
3.71  2.44  Technology Health Water 
Equipments  57 [0.579] Non life Insurance 11 [0.694] 
2.60  1.17  Media  26 [0.579] 
Industrials 
Engineering 11 [0.397] 
2.47  0.62  Travel & Leisure 28 [0.784] 
Technology Health 
Water Equipments  4 [0.193] 
0.58  -5.27  Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  29 [0.447] Beverage  3 [0.139] 
-1.90  -6.47  Beverage  11 [0.707] 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  10 [0.007] 
-2.27  -6.88  Aerospace Defence 10 [0.169] 
Gas Water Multi 
Utility  7 [0.229] 
-3.29  -8.72  Real Estate  50 [-0.069] Real Estate  28 [0.442] 
-3.88 -9.50  Personal goods  12 [0.305] Chemical 8 [0.980] 
-6.65 -10.53  Health Care Equipment 
& Services  44 [0.096] Diversified Industries 2 [-0.370] 
-8.56  -13.93  Food Product 17 [-0.165] Food & Drug Retail  5 [0.397] 
-9.54  -26.54  
Construction & Materials 16 
[0.219] 
Health Care 
Equipment & 
Services  
4 
[0.244] 
-11.36  -121.03  Diversified Industries 22 [0.001] Leisure Goods  1 [-1.251] 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses.  
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Table 4.2.8 Sector Portfolios Abnormal Volume following the London Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal volumes of the sector portfolios following the London 
bombing. Abnormal volumes are measured over one trading day following the announcement of the event. 
The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal volumes with a level of statistical 
significance estimated using the non-parametric Corrado rank test. In the table, portfolios are sorted in 
ascending order according to the size of AV. 
U.S Indices The London Bombing Spanish Indices London Bombing  
Sector # of Firms AV Sector # of Firms AV 
1.27  32.00  Mean Value 
  [0.339] 
Mean Value 
  [1.095] 
25.67  150.44^ Tobacco  3 [1.423] Beverage  2 [1.750] 
18.44  101.96^ Aerospace Defence 10 [0.788] Media  2 [1.032] 
17.42  100.94  Travel & Leisure 28 [0.861] 
Technology Health 
Water Equipments  3 [1.032] 
14.02  98.16^ Beverage  11 [0.947] Food Product 5 [2.630] 
13.84  97.28^ Retail  66 [1.043] Oil and Product 2 [1.930] 
12.68  93.00^ Media  26 [1.276] Industrial Metal 2 [2.070] 
10.44  76.79  Non life Insurance 44 [1.179] Real Estate  5 [1.212] 
8.59  71.09^ Construction & 
Materials 16 [0.885] 
Construction & 
Materials 10 [2.770] 
8.41  65.93  General Finance 38 [0.794] Personal goods  3 [1.287] 
7.15  65.59^ Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  29 [0.910] Support Services 3 [6.791] 
5.79  64.37  Service Water & 
Equipments 29 [0.770] 
Industrials 
Engineering 5 [1.336] 
4.50 59.20^ Diversified Industries 22 [0.178] Travel & Leisure 3 [1.825] 
2.17 58.79^ Chemical 24 [0.120] Electricity  5 [2.412] 
1.51  53.46  Life Insurance 9 [0.157] Leisure Goods  1 [1.019] 
-0.26  47.67  Industrial Metal 11 [1.032] 
Gas Water Multi 
Utility  2 [1.383] 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.8 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Abnormal Volume following the London Bombing 
U.S Indices The London Bombing Spanish Indices London Bombing  
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
AV 
Sector 
# of 
Firms 
CAV 
-0.33  46.47  Oil and Product 31 [0.228] 
Non life Insurance 
2 [1.274] 
-1.47  36.27  Food & Drug Retail  12 [0.073] 
Pharmacy & 
Biotechnology  2 [1.308] 
-2.71  35.17  Gas Water Multi Utility  18 [0.180] Banks  13 [0.918] 
-3.29  34.65  Industrials Engineering 22 [0.147] Chemical 1 [0.918] 
-3.72  26.11  Personal goods  12 [0.010] General Finance 1 [0.610] 
-4.57  14.88  Industrial Transport  15 [0.067] Retail  2 [0.427] 
-5.01  -5.96  Equity Investment and 
Insurance  10 [-0.171] 
Health Care Equipment 
& Services  1 [-0.061] 
-6.01  -9.30  Food Product 17 [0.077] 
Service Water & 
Equipments 1 [-0.291] 
-6.52  -9.73  Leisure Goods  9 [0.200] 
Equity Investment and 
Insurance  1 [-0.049] 
-7.93  -13.67  Mining 5 [-0.081] Tobacco  2 [-0.339] 
-7.95  -33.58  Electricity  30 [-0.069] Industrial Transport  2 [-0.116] 
-8.90  0.00  Technology Health 
Water Equipments  57 [-0.254] 
Food & Drug Retail  0 
[0.000] 
-9.09 0.00  Banks  55 [-0.101] Mining 0 [0.000] 
-14.41  0.00  Health Care Equipment 
& Services  44 [-0.437] Life Insurance 0 [0.000] 
-17.21  0.00  Support Services 31 [-0.733] Diversified Industries 0 [0.000] 
-22.10  0.00  Real Estate  50 [-0.805] Aerospace Defence 0 [0.000] 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.9 Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volume following the 
September 11 Attack 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal volumes of the sector portfolios 
following September 11 attack. Cumulative abnormal volumes are measured over one trading day 
following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean 
adjusted abnormal volumes with a level of statistical significance estimated using the non-parametric 
Corrado rank test In the table, portfolios are sorted in ascending order according to the size of CAV 
Spanish Indices  U.K Indices  
Sector CAV Sector CAV 
48.85  -34.31  Mean Value 
[1.223] 
Mean Value 
[0.069] 
210.30^ 57.38 Retail  [2.253] Chemical [1.415] 
110.18^ 44.68 Technology Health Water 
Equipments  [2.192] Oil and Product [1.557] 
102.89^ 44.42  Real Estate  [2.204] Food Product [1.557] 
101.61  24.39  Non life Insurance [1.625] Life Insurance [1.023] 
101.01  20.86  Chemical [1.442] Beverage  [0.851] 
100.40  9.70  Equity Investment and 
Insurance  [1.209] 
Non life 
Insurance [0.652] 
95.89^ 8.79^ Food Product [3.023] 
Travel & 
Leisure [4.851] 
89.37^ 7.32  Travel & Leisure [1.682] 
Industrials 
Engineering [0.502] 
83.38^ -1.35  Pharmacy & Biotechnology  [1.886] Support Services [0.135] 
75.29  -7.28  General Finance [1.203] 
Food & Drug 
Retail  [-0.006] 
74.59^ -17.60  Banks  [2.159] 
Diversified 
Industries [-0.094] 
73.81 -20.43  Industrials Engineering [1.663] 
Gas Water Multi 
Utility  [-0.547] 
63.03 -24.19  Service Water & 
Equipments [1.358] Electricity  [-0.473] 
57.68  -25.07  Support Services [1.509] Banks  [-0.110] 
57.57^ -26.26  Leisure Goods  [1.557] Media  [-0.100] 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.9 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volume following the September 
11 Attack 
Spanish Indices  U.K Indices  
Sector CAV Sector CAV 
56.17  -28.64  Tobacco  
[1.371] 
Technology Health Water 
Equipments  [-0.595] 
54.31^ -29.14  Construction & Materials [1.941] Tobacco  [-0.659] 
51.75  -30.56  Personal goods  [1.283] General Finance [-0.171] 
41.82  -32.81  Media  [1.501] Pharmacy & Biotechnology  [-0.171] 
41.20  -43.31  Industrial Transport  [1.064] Mining [-1.095] 
40.87  -43.96  Oil and Product [1.303] Retail  [-0.769] 
23.85  -45.82  Industrial Metal [0.264] 
Equity Investment and 
Insurance  [-0.063] 
6.92  -47.27 Electricity  [0.357] Industrial Metal [-0.172] 
2.58  -49.06  Beverage  [0.916] Construction & Materials [-0.634] 
1.33^ -58.37  Health Care Equipment & 
Services  [1.685] 
Aerospace Defence 
[-0.392] 
-29.28  -86.68  Gas Water Multi Utility  [-0.569] Leisure Goods  [-1.073] 
0.00  -97.00  Aerospace Defence 
[0.000] 
Real Estate  
[-0.061] 
0.00 -120.08  Life Insurance [0.000] Industrial Transport  [-1.120] 
0.00  -127.22  Food & Drug Retail  [0.000] Service Water & Equipments [-0.446] 
0.00  -149.57  Diversified Industries [0.000] Personal goods  [-1.281] 
0.00  -218.77  Mining 
[0.000] 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services  [-0.125] 
 *Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.10 Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volume following the Madrid Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal volumes of the sector portfolios following the 
Madrid bombing. Cumulative abnormal volumes are measured over one trading day following the 
announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal volumes with 
a level of statistical significance estimated using the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, portfolios are 
sorted in ascending order according to the size of CAV 
U.S Indices The Madrid Bombing U.K Indices Madrid Bombing  
Sector CAV Sector CAV 
-13.03  -22.08 Mean Value 
[-0.479] 
Mean Value 
[-0.321] 
37.48  85.98^ Tobacco  [0.850] Industrial Transport  [1.766] 
21.90  62.62  Electricity  [0.703] Electricity  [0.546] 
19.60  43.35  Mining [0.664] Construction & Materials [0.546] 
10.77  40.24  Gas Water Multi Utility  [0.409] General Finance [1.623] 
10.66  19.30  Industrial Transport  [-0.039] Personal goods  [0.215] 
10.28  17.63  Non life Insurance [0.179] Tobacco  [0.200] 
0.30  16.46  Real Estate  [-0.003] Service Water & Equipments [-0.124] 
-0.48  14.76  Service Water & Equipments [-0.006] Retail  [0.315] 
-1.35  9.14  Travel & Leisure [-0.196] 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services  [-0.505] 
-1.59  8.74  Support Services [-0.069] Media  [-0.269] 
-4.08  7.79  Media  [0.035] Pharmacy & Biotechnology  [0.061] 
-5.17 5.95  Oil and Product [-0.250] Support Services [-0.191] 
-7.25 -2.39  Industrials Engineering [-0.328] 
Equity Investment and 
Insurance  [-0.007] 
-10.18  -4.61  General Finance [-0.323] Gas Water Multi Utility  [-0.082] 
-12.03  -14.14  Chemical [0.546] Food Product [-0.386] 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.10 Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volume following the Madrid 
Bombing 
U.S Indices  U.K Indices  
Sector CAV Sector CAV 
-12.33  -25.75  Banks  
[-0.461] 
Banks  
[-0.886] 
-12.88  -33.97  Health Care Equipment & 
Services  [-0.591] Travel & Leisure [-0.001] 
-13.00  -34.76  Retail  [-0.742] Chemical [-0.966] 
-14.83  -35.02  Pharmacy & Biotechnology  [-0.421] Oil and Product [-0.966] 
-16.35  -38.38  Industrial Metal [-0.591] Industrials Engineering [-0.420] 
-17.28  -40.84  Personal goods  [-0.526] Aerospace Defence [-1.035] 
-18.39  -41.89  Construction & Materials [-0.713] Non life Insurance [-0.808] 
-23.63  -42.23  Equity Investment and 
Insurance  [-0.910] Industrial Metal [-1.145] 
-24.02  -45.16  Life Insurance [-0.856] Mining [-1.320] 
-29.48  -45.22  Diversified Industries [-0.323] Food & Drug Retail  [-0.839] 
-32.41  -72.02  Leisure Goods  [-1.033] Life Insurance [-1.018] 
-36.41  -81.93  Technology Health Water 
Equipments  [-1.311] Real Estate  [0.349] 
-36.44 -88.56^ Food Product [-1.237] Diversified Industries [-1.723] 
-41.62  -88.84^ Food & Drug Retail  [-1.603] Beverage  [-1.804] 
-43.86^ -89.52  Aerospace Defence [-1.652] 
Technology Health Water 
Equipments  [-1.552] 
-58.44^ -202.07  Beverage  [-1.813] Leisure Goods  [-1.517] 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.11 Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volume following the London 
Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal volumes of the sector portfolios following the 
London bombing. Cumulative abnormal volumes are measured over one trading day following the 
announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal volumes 
with a level of statistical significance estimated using the non-parametric Corrado rank test In the table, 
portfolios are sorted in ascending order according to the size of CAV.  
U.S Indices  Spanish Indices  
Sector CAV Sector CAV 
-10.95  40.55  Mean Value 
[-0.362] 
Mean Value 
[0.166] 
34.70  237.82  Tobacco  [0.985] 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services  [1.347] 
9.70  87.36^ Travel & Leisure [0.634] Food Product [7.928] 
9.23  76.86^ Service Water & Equipments [0.554] Support Services [7.928] 
3.16  62.52^ Industrial Transport  [0.128] 
Technology Health Water 
Equipments  [28.543] 
2.61  57.02^ Banks  [0.094] Electricity  [34.812] 
2.56  56.65^ Construction & Materials [0.011] 
Service Water & 
Equipments [83.368] 
0.39  56.32  Support Services [-0.026] Gas Water Multi Utility  [0.955] 
-2.21  30.31^ Health Care Equipment & 
Services  [-0.255] Retail  [13.610] 
-4.81  24.04  Pharmacy & Biotechnology  [-0.275] Banks  [0.765] 
-5.77  9.36  Leisure Goods  [-0.180] Beverage  [0.473] 
-6.36  -5.34  Media  [-0.431] Industrials Engineering [0.094] 
-7.30 -11.68^ Real Estate  [-0.205] Travel & Leisure [-4.998] 
-8.19 -20.75  Diversified Industries [-0.095] Chemical [-0.145] 
-8.31  -21.10  Gas Water Multi Utility  [-0.460] Construction & Materials [-0.332] 
-9.85  -31.06^ Technology Health Water 
Equipments  [7.928] Industrial Transport  [-19.611] 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2.11 (cont.) Sector Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Volume following the London 
Bombing 
U.S Indices  Spanish Indices  
Sector CAV Sector CAV 
-9.98  -41.92^ Beverage  
[-0.823] 
Media  
[-40.526] 
-10.63  -42.02  Equity Investment and Insurance  [-0.254] Industrial Metal [-0.928] 
-12.50  -55.05  General Finance [-0.357] General Finance [-1.000] 
-14.21  -55.82  Oil and Product [-0.581] Tobacco  [-1.000] 
-14.96  -58.78  Retail  [-0.531] Real Estate  [-0.759] 
-17.35  -63.28  Life Insurance [-0.564] Personal goods  [-0.905] 
-18.23  -63.43  Aerospace Defence [-0.613] Oil and Product [-1.490] 
-20.83  -64.04  Industrials Engineering [-0.714] 
Equity Investment and 
Insurance  [-0.486] 
-23.02  -72.25  Personal goods  
[-0.744] 
Pharmacy & Biotechnology  
[-1.477] 
-23.05  -118.25  Non life Insurance 
[-0.702] 
Leisure Goods  
[-1.406] 
-23.85  -132.35^ Mining [-0.648] Non life Insurance [-94.000] 
-25.20  0.00  Electricity  
[-0.996] 
Food & Drug Retail  
[0.000] 
-26.29 0.00  Food & Drug Retail  [-0.684] Life Insurance [0.000] 
-30.91  0.00  Industrial Metal [-0.957] Mining [0.000] 
-35.93  0.00  Chemical [-0.386] Diversified Industries [0.000] 
-42.04  0.00  Food Product 
[-1.580] 
Aerospace Defence 
[0.000] 
 *Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 5. SIZE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ABNORMAL RETURNS: 
A CASE STUDY ON UNITED STATES INDUSTRIES 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter Four analyses abnormal returns generated by terrorist events, using the main 
industry and sector equity portfolios. The methods used in this study include Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) mean adjusted abnormal returns with Brown and Warner (1980) 
parametric t-test and the Corrado and Zivney (1992) non-parametric tests. This approach is a 
non-regression based method commonly used in event studies on price effect (see for example 
Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006), Chen and Siems (2004), Hillison and Pacini (2004), Pacini 
and Marlett (2001)). Over recent years alternative methods-including regression based 
models-have been developed to estimate and to evaluate the statistical significance of 
abnormal returns. Chapter Five contains a comparative analysis of abnormal returns 
calculated using non-regression and regression based methods. This study is not a simulation 
where abnormal returns are artificially produced. It is an empirical study, using the U.S 
industry, sector and sub-sector equity returns following terrorist events. In addition to 
providing insight into event study methods, this chapter also provides a detailed analysis of 
the industry, sector and sub-sector specific effects of terrorism on U.S equity markets. The 
results from this particular study complement the investigation in Chapter Four, which 
conducts - in the context of a cross-country analysis - a general evaluation of terrorism price 
effects on U.S industries and sectors.  
Price based events studies aim at measuring the impact of an event on security prices. 
The assessment is made by comparing the actual return with an expected return (also called 
“normal” return). The difference between the two returns is the abnormal return. To test the 
level of statistical significance of the difference between the actual and expected return, two 
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methods are commonly used: the non-regression based method and regression based method. 
The expected return is calculated using single or multi-factor models. As the model defines 
the expected returns this will influence the size and significance of the estimated abnormal 
returns. In the case study presented in this chapter, abnormal returns are estimated using five 
different models. One estimation model is processed using non regression based methods, and 
the four other models are estimated with regression based methods.  
The non-regression based method is based on Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). It 
estimates abnormal return with mean adjusted return model.  This model is commonly used in 
event studies (see for example Chen and Siems 2004; Dawkins and Smith Bamber 1998; 
Hamill, Opong and McGregor 2002; Huckins 1999). The second method used in this chapter 
is regression based and involves market-based models. Within the regression based estimates, 
expected returns are calculated using the initial Black, Jensen and Scholes Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). In the CAPM, returns are a function of market return and return of a 
risk free asset. A second market model contains the Fama and French factors (1996) which 
represent the portfolio returns to size and to book to market as well as the return to the market. 
A third model is fitted with GARCH, which corrects non spherical disturbances. A final 
fourth market model contains both the Fama and French factors and the GARCH correction.  
This analysis shows the impact on results obtained from various estimation methods. 
There are significant differences between mean adjusted returns and the market adjusted 
returns, with sometimes contradictory results. To a lesser extent, there is also variation 
discretionary between the market adjusted abnormal returns estimated with different market 
models. Yet the use of more concentrated portfolios seems to increase the level of consistency 
amongst estimates. Regression using market adjusted abnormal returns also tend to converge 
when using longer time series. Finally, the estimates of abnormal return for sub-sector 
portfolios indicate that the September 11 attack had a significant negative impact on the 
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Travel and Tourism, the Hotel and the Aerospace sectors. In contrast, the event had a positive 
effect on the Defence and Water sectors.   
 
 
5.2 Literature 
 
 There is currently no consensus on which method should be used for event studies. 
Researchers undertaking such analysis have to decide on the basic method, regression or non-
regression, as well as on a model to measure the abnormal returns, mean adjusted or market 
adjusted returns. The dilemma is such that studies often use multiple techniques. The 
following section reviews the some basic methods and models commonly seen in economic 
and finance event studies on price effect17. 
 
5.2.1 Event Study Methodology Overview 
Event studies in finance can be traced back to the 1930s, to one of the first studies on 
price effect published by Dollet (MacKinlay 1997). A benchmark method was developed in 
the late 1960s with the studies of Ball and Brown, and Fama, Fisher Jensen and Roll 
(Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 1997). Later, Brown and Warner (1985) provided a standard 
non regression based event study technique used today. As an alternative to this traditional 
technique, the regression based method has been developing and an increasing number of 
finance event studies follow this approach. Discussion on the choice between a non-regression 
and regression based methods are scarce. In a brief paper, Cable and Holland (1999) 
specifically compare the two methods. The study concludes in favour of regression based 
method with robust estimators.  
 
                                                 
17
 The literature on volume effect is covered in chap
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5.2.2 Test Statistics 
When deciding on a method, the method that provides the best estimate of abnormal 
returns is generally preferred. Standard parametric test statistics for both regression and non-
regression based methods are required to meet key statistical assumptions for their estimates 
to be valid. Common to both methods, the assumption of normality represents a problem as 
daily stock returns are not normality distributed (Cable and Holland 2000; Mills, Coutts and 
Roberts 1996). It is assumed however that sample size with aggregation over time and 
portfolio size will correct for non-normality (Brown and Warner (1985) cited in Strong 1992). 
Nevertheless, normality can remain an issue as the aggregation of data is not necessarily 
sufficient to created normality (Jackson, Kline and Skinner 2006). Moreover in some studies, 
sample size is limited (Jackson, Kline and Skinner 2006). Other problems can arise from non 
stable variance, autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and event clustering (Mills, Coutts and 
Roberts 1996). Finally in regressions, an ARCH effect is often detected (Cable and Holland 
2000; Mills, Coutts and Roberts 1996). The issues are more obvious with the regression based 
tests since they generally rely on the market model. The market model is especially known to 
assume non-spherical disturbances in the error terms for statistical testing. 
If the assumptions are not met and the estimation model can not be corrected, robust 
or non-parametric tests can be used instead of the traditional standardised t-test. A range of 
modified standard tests and non-parametric tests have been developed including, for instance, 
the modified parametric Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) method, the Wilcoxon test, 
the Corrado ranking test (Corrado 1989), the sign test (Corrado and Zivney 1992), among 
others. The downside of non-parametric tests is a greater rejection rate of the true null 
hypothesis than standardised t statistics (Brown and Warner 1985). The use of non-parametric 
tests to support parametric tests is frequent in non regression based studies (Hamill, Opong 
and McGregor 2002).  
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Robust methods are less common in regression based studies. One of the reasons for 
the less frequent use of robust regression estimators may be due to the scarcity of examples in 
the event study literature. Further, the utility and the superiority of the robust regression 
estimates remains uncertain (Cable and Holland 2000). Examples of robust regression 
estimate can be found in Mill and Coutts and Roberts (1997; 1996). To support their 
regression results some studies use the Corrado ranking test alongside regression analysis 
(Pacini, Hillison and Hobbs 2006). In regression analysis an emphasis is often put on the 
model used rather than the testing technique. Regression based studies generally rely on one 
or three factor models which are known to challenge ordinary least square required 
assumptions (Coutts, Mills and Roberts 1997; 1996). Correcting or changing the model can 
relieve some of the statistical problems and improve the OLS estimation output. 
 
5.2.3 Expected Return Models 
Selecting an appropriate model for the event study is crucial (Mills, Coutts and 
Roberts 1996). Non regression based approaches can use various models but the general rule 
seems to follow the Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) market adjusted or mean adjusted 
model. The advantage of the one factor market model or multifactor models over the mean 
adjusted model is a potentially lower variance in the abnormal returns through better 
explanation of  the variation in normal return (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 1997). In 
regressions, the trend has been toward use of a simple one factor market model but 
developments in the asset pricing theory now encourage the use of multifactor models. The 
asset pricing theory and the initial CAPM were drawn in the 1960’s (Campbell, Lo and 
MacKinlay 1997). Since then, the validity of the one factor model has been contested18, and 
alternative market models - such as the Merton ICAPM; the Fama and French multifactor and 
the GARCH models - have been developed. 
                                                 
18
 A review of the model anomalies is detailed in Fama and French (1996) 
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The CAPM assumes that equity returns is a function of a single risk factor, the market 
return. Multifactor models see other factors as playing a significant role in shaping firm equity 
returns. For instance, the Fama and French three factor model includes factors such as size 
and value in addition to the original market factor. Ultimately, market models aim to find the 
best estimate of expected returns, to avoid misspecifications and to provide a valid ordinary 
least square output. The literature does not currently agree on a particular model but there is 
strong support for the Fama and French three factor model and the GARCH model. 
 
 
5.3 Method 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to test the initial impact of September 11, the Bali and the 
Madrid bombings on different industries in the United States. A first series of abnormal 
returns are calculated with the non-regression based method of Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985) using a mean adjusted returns model. The abnormal returns are estimated a second time 
using regression based methods with four market based models: the CAPM model, the Fama 
and French three factors model, the GARCH model and the Fama and French three factors 
model with GARCH. 
 
5.3.1 Data 
The equity returns of ten industry indices, 7 super sector indices, 22 sector indices and 
56 sub-sector indices as well as individual firm were collected from DataStream. The daily 
closing value of the indices and firms were gathered from 10 September 2000 until August 5 
2005. The terrorist attacks evaluated are: the September 11 2001 attack; the October 12 2002 
Bali bombing; the March 11 2004 Madrid bombing; and the July 7 2005 London bombing. 
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Tests are run on daily returns with a window starting one year before the event tested and 
closing one month after the event.  
The multiple methods involve the use of two different data sets. The non-regression 
based method uses returns equally weighted portfolios made up of firms consisting of the 
DataStream industry, sector and sub-sector indices. The regression based method uses 
industry, sector and sub-sector indices returns provided by DataStream. In the study, both the 
equally weighted portfolios and the indices are referred to as portfolios in the study.  
Table 5.1 describes the industry and sector portfolios. It provides the FTSE19 industry 
code of the firms making up the portfolios as well as the number of firms per portfolio. The 
descriptive statistics consist of the data statistics of portfolio daily returns from the 11th of 
September 2000 till the 8th of May 2005.  
 
                                                 
19
 FTSE is an independent company owned by The Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange. 
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Table 5.1 Data Descriptive Statistics of Daily Returns 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of daily returns of 95 industry, super sector, sector and sub-sector equity 
portfolios from the 11.9.2000 till the 08.05.2005. The size indicates the number of firms per portfolio. The descriptive 
statistics include the mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum, skewness, kurtosis and results from Jarque-Bera 
test In this table, portfolios are presented following the FTSE industry classification. Portfolios in bold characters 
represent industry. Portfolios in italics and bold characters represent super sector. Portfolios in plain font represent 
sector and Portfolios in italics represent sub-sector. 
 Descriptive Statistics 
FTSE 
Code Portfolio # of 
Firms Mean Max Min 
Std. 
Dev Skew Kurt J-Bera 
500 Oil 67 0.0004 0.0739 -0.0674 0.0140 -0.27 5.00 228.56 
500 Oil and Product 31 0.0004 0.0739 -0.0692 0.0141 -0.26 5.01 229.67 
500 Oil Equipment & Svs 22 0.0001 0.0866 -0.0987 0.0211 -0.10 4.14 71.88 
500 Oil Exploration & Prod 22 0.0007 0.0618 -0.0653 0.0159 -0.28 3.96 65.77 
1000 Basic Materials 42 0.0004 0.0728 -0.0965 0.0146 0.10 6.07 503.12 
1300 Chemicals 24 0.0004 0.0699 -0.0951 0.0147 0.14 6.04 495.89 
1730 Forestry 2 0.0004 0.0877 -0.1102 0.0172 0.08 7.65 1152.44 
1750 Industrial Metals 11 0.0002 0.1135 -0.1174 0.0212 -0.02 5.09 232.58 
1753 Aluminium 1 -0.0001 0.1223 -0.1165 0.0230 0.02 5.48 328.44 
1757 Steel 7 0.0007 0.0881 -0.1378 0.0221 -0.20 5.06 234.80 
1770 Mining 5 0.0008 0.1080 -0.1205 0.0221 0.16 5.22 267.35 
2000 Industrials 143 -0.0001 0.0813 -0.0934 0.0147 0.01 7.13 910.29 
2300 Construction and Mat 16 0.0008 0.0655 -0.0892 0.0173 -0.19 5.15 253.04 
2350 Heavy Con 4 0.0010 0.1728 -0.0878 0.0204 0.79 10.28 2959.61 
2710 Aerospace/Defence 10 0.0003 0.0604 -0.0930 0.0139 -0.37 6.23 584.05 
2713 Aerospace 5 0.0003 0.0665 -0.1661 0.0156 -1.12 14.76 7649.11 
2717 Defence 5 0.0004 0.1454 -0.0779 0.0145 0.46 13.52 5946.12 
2723 Containers and Packaging 10 0.0004 0.0637 -0.0872 0.0152 -0.06 5.69 387.46 
2727 Diversified Industrial 13 -0.0002 0.0977 -0.0971 0.0169 -0.04 7.41 1038.91 
2737 Electronical Equipment 10 -0.0008 0.1557 -0.1143 0.0256 0.48 7.36 1063.36 
2750 Industrial Engineering 22 0.0005 0.0674 -0.0779 0.0140 0.25 5.37 312.45 
2757 Industrial Machinery 12 0.0005 0.0814 -0.0857 0.0150 0.21 5.88 450.73 
2770 Industrial Transport  15 0.0003 0.0548 -0.1431 0.0138 -0.77 12.52 4958.16 
2771 Delivery Svs 2 0.0004 0.0928 -0.0832 0.0134 0.04 8.78 1782.38 
2775 Railroads 4 0.0007 0.0633 -0.0718 0.0160 -0.09 5.06 228.48 
2777 Transports Svs 1 0.0006 0.1200 -0.1069 0.0188 0.02 6.76 755.33 
2790 Support Svs 31 0.0000 0.0636 -0.0839 0.0126 0.03 6.31 583.82 
2791 Business Support Svs 11 -0.0001 0.0637 -0.1118 0.0141 -0.09 7.66 1159.19 
2793 Business Training/Emp Ag   3 0.0008 0.1567 -0.1232 0.0216 -0.30 8.55 1660.16 
2795 Financial Administration 7 0.0001 0.0774 -0.1204 0.0154 -0.14 7.76 1213.47 
2799 Waste and Disposal Svs 4 0.0003 0.0677 -0.1143 0.0159 -0.31 7.37 1040.44 
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Table 5.1 (cont.) Data Descriptive Statistics of Daily Returns 
 Descriptive Statistics FTSE 
Code Portfolio # of 
Firms Mean Max Min Std. Dev Skew Kurt J-Bera 
3000 Consumer Goods 80 0.0001 0.0613 -0.1208 0.0138 -0.21 8.95 1896.31 
3300 Auto & Parts 8 -0.0002 0.0692 -0.1382 0.0163 -0.22 8.39 1559.48 
3353 Automobiles 3 -0.0004 0.0890 -0.1394 0.0186 -0.08 7.31 990.02 
3355 Auto Parts 4 0.0002 0.0677 -0.1384 0.0152 -0.38 9.83 2516.61 
3357 Tires 1 -0.0001 0.1489 -0.1842 0.0316 -0.21 6.58 693.37 
3530 Beverage 11 0.0001 0.0587 -0.0734 0.0109 -0.27 7.44 1064.93 
3533 Brewers 2 0.0001 0.0660 -0.0860 0.0140 -0.39 8.44 1610.77 
3535 Distillers and Vintners 3 0.0008 0.0743 -0.0601 0.0119 0.02 6.40 618.36 
3537 Soft Drinks 5 0.0001 0.0703 -0.0747 0.0121 -0.29 7.45 1075.01 
3577 Food Products 17 0.0004 0.0377 -0.0449 0.0086 -0.25 5.88 454.49 
3722 Dur Household Product 6 0.0004 0.0670 -0.0971 0.0144 -0.05 6.48 646.45 
3740 Leisure Goods 9 0.0005 0.0610 -0.0948 0.0127 0.02 7.12 904.11 
3743 Consumer Electronic 1 0.0003 0.2246 -0.3087 0.0322 -0.36 14.20 6720.90 
3745 Recreational Prd 3 -0.0001 0.0781 -0.2443 0.0190 -2.06 27.81 33729.53 
3747 Toys 4 0.0005 0.1100 -0.0709 0.0160 0.37 7.75 1230.12 
3760 Personal Goods 12 0.0004 0.0630 -0.0607 0.0111 -0.02 6.58 684.53 
3763 Cloth & Access 6 0.0004 0.0583 -0.0954 0.0145 -0.10 6.52 661.58 
3767 Personal Product 5 0.0003 0.0599 -0.0659 0.0116 -0.05 6.29 578.57 
3780 Tobacco 3 0.0008 0.0953 -0.1436 0.0180 -0.79 10.68 3277.40 
4000 Health Care 68 0.0002 0.0526 -0.0461 0.0097 -0.17 5.59 362.66 
4530 Heath Care Eq & Svs 44 0.0004 0.0614 -0.0674 0.0108 -0.29 6.05 514.15 
4570 Pharmacy & Bio 29 -0.0001 0.0598 -0.0558 0.0133 -0.20 4.83 186.49 
5000 Consumer Svs 122 0.0000 0.0864 -0.1022 0.0138 0.00 8.04 1352.44 
5300 Retail 66 0.0002 0.1018 -0.0910 0.0163 0.18 6.94 835.05 
5330 Food & Drug Retailers 12 0.0002 0.1040 -0.0996 0.0133 0.20 13.05 5399.84 
5371 Apparel Retailers 18 0.0003 0.1390 -0.1258 0.0209 0.20 7.76 1214.42 
5375 Home Impr Retailers 2 0.0001 0.0756 -0.0682 0.0163 0.22 5.50 343.76 
5377 Specialized Consumer Sv 9 0.0008 0.1062 -0.1273 0.0197 0.10 7.20 942.22 
5379 Speciality Retailers 19 0.0002 0.1330 -0.2259 0.0202 -0.90 18.43 12868.87 
5550 Media 26 -0.0001 0.0753 -0.0806 0.0149 -0.08 6.10 514.96 
5557 Publishing 10 0.0002 0.0496 -0.0653 0.0107 -0.11 6.04 496.01 
5750 Travel & Leisure 28 0.0000 0.1179 -0.1527 0.0174 -0.57 12.03 4414.89 
5753 Hotels 4 0.0005 0.0996 -0.2256 0.0171 -1.49 28.92 36319.90 
5757 Restaurants & Bars 8 0.0004 0.0500 -0.0856 0.0134 -0.24 5.46 335.85 
5759 Travel & Tourism 1 0.0004 0.1132 -0.2821 0.0226 -1.26 24.65 25333.37 
6000 Telecommunication 12 -0.0004 0.0784 -0.1013 0.0168 0.00 6.40 617.36 
6530 Fixed Line 8 -0.0005 0.0792 -0.1130 0.0167 -0.08 6.86 797.01 
7000 Utilities 49 0.0000 0.0731 -0.0810 0.0125 -0.50 8.65 1757.34 
7530 Electricity 30 0.0002 0.0806 -0.0855 0.0127 -0.47 9.70 2438.54 
7570 Gs/Wt/Mul Utilities 19 -0.0004 0.0665 -0.0927 0.0147 -0.98 7.95 1513.85 
7573 Gas Distribution 11 -0.0006 0.0767 -0.1060 0.0161 -1.06 8.69 1965.64 
7575 Multi-utilities 7 0.0003 0.0673 -0.1035 0.0119 -0.83 12.58 5040.23 
7577 Water 1 0.0010 0.1747 -0.0739 0.0139 1.56 25.19 26777.78 
  149 
 
Table 5.1. (cont.) Data Descriptive Statistics of Daily Returns 
 Descriptive Statistics FTSE 
Code Portfolio # of 
Firms Mean Max Min 
Std. 
Dev Skew Kurt J-Bera 
8000 Financials 196 0.0002 0.0629 -0.0515 0.0125 0.18 6.00 487.40 
8300 Banks  55 0.0002 0.0669 -0.0679 0.0140 0.08 6.09 510.13 
8530 Nonlife Insurance 44 0.0001 0.0708 -0.0601 0.0119 0.13 7.26 972.60 
8532 Full Lin Insurance 3 0.0000 0.0792 -0.0635 0.0128 0.14 7.47 1069.36 
8536 Prop/Casualty Insurance 31 0.0004 0.0613 -0.0619 0.0127 0.15 6.13 525.84 
8537 Software 22 -0.0005 0.1519 -0.0964 0.0232 0.35 7.18 956.85 
8538 Reinsurance 7 0.0003 0.0682 -0.0494 0.0105 0.31 7.82 1259.01 
8570 Life Insurance 9 0.0004 0.0720 -0.0605 0.0133 0.06 5.86 435.64 
8730 Real Estate  50 0.0006 0.0466 -0.0536 0.0089 -0.64 6.32 676.40 
8770 General Financial 38 0.0001 0.0717 -0.0591 0.0152 0.26 5.53 355.86 
8773 Consumer Finance 5 0.0000 0.0920 -0.1048 0.0186 -0.01 6.78 762.54 
8775 Specialty Finance 2 0.0005 0.0614 -0.0612 0.0131 0.05 5.77 409.89 
8777 Investment Svs 12 -0.0002 0.1526 -0.1167 0.0221 0.45 7.36 1055.69 
8779 Mortgage Finance 4 0.0004 0.0679 -0.0625 0.0136 0.08 5.35 297.15 
8980 Equity Investment Inst 10 -0.0003 0.0871 -0.1033 0.0169 0.03 7.35 1009.87 
9000 Technology  85 -0.0007 0.1570 -0.0840 0.0231 0.51 6.80 824.42 
9530 Software & Comp Svs 29 -0.0005 0.1348 -0.0896 0.0208 0.36 6.86 820.68 
9533 Computer Services 6 -0.0001 0.0869 -0.1163 0.0155 -0.06 9.00 1921.25 
9535 Internet 1 -0.0005 0.1556 -0.1398 0.0292 0.05 5.29 279.79 
9570 Technology Hardw & Eq 57 -0.0008 0.1686 -0.0981 0.0259 0.44 6.27 609.81 
9576 Semiconductors 27 -0.0008 0.1443 -0.1355 0.0308 0.33 5.14 267.33 
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5.3.2 Non Regression Based Method  
5.3.2.1 Mean Adjusted Return Model  
The mean adjusted model is used to calculate the abnormal returns. This model is 
chosen because it is the simplest model and Brown and Warner (1980) also argue that this 
model does not differ much from the market adjusted model. Details of mean adjusted 
abnormal return estimation are provided in Chapter Four. 
 
5.3.2.2 Parametric and Non-Parametric Tests 
The test of significant of the mean adjusted abnormal return includes the Brown and 
Warner (1980) parametric t-test and the non-parametric ranking test. The non-parametric test 
is the latest version of the Corrado ranking test (Corrado and Zivney 1992). The Corrado non-
parametric rank test has been found to perform better than standardised tests and it is a 
recommended test (Campbell and Wasley 1993; Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 1997; Hamill, 
Opong and McGregor 2002; MacKinlay 1997). The test is described in Chapter Four. 
 
5.3.3 Regression Based Methods  
In the regression based method, the abnormal return is captured by an event dummy 
introduced into a market model. The dummy has a value of one or zero. The dummy takes a 
value of one on the day or the first trading day following a terrorist event; it has a value of 
zero any other days. For instance for the September 11 attack, the dummy takes a value of one 
on September 17th, the day on which the New York stock exchange reopened after the attack. 
For estimation of cumulative abnormal returns, the dummy assesses abnormal returns over a 
week, in this case the five consecutive days following the event take a value of one.  
Individual regressions are run for each terrorist event tested. Each regression estimates 
abnormal returns using a time series starting one year before the event and finishing one 
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month after the event. In the last analysis, a dummy containing all terrorist events is created 
and a regression is run over the entire time series window starting one year before the 
September 11 attack and finishing one month after the London bombing. 
 
CAPM 
The CAPM model postulates that security returns are a function of the market and a 
risk free financial asset return. The initial regression framework used in this study is the 
following: 
           (5.1) 
tpR ,  is the continuous rate of return on individual DataStream U.S industry indices. 
The indice returns are the first difference of the logarithm ( ) ( )1,, −− tptp PLnPLn . tmktR ,  is the 
value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from CRSP. tfR ,  is the risk 
free return from the one months U.S Treasury bills rate. Dummy is a dummy variable taking a 
value of one the day following a terrorist attack. 
 
Fama and French Three Factors Model 
The alternative models are the Fama and French (1996) model, which is argued to be 
better specified given its extra factors.  
                 (3.2) 
SMB represents “size risk” and it stands for small minus big. The variable is estimated 
subtracting the average return of the market 30 percent smallest stocks and subtracting this 
return from the average return of the 30 percent largest stocks.  The HML factor accounts for 
“value” and stands for high minus low. HML is the difference between the average return of 
the 50 percent of the listed firms with the highest book to market ratio and the average return 
of the 50 percent of listed firms with the lowest book to market ratio. 
( ) ( ) tpttttftmkttptptftp eDummyHMLhSMBsRRRR ,,,,,1,,, ++++−+=− γβα
( ) ( )
 
,,,,,1,,, tpttftmkttptptftp eDummyRRRR ++−+=− γβα
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GARCH Model 
The third variation on the market model is a GARCH model. ARCH effects have been 
detected in event studies on previous occasions (Cable and Holland 2000; Mills, Coutts and 
Roberts 1996) and it has been found that the GARCH (p,q) model corrects autocorrelation, 
removes heteroskedasticity and enhances model fit20. A GARCH (1,1) model is most effective 
in accounting for the time series ‘structure’ in volatility. The mean equation is presented as 
followed: 
             (5.3) 
With the conditional variance defined as follows: 
     
2
11
2
110
2
−−
++= ttt e σηϕϖσ    (5.4) 
 
Fama and French Model Fitted with GARCH 
The last model is the Fama and French three factor model fitted with GARCH to 
capture the GARCH effect. The equation is presented as followed: 
           (5.5) 
With the conditional variance defined as follows: 
   
2
11
2
110
2
−−
++= ttt e σηϕϖσ     (5.6) 
 
                                                 
20
 The variance of financial time series can be auto-correlated and have an autoregressive structure. With the 
introduction of the conditional variance, the GARCH(1,1) model captures the some of underlying ‘structure’ in 
time series data (Chappell and Eldridge 2000). 
( ) ( ) tpttftmkttptptftp eDummyRRRR ,,,,,,, ++−+=− γβα
( ) ( ) tpttttftmkttptptftp eDummyHMLhSMBsRRRR ,,,,,,, ++++−+=− γβα
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5.4 Results 
 
5.4.1 Comparative Analysis of Non Regression and Regression Based Models 
5.4.1.1 Size and Distribution of Abnormal Returns  
 Table 5.2 presents industry and sector portfolio 1-day price responses to the 
announcement of terrorist attacks. It shows comparative results from the Brown and Warner 
(B&W) model and from regression models that include the CAPM, the FF and the GARCH 
and the FF GARCH models. The B&W model estimates and tests mean adjusted abnormal 
returns (AR). The regression models assess market adjusted AR.  
Following the four events, the B&W model constantly provides the largest average 
AR and the highest percentage of statistically significant AR compare to the regression 
models. The B&W average AR ranges from -6.20 percent following the September 11 attack, 
to 0.30 percent following the London bombing. The September 11 attack generated the 
highest percentage of statistically significant AR (92.63 percent) and the London bombing the 
lowest (22.11 percent). Compared to the B&W model, the regression models provide on 
average smaller average AR and a lower percentage of portfolios with statistically significant 
AR. Within the regression models, the CAPM and the GARCH models exhibit comparable 
average AR and percentage of negative AR, average AR are around 2.40 percent following 
the September 11 attack and of less than -0.32 percent following other events.  
The percentage of statistically significant AR is however higher in the CAPM model 
than in the GARCH model. The FF and the FF GARCH models also display similar patterns. 
Both models have average AR around -2.44 percent following the September 11 attack and 
close to zero following the other attacks. The models differ in the percentage of statistically 
significant AR. These results suggest that fitting a GARCH equation to the CAPM and FF 
models dramatically reduces AR levels of statistical significance.  
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Table 5.2 Summary of Abnormal Returns of Industry, Sector and Sub-Sector Portfolios 
This table presents average and median of 1-day abnormal returns of industry, sector and sub-sector equity 
portfolios following four terrorist events. Abnormal returns are estimated on the first day of trading following 
the announcement of the attack. The terrorist attacks tested are the September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, the 
Madrid bombing and the London bombing. The indices are 17 industry and 78 sector indices. The Brown and 
Warner model uses equally weighted portfolios of firms, constituents of DataStream industry and sector indices. 
The Brown and Warner model measures and tests mean adjusted abnormal returns. The regression models 
include the CAPM, the Fama and French, the GARCH and the Fama and French GARCH models and they use 
DataStream industry and sector value weighted indices. The regression models measure and test market 
adjusted abnormal returns. Percentage significant = the percent of abnormal returns having a statistically 
significant value. Percentage negative = the percent of abnormal returns having negative a value. 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns Estimated following the September 11 attack 
Abnormal Return Estimation Model Average Median Percent Significant Percent Negative 
B&W -6.20 -5.86 92.63% - 73.68%^ 92.63% 
Regression Model 
    
CAPM -2.44 -2.05 56.84% 71.58% 
FF -0.29 -0.15 38.95% 53.68% 
GARCH -2.38 -2.01 7.37% 72.63% 
FF GARCH -0.33 -0.33 12.63% 55.79% 
Panel B: Abnormal Returns Estimated following the Bali Bombing 
Abnormal Return Estimation Model Average Median Percent Significant Percent Negative 
B&W 1.02 0.88 43.16% - 43.16%^ 36.84% 
Regression Model 
    
CAPM -0.32 -0.47 20.00% 57.89% 
FF 0.07 0.05 16.84% 48.42% 
GARCH -0.24 -0.48 12.63% 55.79% 
FF GARCH 0.15 0.16 11.58% 46.32% 
Panel C: Abnormal Returns Estimated following the Madrid Bombing 
Abnormal Return Estimation Model Average Median Percent Significant Percent Negative 
B&W -1.23 -1.36 67.37% - 31.58%^ 88.42% 
Regression Model 
    
CAPM -0.08 -0.16 6.32% 58.95% 
FF -0.02 -0.06 7.37% 52.63% 
GARCH -0.08 -0.18 3.16% 61.05% 
FF GARCH -0.02 -0.11 0.00% 54.74% 
Panel D: Abnormal Returns Estimated following the London Bombing 
Abnormal Return Estimation Model Average Median Percent Significant Percent Negative 
B&W 0.30 0.24 22.11% - 14.74%^ 25.26% 
Regression Model 
    
CAPM -0.01 -0.03 1.05% 54.74% 
FF 0.02 -0.07 3.16% 57.89% 
GARCH -0.02 -0.04 0.00% 54.74% 
FF GARCH -0.01 -0.07 0.00% 57.89% 
The symbol ^ identifies the percentage of statistically significant abnormal returns in the sample of portfolios 
according to Corrado t test.   
 
 
Table 5.3 reports industry, sector and sub-sector portfolio 5-day price response to the 
announcement of terrorist attacks. In line with the AR, results from the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) indicate that the B&W model provides the largest, most significant and 
greatest number of negative abnormal price movements.  
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Table 5.3 Summary of Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Industry, Sector and Sub-Sector 
Portfolios 
This table presents average and median of 5 day cumulative abnormal returns of industry, sector and sub–sector 
equity portfolios following terrorist events. Cumulative abnormal returns are estimated over the five days of 
trading following the announcement of the attack.  The indices are 17 industry and 78 sector indices.  The Brown 
and Warner model uses equally weighted portfolios of firms, constituents of DataStream industry and sector 
indices. The Brown and Warner model measures and tests mean adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. The 
regression models include the CAPM, the Fama and French, the GARCH and the Fama and French GARCH 
models and they use DataStream industry and sector value weighted indices. The regression models measure and 
test market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. Percentage significant = the percent of cumulative abnormal 
returns having a statistically significant value. Percentage negative = the percent of cumulative abnormal returns 
having negative a value. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following the September 11 Attack 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Estimation Model Average Median Percent Significant Percent Negative 
B&W -14.94 -14.74 94.74% - 80.00%^ 98.95% 
Regression Model     
CAPM -1.02 -1.07 47.37% 78.95% 
FF -0.05 0.00 15.79% 49.47% 
GARCH -1.35 -1.22 66.32% 80.00% 
FF GARCH -0.16 0.03 33.68% 49.47% 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following the Bali Bombing 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Estimation Model Average Median Percent Significant Percent Negative 
B&W 5.91 5.65 73.68% - 38.95%^ 5.26% 
Regression Model     
CAPM -0.07 -0.04 6.32% 52.63% 
FF 0.02 0.01 8.42% 49.47% 
GARCH -0.05 -0.04 14.74% 54.74% 
FF GARCH 0.02 0.04 15.79% 46.32% 
Panel C: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following the Madrid Bombing 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Estimation Model Average Median Percent Significant Percent Negative 
B&W -0.15 -0.36 18.95% - 3.16%^ 56.84% 
Regression Model     
CAPM 0.08 0.07 2.11% 38.95% 
FF 0.08 0.07 3.16% 38.95% 
GARCH 0.09 0.09 5.26% 41.05% 
FF GARCH 0.07 0.06 7.37% 42.11% 
Panel D: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following the London Bombing 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Estimation Model Average Median Percent Significant Percent Negative 
B&W 1.02 0.88 43.16% - 6.32%^ 36.84% 
Regression Model     
CAPM -0.32 -0.47 20.00% 57.89% 
FF 0.07 0.05 16.84% 48.42% 
GARCH -0.24 -0.48 12.63% 55.79% 
FF GARCH 0.15 0.16 11.58% 46.32% 
The symbol^ identifies the percentage of statistically significant abnormal returns in the sample of portfolios 
according to Corrado t test.   
 
On average, with the B&W technique the CAR are greater than the AR. In contrast, with the 
regression models the CAR tend to be smaller than the AR. With the modified GARCH 
models the percentage of statistically significant CAR is however higher than the percentage 
of statistically significant AR.  
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The histogram of 1-day abnormal returns presented in Table 5.4 shows that estimation 
models generate different distributions of abnormal returns. The distribution of mean-adjusted 
AR from the B&W tend to be uneven around the zero value, AR are mostly negative or 
positive depending on the events. The distortion is most significant with the distribution of 
AR estimated following the September 11 attack and the Madrid bombing. In both instances, 
more than 90 percent of AR are negative. In contrast, regression models market adjusted AR 
follow an even distribution with approximately equal number of positive and negative AR.  
The AR distribution shows that all models detect large positive and negative AR 
following the September 11 attack. The largest AR represents a deviation of over 8 percent 
from normal returns. With the B&W model, most AR have value ranging between 4 percent 
to -8 percent. The CAPM and the GARCH AR are distributed between -8 percent and 2 
percent. The FF and GARCH FF AR distribution follow a bell shape centre around zero and 
distributed between -4 percent and 4 percent. Following the Bali attack, only the B&W 
estimation reports a portfolio AR with a value greater than 8 percent. With the FF and 
GARCH FF models, AR are in the -6 percent to 6 percent range. AR from the CAPM and 
GARCH models remain in the 4 percent to -4 percent bound. Following the Madrid bombing 
and the London bombing, across models AR values are very small and stay between -2 
percent and 2 percent. 
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Table 5.4 Distribution of Abnormal Returns of Industry, Sector and Sub-Sector Portfolios 
This table shows the distribution of 1-day abnormal returns of 95 industry, sector and sub-sector equity 
portfolios following terrorist events. The terrorist events tested are the September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, 
the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. The Brown and Warner model estimates and tests mean adjusted 
abnormal returns. The regression models include the CAPM, the Fama and French, the GARCH and the Fama 
and French GARCH models. They measure and test market adjusted abnormal returns. 
Panel A: Distribution of Abnormal Returns Estimated following the September 11 Attack 
Abnormal Return Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
AR >8% 1 2 2 1 2 
8% ≥ AR > 6% 0 0 3 0 2 
6% ≥ AR > 4% 0 2 6 2 8 
4% ≥ AR > 2% 2 9 17 9 15 
2% ≥ AR > 0% 4 14 16 13 15 
 7 27 44 25 42 
      
-2% < AR ≤ 0% 11 18 17 21 23 
-4% < AR ≤ -2% 19 19 19 15 15 
-6% < AR ≤ -4% 14 11 6 14 6 
-8% < AR ≤ -6% 15 11 5 9 5 
AR ≤ -8% 29 9 4 10 4 
 88 68 51 69 53 
Panel B: Distribution of Abnormal Returns Estimated following the Bali Bombing 
Abnormal Return Estimation Model 
 Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
AR >8% 1 0 0 0 0 
8% ≥ AR > 6% 3 0 0 0 0 
6% ≥ AR > 4% 4 0 1 0 1 
4% ≥ AR > 2% 18 8 6 10 7 
2% ≥ AR > 0% 34 32 42 32 43 
 60 40 49 43 51 
      
-2% < AR ≤ 0% 33 40 37 37 35 
-4% < AR ≤ -2% 2 15 8 16 8 
-6% < AR ≤ -4% 0 0 1 0 1 
-8% < AR ≤ -6% 0 0 0 0 0 
AR ≤ -8% 0 0 0 0 0 
 35 55 46 53 44 
Panel C: Distribution of Abnormal Returns Estimated following the Madrid Bombing 
Abnormal Return Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
AR >8% 0 0 0 0 0 
8% ≥ AR > 6% 0 0 0 0 0 
6% ≥ AR > 4% 0 0 0 0 0 
4% ≥ AR > 2% 1 3 3 3 4 
2% ≥ AR > 0% 10 36 42 34 39 
 11 39 45 37 43 
      
-2% < AR ≤ 0% 65 54 48 56 51 
-4% < AR ≤ -2% 18 2 2 2 1 
-6% < AR ≤ -4% 1 0 0 0 0 
-8% < AR ≤ -6% 0 0 0 0 0 
AR ≤ -8% 0 0 0 0 0 
 84 56 50 58 52 
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The analysis of results presented in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 suggests that the B&W 
model provides larger and more statistically significant AR than do regression models. The 
distribution of B&W AR tends to be tilted with clusters of negative or positive AR, depending 
on the event. Regression models provide smaller AR with lower level of statistical 
significance. The number of portfolios having positive and negative AR is generally fairly 
distributed. The introduction of GARCH in models does not appear to have an impact on AR 
sizes or distributions but it lowers the level of statistical significance. Analysis of the 
distribution of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns has also been performed results are 
presented in Appendix 5, Table 5.6.1. 
The results presented in Tables 5.2 to 5.4 show that the model used for measuring 
the abnormal performance does alter the AR size and significance. The different results can be 
explained by the models used to estimate the AR. Each model holds different independent 
variables which explain the indices return. The B&W mean return model estimates the AR 
based on the equity indices past return. It does not contain other variables which may have an 
impact or explain a return deviation that may be not related to terrorist event.  The market 
Table 5.4 (cont.) Distribution of Abnormal Returns of Industry, Sector and Sub-Sector 
Portfolios 
Panel D: Distribution of Abnormal Returns Estimated following the London Bombing 
Abnormal Return Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
AR >8% 0 0 0 0 0 
8% ≥ AR > 6% 0 0 0 0 0 
6% ≥ AR > 4% 0 0 0 0 0 
4% ≥ AR > 2% 1 0 1 0 1 
2% ≥ AR > 0% 70 43 39 43 39 
 71 43 40 43 40 
      
-2% < AR ≤ 0% 24 52 55 52 55 
-4% < AR ≤ -2% 0 0 0 0 0 
-6% < AR ≤ -4% 0 0 0 0 0 
-8% < AR ≤ -6% 0 0 0 0 0 
AR ≤ -8% 0 0 0 0 0 
 24 52 55 52 55 
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adjusted estimate AR is based on aggregate market returns. With the market variable, the 
market models discount indices-return variations that are related to market returns.  Since the 
market effect is acknowledged, the dummy variable should capture AR free of return 
variations from market return. This may explain why the AR from the market adjusted models 
appear smaller and less significant than the AR estimates based on the B&W mean return 
model.  
Derived from the CAPM, the FF model holds a market variable and two additional 
variables: the SMB and the HML. Like the market variable, the SMB and the HML variables 
are considered significant factors in explaining the indices returns. The results obtain from our 
analysis suggest that, in most cases, the presence of the SMB and HML variables further 
reduces the size and statistical significance of the AR. The FF variables may remove 
additional returns variation which may not be related to the terrorist event, hence reducing the 
size of the AR. If the market return, the SMB and the HML are indeed contributing factors to 
indices return then the FF multiple factor model may seem the most appropriate model to 
isolate the effects of terrorist attacks. The model would be superior to the mean model and 
traditional market model by reducing the likelihood of missing variables. However, the 
market adjusted models have major shortcomings.  
The market models fail to meet the statistical assumptions required for unbiased 
OLS estimation. It has issues of serial correlation, non-normality, non-linearity and 
heteroskedasticity (for further discussions refer to section 5.2). The GARCH process can 
improve the quality of the estimates by solving the issue of heteroskedasticity. In the results, 
comparing the output from the GARCH models (GARCH and GARCH FF) and the output 
from the corresponding market models (CAPM and FF), the AR have comparable size but 
with a different level of statistical significance. GARCH models’ AR tend to have a lower 
level of statistical significance than the market models’ AR. This difference may be explained 
by a misspecification of the market adjusted models. The misspecification leads to an 
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underestimation of the variance (Brockett, Chen & Garven 1999). Boehmer et al. (1991) 
observe that if an event study technique does not adjust for change in variance, it is likely to 
produce biased estimates with overly high level of statistical significance. The GARCH 
models acknowledge change in variance and, consequently, it should avoid such biases in the 
estimate. Amongst the regression methods, the FF GARCH model may provide one of the 
best estimates of AR and CAR generated by terrorist events.  
The model and the estimation procedure determine the AR size and level of 
statistical significance. With a single variable, the B&W model generates relatively large AR 
with high level of statistical significance. The market adjusted models are multivariable 
models. In these models, AR size tends to decrease as the number of variables increases. 
Finally, the adjustment provided by the GARCH appears to remove some of the market model 
mis-specification and to generate the most reliable AR produced with regression models. 
 
5.4.1.2 Industries and Sub-Sectors Abnormal Returns  
Industries Abnormal Returns 
 
 The performance of principal industry portfolios further illustrates the variation in AR 
with estimation model choice. In Table 5.5, mean adjusted AR from the B&W model are not 
consistent with market adjusted AR from the regression models. In several instances, the 
B&W and the regression results are inconsistent. 
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Table 5.5 Main Industry Portfolios Abnormal Returns from Individual Terrorist Attack 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of 10 industry portfolios following the September 
11 attack, the Bali bombing, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Using five estimation models, 
abnormal returns are measured over one trading day following the announcement of terrorist event. The 
Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance 
estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models 
measure market adjusted abnormal returns with a level of significance estimated using an ordinary least 
square regression t-test. In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of AR 
from the Brown and Warner model. 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns Estimated following the September 11 Attack 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Consumer Services -11.68*^ -5.33* -4.21* -5.07 -4.17 
 (0.032) (0.010) (0.011) (1.603) (2.084) 
Basic Materials -8.44*^ -6.55* -1.47 -5.94 -1.77 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (1.184) (0.776) 
Technology -6.24* 3.56* -2.88* 3.44 -2.38 
 (0.055) (0.017) (0.016) (1.974) (2.911) 
Consumer Goods -5.97*^ -8.47* -5.42* -8.22 -5.34 
 (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.890) (0.951) 
Industrials -5.92*^ -3.77* -2.21* -3.70 -1.91 
 (0.030) (0.010) (0.010) (1.844) (0.007) 
Financials -4.16*^ -1.03 0.78 -1.13 0.47 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.772) (0.512) 
Health Care -3.73*^ 0.51 3.08* 0.48 3.04 
 (0.033) (0.011) (0.011) (2.847) (1.236) 
Oil -2.70* -2.05 2.47 -2.02 2.76 
 (0.029) (0.016) (0.016) (1.579) (2.287) 
Telecommunication -2.29* 3.02* 3.17 3.25 4.39 
 (0.029) (0.015) (0.017) (3.889) (3.215) 
Utilities -1.78* -1.13 4.41* -1.24 3.55* 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.984) (0.010) 
Panel B: Abnormal Returns Estimated following  the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Utilities -0.91* -1.07 0.51 -1.05 0.20 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.013) (16.449) (11.238) 
Basic Materials -0.65 -1.00 -0.18 -0.97 -0.15 
 (0.025) (0.010) (0.010) (0.684) (2.151) 
Industrials -0.42* -1.59 -1.37 -1.59 0.34 
 (0.028) (0.008) (0.008) (3.237) (0.004) 
Financials 0.31 -0.22 0.23 1.20* 1.25* 
 (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Consumer Goods 0.42* -1.83* -0.72 -2.01 -0.67 
 (0.021) (0.009) (0.008) (0.078) (0.603) 
Consumer Services 0.99* -0.15 0.28 -0.14 0.38 
 (0.030) (0.007) (0.007) (1.062) (1.603) 
Telecommunication 1.44 -0.76 0.05 -0.63 1.18 
 (0.037) (0.016) (0.016) (4.810) (0.073) 
Technology 1.84* -0.47 -1.86 -0.53 -1.96 
 (0.043) (0.014) (0.013) (0.593) (0.394) 
Health Care 2.47*^ 1.64* 1.20 1.70 1.35 
 (0.029) (0.008) (0.008) (3.136) (1.141) 
Oil 2.86* 1.48 1.53 1.45 1.58 
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.532) (0.360) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.5 (cont.) Main Industry Portfolios Abnormal Returns from Individual Terrorist 
Attack 
Panel C: Abnormal Returns Estimated following the Madrid Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Consumer Goods -1.78*^ -0.39* -0.31* -0.43 -0.36 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.279) (0.459) 
Financials -1.67*^ -0.15 -0.03 -0.14 -0.04 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.168) (1.130) 
Telecommunication -1.63* -0.16 0.14* -0.15 0.13* 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (2.505) (1.376) 
Oil -1.63*^ -1.25* -1.04* -1.24 -0.76 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (1.042) (0.022) 
Health Care -1.36*^ -0.84* -0.88 -0.86 -0.83 
 (0.020) (0.004) (0.004) (0.138) (0.420) 
Consumer Services -1.50*^ 0.38 0.43* 0.30 0.35 
 (0.021) (0.004) (0.004) (0.190) (0.093) 
Technology -1.31* 1.13* 0.82* 1.13 0.82 
 (0.027) (0.007) (0.007) (10.287) (3.583) 
Utilities -1.15*^ -0.52* -0.23* -0.56 -0.26 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.909) (1.015) 
Industrials -1.04* -0.20 -0.14 -0.21 -0.14 
 (0.019) (0.005) (0.005) (1.040) (0.733) 
Basic Materials -0.42* 0.71* 0.85 0.70 0.85 
 (0.019) (0.005) (0.005) (0.364) (0.263) 
Panel D: Abnormal Returns Estimated following the London Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Consumer Services -0.02* -0.14 -0.18 -0.15 -0.18 
 (0.017) (0.003) (0.003) (0.320) (0.379) 
Telecommunication 0.12* -0.47* -0.58 -0.45 -0.55 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (2.608) (0.678) 
Health Care 0.16* -0.15 -0.28 -0.14 -0.29 
 (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.564) (0.118) 
Financials 0.22 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.08 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.090) (0.267) 
Technology 0.22* 0.11 -0.04 0.13 -0.04 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.005) (0.469) (1.796) 
Industrials 0.27 -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.11 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.769) (0.152) 
Consumer Goods 0.38* -0.38 -0.35 -0.37 -0.35 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.367) (2.399) 
Basic Materials 0.50 0.41 0.59 0.40* 0.60 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.005) (1.256) (6.363) 
Utilities 0.53* 0.45 0.61 0.46 0.61 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (1.590) (1.120) 
Oil 0.82*^ 0.66* 1.02 0.96 1.02 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.008) (0.033) (1.537) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Following the September 11 attack, according to the B&W model, the Technology, 
the Telecommunication and the Utilities portfolios gave statistically significant negative AR. 
However, according to regression models, following the September 11 attack the Technology, 
the Telecommunication and the Utilities portfolios displayed statistically significant positive 
AR. The introduction of the overall market return as well as the risk-free rate factor in the 
estimation of the market adjusted AR explains the divergence between the B&W model and 
the regression models results. Overall, the B&W estimates have higher standard deviation, 
suggesting a possibly less reliable AR estimate. 
Table 5.5 also shows some degree of discrepancy amongst regression based model 
AR. There is some consistency between the CAPM and the GARCH results, and between the 
FF and the FF GARCH results. However, there is variation in size and standard deviation 
between the CAPM/GARCH models and the FF/FF GARCH models. The difference between 
the market adjusted AR is not as great as the difference between the market adjusted AR and 
the mean adjusted AR, but it is large enough to change AR sign and degree of statistical 
significance. 
 When ranking industries according to the AR size, the B&W model results suggest 
that the Consumer services industry has the largest negative price response to the September 
11 attack and the London bombing. The Consumer Goods industry holds the largest negative 
AR following the Bali bombing and the Utility industry following the Madrid bombing. The 
CAPM and the GARCH models identify the Consumer Goods industry with the largest 
negative AR following the September 11 attack and the Bali bombing. According to these 
models, the Madrid and the London bombings have had the greatest negative impact on the 
Telecommunication and the Health Care industries respectively. With the FF and GARCH FF 
models the Consumer Goods is also the weakest industry following the September 11 attack 
but no industry displays significant negative AR following the Bali bombing.   
  164 
 With the B&W model, following the attacks, the smallest negative or highest positive 
AR are found in the Utilities, the Oil and the Basic Materials industries. With the CAPM 
model, a pattern of positive responses to terrorist attacks appears with the Technology 
industry. The industry is amongst the best performing industries following the September 11 
attack, the Madrid and the London bombings. The FF model provides comparable results with 
the B&W model, where the Utility, the Oil, and the Basic Materials industries have the 
smallest or highest positive AR following terrorist attacks. The GARCH and the FF GARCH 
identify large standard deviations and they record very few positive AR. 
 
 
Industries Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Table 5.6 contains major industries’ CAR calculated over 5 days of trading following 
the announcement of a terrorist attack. CAR results show some disparity between the various 
event study methods. The variation in results is most significant following the September 11 
attack. After the event, the B&W model display growing CAR with on average CAR twice 
the size of their corresponding AR (see Table 5.5). In contrast, the regression models exhibit 
small CAR with CAR less than half the size of their corresponding AR (see Table 5.5). 
Compared to their corresponding AR from Table 5.5, the GARCH and the FF GARCH CAR 
tend to have smaller standard deviation and they are more frequently statistically significant. 
 Overall results for industry AR and CAR suggest that the assessment of the impact of 
terrorist events on industry varies greatly depending on the estimation model. While the B&W 
model can identify some pattern of industries’ responses, the results are often contradicted by 
results from regression models.  
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Table 5.6 Main Industry Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns from Individual 
Terrorist Attack 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns of 10 industry portfolios following the 
September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Using five 
estimation models, cumulative abnormal returns are measured over five trading days following the 
announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-
parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models measure market adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns with a level of significance estimated using ordinary least square regression t-test.  In the table, 
industries are sorted in ascending order according to the size of CAR from the Brown and Warner model. 
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following the September 11 Attack 
Estimation Model 
 Regression Model Portfolio 
B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Basic Materials -20.62*^ -1.83* 0.64 -2.28* 0.46 
 (0.054) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
Consumer Svs -19.69*^ -0.58 0.27 -1.61* -0.48 
 (0.070) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Technology -17.90*^ 1.70* -1.03 1.71* -0.71 
 (0.117) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Industrials -16.75*^ -1.20* -0.57 -1.14* -0.34 
 (0.064) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Consumer Goods -14.56*^ -2.20* -0.66 -4.17* -2.64* 
 (0.050) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Oil -13.95*^ -2.22* -0.18 -2.17* -0.09 
 (0.064) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) 
Health Care -11.77*^ -0.99* -0.35 -1.07* -0.34 
 (0.071) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Financials -10.19*^ -0.38 0.02 -0.42* -0.06 
 (0.044) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Utilities -6.34*^ -0.94 1.36* -0.89* 2.04* 
 (0.045) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Telecommunication -3.81*^ 2.00* 1.90* 1.61* 1.99* 
 (0.060) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following  the Bali Bombing 
Estimation Model 
 Regression Model Portfolio 
B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Utilities 0.24 -0.91 -0.57 -0.82 -0.74 
 (0.057) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.009) 
Basic Materials 3.98* -0.16 0.02 -0.13 0.04 
 (0.055) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Health Care 4.25*^ 0.07 -0.01 0.18 0.10 
 (0.061) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Consumer Goods 5.10*^ -0.21 0.04 -0.28 0.08 
 (0.046) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Consumer Svs 5.63*^ -0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.04 
 (0.066) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Financials 5.65*^ 0.45 0.57 0.63* 0.68* 
 (0.042) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industrials 5.98* -0.28 -0.21 -0.29 -0.22 
 (0.061) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Oil 7.06* 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.23 
 (0.062) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Telecommunication 9.35*^ 0.33 0.56 0.93 1.47 
 (0.083) (0.007) (0.007) (0.028) (0.020) 
Technology 10.75*^ -0.42 -0.76 -0.82 -1.23* 
 (0.094) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.6 (cont.) Main Industry Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns from Individual 
Terrorist Attack 
Panel C: Cumulative abnormal Returns Estimated following the Madrid Bombing 
Estimation Model 
 Regression Model Portfolio 
B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Telecommunication -2.41* -0.15 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 
 (0.039) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.014) 
Consumer Goods -1.23* 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
 (0.034) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Health Care -1.17* -0.36 -0.36* -0.34 -0.37* 
 (0.045) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Financials -0.95* 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 (0.030) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) 
Consumer Svs -0.92* 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.02 
 (0.047) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Technology -0.39 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.28 
 (0.061) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Basic Materials 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 
 (0.042) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Industrials 0.87* 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 
 (0.043) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Oil 0.99* 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.15 
 (0.037) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Panel D: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following the London Bombing 
Estimation Model 
 Regression Model Portfolio 
B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Health Care 0.54 -0.05 -0.13 -0.02 -0.12 
 (0.017) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Oil 1.05* -0.29 0.01 -0.21 0.00 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
Utilities 1.81* 0.18 0.32 0.19 0.32 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012) (0.004) 
Consumer Svs 1.47* -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.017) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Financials 1.75* -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) 
Industrials 2.17* -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Telecommunication 2.33* -0.11 -0.15 -0.08 -0.11 
 (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Consumer Goods 2.40* 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Basic Materials 3.24* 0.16 0.27 0.13 0.26 
 (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Technology 4.17* 0.37 0.22 0.39 0.23 
 (0.021) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Sector Portfolios with Highest Abnormal Returns 
 Amongst the 95 portfolios tested, 56 portfolios represent sub-sectors of industries. 
Sector portfolios are used if an industry does not have sub-sector portfolios. This evaluation 
of AR from sub-sectors completes the investigation that begun in Chapter Four on the 
industry specific effect of terrorism. Table 5.7 presents the five sub-sector portfolios 
presenting the largest negative AR following terrorist attacks according to the B&W model. 
AR and CAR have been estimated for all portfolios and results are presented in Tables 5.21 to 
5.2.8, Appendix 5.2 
According to all estimation models, the Travel and Tourism portfolio has the largest 
negative AR and this is statistically significant following September 11. For this portfolio, the 
B&W model estimates AR of -52.80 percent. The regression models estimate smaller AR 
with market adjusted AR of around -20 percent. The Hotel portfolio also records substantial 
negative AR following September 11 and, following the Madrid bombing. AR following the 
Madrid bombing are however not statistically significant when estimated using the regression 
based methods. The Aerospace sub-sector is the third sub-sector the most responsive to the 
September 11 attack. Following the Bali bombing, the Aerospace portfolio recorded the 
largest AR out of all the sub-sectors tested. Its AR is -2.48 percent according to the B&W 
model and around -3 percent when using the regression models. The GARCH approaches do 
not support the Aerospace portfolio AR as being statistically significant following the 
September 11 attack. The Aerospace AR from the Madrid bombing are also insignificant 
according to the GARCH models. 
The Automobile sub-sector systematically displays extreme negative AR. The Madrid 
bombing is the only event where the portfolio does not have some of the largest AR. Finally, 
the Railroad industry also frequently present, with considerable negative AR.  
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Table 5.7 Sub-Sector Portfolios with Extreme Negative Abnormal Returns from Individual 
Terrorist Attack 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of the 5 sub-sector portfolios exhibiting the largest 
negative abnormal returns, according to the Brown and Warner model. The events tested are the September 11 
attack, the Bali bombing, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Using five estimation models, 
abnormal returns are measured over one trading day following the announcement of a terrorist event. The 
Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted abnormal returns, a level of statistical significance estimated 
using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models measure market 
adjusted abnormal returns a level of significance estimated using ordinary least square regression t-test.  
Panel A: Extreme Negative Abnormal Returns following September 11 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Travel & Tourism -52.80* -22.91* -18.57* -19.40* -18.79* 
 (0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.006) (12.717) 
Hotels -26.95*^ -18.29* -15.24* -16.53* -17.54* 
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008) 
Aerospace -18.40* -12.57* -8.61* -12.57 -9.55* 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (5.024) (0.008) 
Apparel Retailers -13.07*^ -7.23 -6.23 -7.08 -6.27 
 (0.040) (0.025) (0.027) (0.976) (4.207) 
Automobiles -12.78*^ -10.01* -7.03* -9.91 -6.92 
 (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (2.578) (0.611) 
Panel B: Extreme Negative Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Aerospace -2.48*^ -3.44* -2.99* -3.46 -3.06 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.014) (12.169) (3.646) 
Diversified Industrial -1.80 -0.82 -0.71 -0.91 -0.75 
 (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.145) (1.286) 
Automobiles -1.71 -2.60 -0.72 -2.61 -0.75 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.013) (2.997) (2.651) 
Railroads -1.49^ -2.18 -0.89 -2.19 -0.88 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (2.725) (2.455) 
Containers and Packaging -1.40* -2.40* -1.38 -2.38 -1.33 
 (0.031) (0.013) (0.012) (5.731) (1.898) 
Panel C: Extreme Negative Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Recreational Prod -4.29*^ -1.60 -1.66 -1.79 -1.68 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (8.198) (0.653) 
Soft Drinks -3.64*^ -1.73* -1.67* -2.33* -1.70 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.490) 
Toys -2.89*^ -2.69* -2.63* -2.70 -2.69 
 (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (5.049) (0.131) 
Consumer Electronic -2.78 -0.59 -0.80 -0.59 -0.78 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (4.716) (0.584) 
Hotels -2.71*^ -0.51 -0.40 -0.66 -0.57 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.075) (0.036) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
 
  169 
 
Table 5.7 (cont.) Sub-Sector Portfolios with Extreme Negative Abnormal Returns from 
Individual Terrorist Attack 
Panel D: Extreme Negative Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Speciality Retailers -1.28* -0.03 -0.10 -0.01 -0.45 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) (0.735) (0.009) 
Automobiles -1.07^ -1.32 -1.28 -1.30 -1.29 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (2.105) -(0.013) 
Tires -1.06^ -1.56 -1.54 -1.56 -1.55 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (8.137) (5.064) 
Publishing -0.94* -0.77 -0.80 -0.77 -0.80 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (1.054) (1.678) 
Railroads -0.79^ -1.02 -0.93 -1.03 -0.92 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (1.538) (1.534) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
 
Overall, there seem to be some consistency in the estimates of sub-sectors negative 
AR. The estimated AR from the B&W model and from the regression model results are 
broadly consistent with this data. Ultimately, these results suggest that the Travel and 
Tourism, the Hotel, the Aerospace sectors and the Automobile sub-sectors are especially 
sensitive to terrorist attacks 
 Table 5.8 reports the best performing sub-sector portfolios following terrorist attacks. 
These portfolios have either positive or limited negative price response to the events. With the 
September 11 attack, AR from the various estimation models are relatively consistent. In this 
case however, positive AR from regression models are often greater than AR estimated with 
the B&W model. Following the attack, the Defence portfolio yields the most substantial 
positive AR ranging from 19.56 percent with the B&W estimate to 15.91 percent with the 
CAPM regression model estimate. This positive response to the event is in line with the 
literature which reports that during military conflicts the equity return from defence firms are 
significantly superior to that of other firms return. However, these extreme positive AR are 
not detected following the other terrorist events tested in this study. This could indicate that 
the Defence sub-sector does not systematically out perform the market following terrorist 
attacks.  
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Table 5.8 Sub-Sector Portfolios with Extreme Positive Abnormal Returns from Individual 
Terrorist Attack 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of the 5 sub-sector portfolios, which according to the 
Brown and Warner model, exhibit the largest positive or the smallest negative abnormal returns following 
terrorist events. The events tested are the September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, the Madrid bombing and the 
London bombing. Using five estimation models, abnormal returns are measured over one trading day 
following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted 
abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-
parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models measure market adjusted abnormal returns with a 
level of significance estimated using ordinary least square regression t-test.  
Panel A: Extreme Positive Abnormal Returns following September 11 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Defence 19.53*^ 15.91* 17.93* 16.06 18.36* 
 (0.022) (0.015) (0.016) (1.345) (0.008) 
Water 3.52 18.68* 22.29* 18.87 21.54 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (1.373) (1.584) 
Mortgage Finance 0.19 3.85* 6.85* 3.86 4.75* 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (2.092) (0.011) 
Heavy Con -0.33 0.61 5.41* 0.76 5.36 
 (0.037) (0.026) (0.027) (6.413) (7.858) 
Distillers and Vintners -1.17 -1.20 1.74 -1.05 1.59 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.922) (3.079) 
Panel B: Extreme Positive Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 9.35* -1.02 -2.49 -1.03 -2.41 
 (0.045) (0.017) (0.017) (0.925) (2.029) 
Internet 6.62^ 2.95 2.35 2.97 2.72 
 (0.048) (0.021) (0.021) (35.504) (9.896) 
Oil Equipment & Svs 4.68*^ 3.39 3.53 3.38 3.69 
 (0.032) (0.022) (0.023) (4.901) (2.553) 
Travel & Tourism 4.60^ -2.01 -0.33 -1.93 0.25 
 (0.031) (0.022) (0.021) (21.382) (33.945) 
Distillers and Vintners 4.29*^ 3.81* 4.10* 3.82 4.35 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (7.016) (5.264) 
Panel C: Extreme Positive Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 2.29* 1.52 1.10 1.51 1.09 
 (0.028) (0.010) (0.009) (4.858) (1.075) 
Brewers 0.46 0.31 0.38 0.32 0.39 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (12.585) (1.893) 
Transports Svs 0.34 1.96 2.09 1.97 2.27 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (4.350) (0.506) 
Railroads 0.21 1.46 1.74* 1.47 1.76 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.749) (0.614) 
Delivery Svs 0.12 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.61 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.006) (0.755) (1.046) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.8 (cont) Sub-Sector Portfolios with Extreme Positive Abnormal Returns following 
Individual Terrorist Attack 
Panel D: Extreme Positive Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 2.06* -0.04 -0.21 -0.28 0.27 
 (0.022) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) 
Oil Exploration & Prod 1.73* 1.60 2.08* 1.36 2.08 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.010) (0.067) (0.021) 
Auto Parts 1.72* 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.86 
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (1.851) (0.513) 
Soft Drinks 1.50* 0.11 -0.02 0.06 -0.07 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.895) (0.586) 
Internet 1.43^ 0.97 0.89 1.00 1.20 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (1.585) (0.133) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
 
The Water portfolio displays the second largest AR according to B&W model. The 
Water portfolio’s mean adjusted AR is not statistically significant but the market adjusted AR 
are statistically significant and greater than the Defence portfolio AR. The regression models 
estimates these AR at around 20 percent while the B&W model only finds an abnormal price 
return of 3.52 percent. The Mortgage Finance sub-sector and the Heavy Construction 
sub-sector are the third and fourth best performing sub-sectors following the September 11 
attack. According to the B&W model, their AR are insignificant and have values close to 0 
percent. When adjusted for market return, these portfolios AR are larger and statistically 
significant. Following the September 11 attack, the Distillers and Vintners portfolio was the 
fifth best performing portfolio. Its AR following September 11 are significant but they are 
positive and significant following the Bali bombing. From the same industry, the Brewers and 
the Soft Drink sub-sectors also display positive AR following the terrorist events tested.    
Following each of the Bali, Madrid and London bombings, the Technology hardware 
& equipment portfolio yielded the highest AR. The AR range form 9.35 percent following the 
Bali bombing to 2.06 percent following the London bombing. The Internet sub-sector also has 
a positive price response to foreign terrorist attack according to the B&W estimates. Overall, 
results on foreign attacks show relatively small AR and level of statistical significance. AR 
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across estimation models are also less likely coincide compare to the AR obtain following 
September 11 attack.   
Tables presenting sub-sector portfolios with extreme CAR are presented in 
Appendix 5.1, Table 5.1.2 and Table 5.1.3. Results from this analysis are in line with the 
results obtained with the AR analysis.  
 
5.4.2 Comparative Analysis of Regression Models 
 Regression models enable testing for AR and CAR using a single dummy accounting 
for the four terrorist events tested in this study.  This section presents the results of regression 
analysis using the entire sample range, starting one year before the September 11 attack and 
finishing one month after the London bombing, and including a single dummy to account for 
each of the terrorist events. The dummy coefficient obtained corresponds to the portfolio 
average response to terrorist attacks. This analysis offers an opportunity to compare overall 
AR generated by recent terrorist attack but also to take a closer look at the characteristics of 
the four regression models used in this study. 
 Table 5.9 provides a summary of the CAPM, the FF, the GARCH and FF GARCH 
regressions characteristics in the estimation of AR and CAR of industry, sector and sub-sector 
equity portfolios following terrorist attacks. The averages of portfolio AR indicate that the 
CAPM model finds the attacks generate an overall positive price response. In contrast, the FF, 
the GARCH and FF GARCH models detect a negative price response. However, the CAPM 
estimates include the portfolios with largest negative AR (-6.23 percent) and the smallest 
positive AR (5.15 percent). The averages of standards deviation are comparable across 
models. Adjusted R² are also similar, although the FF and GARCH FF models appear to some 
extent superior. Tests for serial correlation with the Durbin Watson test also show comparable 
results.  
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Table 5.9 Summary of Regression Characteristics for Multiple Terrorist Attacks Abnormal 
Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table presents a summary of characteristics of regressions estimate of 1-day abnormal returns and of 5-
day cumulative abnormal returns of 95 industry, sector and sub-sector equity portfolios as a result of the 
combination of the September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. 
The abnormal returns are market adjusted abnormal returns measured over one or five trading days following 
the announcement of terrorist events. The sample includes data from the 11th of September 2000 till the 8th of 
May 2005. This table contains the average of portfolios abnormal return and standard deviation, as well as, 
the regressions average value of adjusted R-square and Durbin Watson. The table also presents abnormal 
returns minimum and the maximum values. 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns Estimated following Terrorist Events 
Estimation Model Abnormal Return 
 
Average 
Abnormal 
Return 
Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 
Abnormal 
Return 
Maximum 
Abnormal 
Return 
Average R² 
Average 
Durbin 
Watson 
CAPM 0.62 0.006 -6.23 5.15 0.411 2.00 
FF -0.17 0.006 -5.39 5.50 0.459 2.02 
GARCH -0.36 0.005 -3.94 8.50 0.405 1.99 
FF GARCH -0.17 0.005 -4.37 8.31 0.450 2.01 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following Terrorist Events 
Estimation Model Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
Average 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
return 
Average 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum 
Abnormal 
Return 
Maximum 
Abnormal 
Return 
Average R² 
Average 
Durbin 
Watson 
CAPM -0.15 0.003 -1.96 0.79 0.409 2.00 
FF -0.04 0.003 -1.71 0.91 0.457 2.02 
GARCH 0.00 0.002 -1.17 6.98 0.400 1.99 
FF GARCH 0.06 0.002 -1.27 6.94 0.445 2.01 
 
Table 5.10 shows the combined effects of the September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, 
the Madrid bombing and the London bombing on 10 main industry equity portfolios. Results 
for AR in panel A indicate that all regression models find that the Consumer Goods, the 
Industrial, and the Consumer services industries exhibit a significant negative price response 
to the terrorist attacks. The consumer good portfolio has AR of -2.56 percent, -1.84 percent, 
1.50 percent and 1.37 percent from the CAPM, the FF, the GARCH and the GARCH FF 
models respectively. The industrial and the Consumer services have smaller AR, with values 
ranging from -1.44 percent to -0.53 percent. 
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Table 5.10 Main Industry Portfolios Abnormal Returns from Multiple Terrorist Attacks  
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns and 5-day cumulative abnormal returns of 10 main 
industry portfolios as a result of the combination  of the September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, the Madrid 
bombing and the London bombing. Using regression models, market adjusted abnormal returns are 
measured over one or five trading days following the announcement of terrorist events. The sample includes 
data from the 11th of September 2000 till the 8th of May 2005.  The level of significance is estimated using a 
ordinary least square regression t-test. In the table, industries are sorted in ascending order according to the 
size of AR and CAR estimated using the CAPM model. 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Consumer Goods -2.56* -1.84* -1.50* -1.37* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industrials -1.44* -1.30* -0.68* -0.61* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Consumer Services -1.31* -1.11* -0.53* -0.53* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Basic Materials -1.31* -0.29 -0.50* -0.10 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Financials -0.25 0.12 -0.17 -0.03 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.019) 
Utilities -0.15 1.10* -0.19 0.41 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Oil 0.30 1.31* -0.09 0.48 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
Telecommunication 0.52 0.79 -0.16 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
Health Care 0.57 0.87* -0.14 -0.26* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Technology 0.59 -0.80 0.43 -0.14 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Estimation Model Portfolio CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Consumer Goods -0.44* -0.23 -0.18 -0.15 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Industrials -0.36* -0.35* -0.11 -0.10 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Basic Materials -0.20 0.08 -0.02 0.09 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Oil -0.17 0.10 -0.02 0.09 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Consumer Services -0.15 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Health Care -0.10 -0.06 -0.12 -0.16* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Utilities -0.07 0.23 0.19 0.31* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Financials 0.10 0.15 0.01 0.05 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Technology 0.14 -0.18 0.19 0.03 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Telecommunication 0.58* 0.58* 0.03 0.04 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Other industries AR are less consistent. The CAPM and GARCH models estimate 
statistically significant negative AR for the Basic Materials industry. The FF model finds 
significant positive price response to terrorist events for the Utility, the Oil and the Health 
Care industries. The FF is the estimation model detecting the greatest number of portfolios 
with statistically significant AR. When testing returns over five trading days, terrorist events 
do not appear to have an extensive impact on industries. In panel B, only the Consumer 
Goods and the Industrial industries exhibit negative CAR. The Consumer Goods CAR are 
significant according to the CAPM estimate, and the Industrial CAR are significant with the 
CAPM and the FF models. 
Table 5.11 reports results for sub-sector portfolios with substantial AR resulting from 
combined terrorist attacks. The five portfolios with substantial negative price responses to the 
terrorist attacks have AR that are negative and statistically significant according to all 
estimation models. AR size varies between models but the ranking of portfolio according AR 
size remains consistent. For instance, the Travel and Tourism, the Hotel and the Aerospace 
portfolios exhibit the largest negatives AR according to all regression models. 
Results for the best performing portfolios also show some consistency. Aside from the 
Distiller and Vintners and the Oil and Exploration AR, estimations of positive AR across 
models corroborate. The water sub-sector shows the greatest positive price response to 
terrorism; its AR are 5.15 percent with CAPM model, 5.50 percent with the FF model, 8.50 
percent with the GARCH model and 8.31 percent with the GARCH FF model. Defence is the 
second best performing sub-sector. It has AR ranging from 1.92 percent with the GARCH 
model to 4.23 percent with the FF model. With AR around 2 percent, the Mortgage Finance is 
also one of the portfolios with the highest positive AR.  
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Table 5.11 Sub-Sector Portfolios Extreme Abnormal Returns from Multiple Terrorist 
Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of  sub-sector or sector portfolios, which according to 
the CAPM model, exhibit the largest negative, the largest positive or the smallest negative abnormal returns as 
a result of the combination  of the September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, the Madrid bombing and the  
London bombing. Using regression models, market adjusted abnormal returns are measured over one trading 
day following the announcement of terrorist events and with a sample from the 11.9.2000 till the 08.05.2005. 
The level of significance is estimated with ordinary least square regression t-test. 
Panel A: Extreme Negative Abnormal Returns 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Travel & Tourism -6.23* -5.39* -3.94* -4.37* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hotels -5.20* -4.52* -3.12* -3.08* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
Aerospace -3.89* -3.30* -3.00* -2.85* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
Automobiles -3.30* -2.28* -2.59* -1.91* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Auto Parts -2.97* -2.17* -1.04* -0.85* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Panel B: Extreme Positive Abnormal Returns 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Water 5.15* 5.50* 8.50* 8.31* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
Defence 3.79* 4.23* 1.92* 2.21* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) 
Mortgage Finance 1.85* 2.51* 1.53* 1.86* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Oil Exploration & Prod 0.99 2.12* 0.88* 1.35* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
Distillers and Vintners 0.89 1.47* 0.61 1.17* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
 
These results from multiple terrorist attacks show the dominance of the September 11 
attack. The top three portfolios with the most extreme negative and positive AR are the also 
the best and the worse performers following September 11 attack. Tables 5.10 and 5.11 also 
indicates that AR estimates from the various models can be relatively coherent and that 
estimates tend to converge when focusing on more concentrated portfolios (such as sub-sector 
portfolios) and when using longer time series.  
The extreme CAR results do not appear significantly different from the AR results, 
presented in Appendix 5.1, Table 5.1.4. 
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5.7 Conclusion  
 
This study estimates the AR and the CAR of U.S industry, sector, and sub-sector 
equity portfolios following terrorist attacks. Five AR estimations methods are used for each 
portfolio. The first AR are mean adjusted, AR estimated with the Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985) method. The other AR are calculated using regression based estimates. The results 
illustrate the difference between AR, and suggest that AR estimated using the various 
estimation methods can diverge considerably. They show a clear discrepancy between mean 
adjusted and market adjusted AR. Variations can also be seen amongst the regression model 
estimates. The introduction of the FF factors seems to alter the size and the significance of the 
AR. The GARCH modification does not appear to change the size or sign of the AR but it 
reduces the level of statistical significance of 1-day AR.  
While AR size still varies across regression estimates. The AR estimates are more 
consistent as the sample portfolio becomes smaller. So, to a certain extent, sector and 
sub-sector portfolios AR from various estimation models do coincide in terms of the level of 
significance and the ranking of portfolios according to AR sign and size.  
At industry level, the September 11 attack generated extreme negative AR for the 
Travel and Tourism, and for the Hotels and the Aerospace equity portfolios. In contrast, the 
event also had a positive impact, causing abnormally high positive returns for Defence and 
Water portfolios. Following foreign terrorist attacks, there is no specific pattern in the way 
U.S industries reacted to these events. Only the Technology, Hardware and Equipment 
portfolio seems to exhibit positive price response to news of terrorist attacks.   
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 Appendix 5.1 
Table 5.1.1 Histogram of Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Industry, Sector and Sub-Sector 
Portfolios 
This table shows the distribution of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns of 95 industry, sector and sub-sector equity 
portfolios following terrorist events. The terrorist events tested are the September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, the 
Madrid bombing and the London bombing The Brown and Warner model estimates and tests mean adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns. The regression models include the CAPM, the Fama and French, the GARCH and the 
Fama and French GARCH models. They measure and test market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. 
Panel A: Distribution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following the September 11 Attack 
Estimation Model 
 Regression Model Cumulative Abnormal Return 
B & W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
CAR >8% 1 0 0 1 2 
8% ≥ CAR > 6% 0 0 0 0 0 
6% ≥ CAR > 4% 0 1 1 0 0 
4% ≥ CAR > 2% 0 2 2 0 2 
2% ≥ CAR > 0% 0 17 45 17 44 
 1 20 48 18 48 
      
-2% < CAR ≤ 0% 1 53 42 47 36 
-4% < CAR ≤ -2% 7 18 4 19 6 
-6% < CAR ≤ -4% 3 3 1 5 2 
-8% < CAR ≤ -6% 10 1 0 2 1 
CAR ≤ -8% 73 0 0 3 2 
 94 75 47 76 47 
Panel B: Distribution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following the Bali Bombing 
Estimation Model 
 Regression Model Cumulative Abnormal Return 
B & W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
CAR >8% 25 0 0 0 0 
8% ≥ CAR > 6% 18 0 0 0 0 
6% ≥ CAR > 4% 19 0 0 0 0 
4% ≥ CAR > 2% 20 0 0 1 1 
2% ≥ CAR > 0% 8 45 48 42 50 
 90 45 48 43 51 
      
-2% < CAR ≤ 0% 2 50 47 51 43 
-4% < CAR ≤ -2% 1 0 0 1 1 
-6% < CAR ≤ -4% 1 0 0 0 0 
-8% < CAR ≤ -6% 1 0 0 0 0 
CAR ≤ -8% 0 0 0 0 0 
 5 50 47 52 44 
Panel C: Distribution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following the Madrid Bombing 
Estimation Model 
 Regression Model Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 B & W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
CAR >8% 0 0 0 0 0 
8% ≥ CAR > 6% 1 0 0 0 0 
6% ≥ CAR > 4% 2 0 0 0 0 
4% ≥ CAR > 2% 6 0 0 0 0 
2% ≥ CAR > 0% 32 58 58 56 55 
 41 58 58 56 55 
      
-2% < CAR ≤ 0% 45 37 37 39 40 
-4% < CAR ≤ -2% 9 0 0 0 0 
-6% < CAR ≤ -4% 0 0 0 0 0 
-8% < CAR ≤ -6% 0 0 0 0 0 
CAR ≤ -8% 0 0 0 0 0 
 54 37 37 39 40 
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Table 5.1.1 (cont.) Histogram of Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Industry, Sector and Sub-
Sector Portfolios 
Panel D: Distribution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns Estimated following the London Bombing 
Estimation Model 
 Regression Model 
Cumulative 
Abnormal Return 
 B & W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
CAR >8% 0 0 0 0 0 
8% ≥ CAR > 6% 2 0 0 0 0 
6% ≥ CAR > 4% 11 0 0 0 0 
4% ≥ CAR > 2% 36 0 0 0 0 
2% ≥ CAR > 0% 43 45 47 46 43 
 92 45 47 46 43 
 
     
-2% < CAR ≤ 0% 3 50 48 49 52 
-4% < CAR ≤ -2% 0 0 0 0 0 
-6% < CAR ≤ -4% 0 0 0 0 0 
-8% < CAR ≤ -6% 0 0 0 0 0 
CAR ≤ -8% 0 0 0 0 0 
 3 50 48 49 52 
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Table 5.1.2 Sub-Sector Portfolios with Extreme Negative Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table contains estimates of 5-day abnormal returns of the 5 sub-sector portfolios exhibiting the largest negative 
abnormal returns which according to the Brown and Warner model following a terrorist event. The event tested are the 
September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Using five estimation models, 
abnormal returns are measured over five trading days following the announcement of terrorist event. The Brown and 
Warner model provides mean adjusted cumulative abnormal returns a level of statistical significance estimated using a 
parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models measure market adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns a level of significance estimated using ordinary least square regression t-test.  
Panel A: Extreme Negative Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the September 11 Attack 
 Estimation Model Portfolio  B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Travel & Tourism -56.97*^ -7.39* -4.84* -15.88* -12.37* 
 (0.082) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) 
Hotels -40.29*^ -5.65* -3.80* -13.22* -10.96* 
 (0.064) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) 
Aerospace -37.36 -4.10* -2.21* -8.40* -6.17* 
 (0.055) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Recreational Prod -30.33*^ -4.55* -3.57* -4.50* -3.69* 
 (0.052) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) 
Semiconductors -28.08*^ -0.35 -3.71* -0.47 -3.03 
 (0.121) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.022) 
Panel B: Extreme Negative Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
 Estimation Model Portfolio  B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Defence -6.72 -1.88* -1.74* -2.01* -1.84* 
 (0.049) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Multi-utilities -2.90 -0.47 -0.22 -0.21 -0.07 
 (0.057) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012) 
Aerospace -1.36 -1.34* -1.23* -1.41 -1.32 
 (0.048) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) 
Waste and Disposal Svs -0.63 -0.66 -0.57 -0.64 -0.53 
 (0.055) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Transports Svs 0.84 -0.94 -0.76 -0.77 -0.54 
 (0.046) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Panel C: Extreme Negative Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Estimation Model Portfolio  
B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Soft Drinks -2.83*^ -0.41 -0.40 -0.38* -0.41* 
 (0.034) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Travel & Tourism -2.77 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 
 (0.056) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Hotels -2.61 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 -0.18 
 (0.032) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Recreational Prod -2.58 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.13 
 (0.051) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Personal Product -2.55*^ -0.46 -0.45 -0.25 -0.33 
 (0.026) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 *Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of deviation 
are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.1.2 (cont.) Sub-Sector Portfolios with Extreme Negative Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Panel D: Extreme Negative Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
Estimation Model Portfolio  
B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Distillers and Vintners -1.16 -0.57 -0.51 -0.57 -0.50 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Reinsurance -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.16 -0.24 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) -(0.002) 
Prop/Casualty Insurance 0.05 -0.30 -0.29 -0.33 -0.32 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Oil Equipment & Svs 0.19 -0.41 -0.06 -0.35 -0.07 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
Travel & Tourism 0.24 -0.30 -0.34 -0.36 -0.40 
 (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of deviation 
are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 5.1.3 Sub-Sector Portfolios with Extreme Positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
This table contains estimates of 5-day abnormal returns of the 5 sub-sector portfolios exhibiting the largest positive or 
the smallest negative abnormal returns following a terrorist event according to the Brown and Warner model. The 
event tested are the September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing. Using five 
estimation models, abnormal returns are measured over five trading days following the announcement of terrorist 
event. The Brown and Warner model provides mean adjusted cumulative abnormal returns a level of statistical 
significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models 
measure market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns a level of significance estimated using ordinary least square 
regression t-test.  
Panel A: Extreme Positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the September 11 attack 
Estimation Model Portfolio  B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Defence 22.15*^ 4.30* 4.62* 10.83* 14.28* 
 (0.050) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) 
Water -2.73 2.49* 3.46* 12.77* 15.41* 
 (0.048) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) 
Fixed Line -3.29* 1.68* 1.68* 1.39* 1.85* 
 (0.064) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
Mortgage Finance -3.89 0.19 0.72 0.34 0.76 
 (0.044) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment -5.65* 1.57 -1.58 1.66* -1.22 
 (0.121) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) 
Panel B: Extreme Positive Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Estimation Model Portfolio  B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Business Training/Emp Ag 22.54*^ -0.81 -0.93 -0.61 -0.70 
 (0.079) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Home Improvement Retailers 14.35*^ -0.34 -0.37 -0.84* -0.85* 
 (0.058) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 13.78* -1.12 -1.49* -1.76* -1.72* 
 (0.098) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Travel & Tourism 13.68 -0.13 0.24 0.22 0.54 
 (0.078) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Computer Services 13.65*^ 1.07 1.04 0.68 0.73 
 (0.100) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.1.3 (cont.) Sub-Sector Portfolios with Extreme Positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Panel C: Extreme Positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Estimation Model Portfolio  B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Internet 6.01 1.17 1.16 1.19 1.31 
 (0.052) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) 
Business Training/Emp Ag 5.90 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 
 (0.061) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) 
Delivery Svs 5.25* 0.71* 0.72* 0.75* 0.77* 
 (0.034) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Heavy Con 3.67 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 
 (0.083) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Transports Svs 2.50 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.76 
 (0.037) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Panel D: Extreme Positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
Estimation Model Portfolio  B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Internet 7.05 0.21 0.05 0.26 -0.03 
 (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
Steel 6.49* 0.10 0.48 0.08 0.50 
 (0.028) (0.008) (0.007) (0.020) (0.005) 
Aluminium 5.72 0.58 0.71 0.63 0.67 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Semiconductors 5.53* 0.34 0.09 0.57 0.13 
 (0.024) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Home Improvement Retailers 5.44^ 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.1.4 Sub-Sector Portfolios with Extreme Cumulative Abnormal Returns from 
Multiple Terrorist Attacks 
This table contains estimates of 1-day and 5-day abnormal returns of the 5 sub-sector or sector portfolios, 
exhibit the largest negative, the largest positive or smallest negative abnormal returns as a result of the 
combination of the September 11 attack, the Bali bombing, the Madrid bombing and the London bombing and 
according to the CAPM model estimate. Using regression models, market adjusted abnormal returns are 
measured over one or five trading days following the announcement of the terrorist events. The sample 
includes data from 11th September 2000 to  8th May .2005. The level of significance is estimated using ordinary 
least square regression t-test. 
Panel A: Extreme Negative Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Estimation Model Portfolio  
CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Travel & Tourism -1.96* -1.71* -1.17* -1.27* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Hotels -1.52* -1.32* -0.87* -0.88* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Aerospace -1.41* -1.26* -0.96* -0.99* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Semiconductors -0.50 -0.83 -0.05 -0.28 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Recreational Prod -0.72* -0.55 0.02 0.11 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Panel B: Extreme Positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Estimation Model Portfolio 
CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Water 0.77* 0.91* 6.98* 6.94* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Defence 0.70* 0.79* 0.35 0.40* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Computer Services 0.79* 0.78* 0.46* 0.40* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mortgage Finance 0.56* 0.67* 0.40 0.49* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Aluminium 0.33 0.67 0.41 0.63* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Appendix 5.2 
Table 5.2.1 Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the September 11 Attack 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of super-sector, sector and sub-sector portfolios following the 
September 11 attack. The Brown and Warner model provide mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of statistical 
significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models 
measure market adjusted abnormal returns with a level of significance estimated using ordinary least square regression 
t-test In this table, portfolios are presented following the FTSE industry classification. Portfolios in bold characters 
represent super-sector. Portfolios in plain font represent sector and Portfolios in italics represent sub-sector. 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Oil and Product -2.10* -2.10 2.46 -2.01 2.77 
 
(0.029) (0.016) (0.016) (3.656) (2.082) 
Oil Equipment & Svs -3.96* -2.78 1.96 -2.78 3.40 
 
(0.033) (0.026) (0.027) (2.105) (15.461) 
Oil Exploration & Prod -2.40* -1.52 3.82 -1.54 4.98 
Oil 
  
(0.031) (0.021) (0.021) (6.789) (6.718) 
Chemicals -8.51* -6.65* -1.67 -6.08 -1.96 
 
(0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (1.594) (0.488) 
Forestry -10.82* -7.68* -1.78 -6.96 -2.47 
 
(0.024) (0.017) (0.032) (5.822) (1.251) 
Industrial Metals -11.60*^ -7.68* -1.78 -6.96 -2.47 
 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.278) (1.098) 
Aluminium -11.81* -7.35* -1.39 -9.19* 0.50 
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.012) (0.017) 
Steel -7.36*^ -5.92* -0.31 -6.01 -0.02 
 
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.636) (8.151) 
Mining -0.16 1.67 2.54 1.74 2.35 
Basic Materials 
  
(0.035) (0.029) (0.032) (5.822) (1.251) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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5.2.1 (cont.)  Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the September 11 Attack 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Construction and Materials -5.56*^ -4.16* 0.77 -3.93 1.30 
 
(0.029) (0.017) (0.017) (3.725) (1.656) 
Heavy Con -0.33 0.61 5.41* 0.76 5.36 
 
(0.037) (0.026) (0.027) (6.413) (7.858) 
Aerospace/Defence 0.56 -5.82* -2.49 -5.72 -2.22 
 
(0.022) (0.014) (0.014) (1.453) (2.057) 
Aerospace -18.40* -12.57* -8.61* -12.57 -9.55* 
 
(0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (5.024) (0.008) 
Defence 19.53*^ 15.91* 17.93* 16.06 18.36* 
 
(0.022) (0.015) (0.016) (1.345) (0.008) 
Containers and Packaging -8.21*^ -5.31* -1.18 -5.13 -1.35 
 
(0.033) (0.015) (0.015) (1.844) (0.920) 
Diversified Industrial -8.15*^ -4.11* -2.44 -4.22 -1.71* 
 
(0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (4.009) (0.008) 
Electronical Equipment -5.19*^ 2.24 -3.88 2.01 -3.59 
 
(0.036) (0.024) (0.022) (18.801) (6.098) 
Industrial Engineering -6.75*^ -3.99* -0.15 -3.81 -0.16 
 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.883) (0.977) 
Industrial Machinery -7.54*^ -4.96* -0.70 -4.69 -0.73 
 
(0.023) (0.014) (0.014) (1.887) (0.857) 
Industrial Transport  -6.17*^ -11.22* -7.95* -11.16 -6.76 
 
(0.027) (0.013) (0.013) (1.829) (0.384) 
Delivery Svs -8.15* -1.60 -0.50 -1.78 -0.59 
 
(0.027) (0.017) (0.018) (2.366) (0.008) 
Railroads -7.51* -4.46* 0.19 -4.44 -0.07 
 
(0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (1.904) (0.745) 
Transports Svs -7.00* -3.86 0.33 -3.79 -0.28 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (5.076) (3.684) 
Support Svs -4.70*^ -1.28 0.40 -1.31 0.17 
 
(0.033) (0.008) (0.009) (1.167) (0.366) 
Business Support Svs -3.11* 0.02 0.83 -0.05 0.77 
 
(0.033) (0.008) (0.009) (1.315) (0.773) 
Business Training/Emp Ag   -10.48*^ 4.41 7.67* 4.39 7.63 
 
(0.040) (0.029) (0.031) (15.142) (1.526) 
Financial Administration -4.72*^ -1.57 1.31 -1.32 1.06 
 
(0.034) (0.014) (0.015) (1.253) (1.847) 
Waste and Disposal Svs -7.84* -6.40* -2.22 -6.03 -2.08 
Industrials 
  
(0.029) (0.020) (0.021) (8.221) (3.352) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.1 (cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the September 11 Attack 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Auto & Parts -12.73*^ -9.99* -6.86* -9.79 -6.73 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (1.665) (1.420) 
Automobiles -12.78*^ -10.01* -7.03* -9.91 -6.92 
 
(0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (2.578) (0.611) 
Auto Parts -2.10 -10.63* -7.08* -10.41 -6.56 
 
(0.032) (0.016) (0.017) (1.412) (2.604) 
Tires -11.23* -6.53* -2.52 -6.36 -2.59 
 
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.376) (0.101) 
Beverage  -1.79* 1.08 3.92* 1.18 3.51* 
 
(0.021) (0.014) (0.013) (0.030) (0.017) 
Brewers -1.54 -0.08 3.16 1.15 1.26 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.016) 
Distillers and Vintners -1.17 -1.20 1.74 -1.05 1.59 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.922) (3.079) 
Soft Drinks -2.20* 1.37 4.12* 2.58* 5.16* 
 
(0.023) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) 
Food Products   -2.25* -1.22 2.51* -1.19 2.25 
 
(0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (2.893) (0.566) 
Dur Household Product -8.16*^ -6.47* -3.35* -6.32 -4.01 
 
(0.024) (0.013) (0.013) (1.192) (0.457) 
Leisure Goods  -8.39*^ -6.30* -3.31* -5.92 -3.54 
 
(0.029) (0.011) (0.011) (0.759) (0.414) 
Consumer Electronic -6.17 3.08 -2.83 2.25 1.25 
 
(0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (3.207) (3.382) 
Recreational Prd -11.27*^ -3.44 -0.72 -4.48 -0.70 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.679) 
Toys -7.28*^ -4.87* -2.37 -4.77 -4.33* 
 
(0.033) (0.020) (0.021) (6.816) (0.009) 
Personal Goods  -7.27*^ -0.13 3.81* -0.32 3.60 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (2.713) (0.026) 
Cloth & Access -10.25*^ -6.14* -3.52* -6.21 -3.57 
 
(0.028) (0.016) (0.017) (0.932) (7.526) 
Personal Product -3.15* -1.20 2.99 -1.07 1.77 
 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (1.128) (0.011) 
Tobacco  2.75*^ 1.68 6.07* 1.99 6.19 
Consumer Goods  
  
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (1.365) (0.449) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.1 (cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the September 11 Attack 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Heath Care Eq & Svs -3.16*^ -0.11 2.92* -0.22 2.63 
 
(0.031) (0.012) (0.012) (0.953) (1.605) 
Pharmacy & Bio -4.27* 0.91 2.06 1.03 2.17 
Health Care  
  
(0.038) (0.014) (0.015) (2.244) (1.958) 
Retail  -8.91*^ -3.39 -1.67 -2.90 -1.42 
 
(0.036) (0.017) (0.019) (2.090) (1.220) 
Food & Drug Retailers -2.28* -2.46 1.30 -2.57 1.19 
 
(0.026) (0.014) (0.014) (2.009) (1.862) 
Apparel Retailers -13.07*^ -7.23* -6.23* -7.08 -6.27 
 
(0.040) (0.025) (0.027) (0.976) (4.207) 
Home Improvement Retailers -7.69*^ -2.01 -0.13 -1.49 -0.16 
 
(0.034) (0.020) (0.021) (4.628) (1.921) 
Specialized Consumer Svs -4.83*^ 2.12 -0.05 1.79 -1.66 
 
(0.038) (0.020) (0.021) (4.742) (0.015) 
Speciality Retailers -11.53*^ -5.04* -2.27 -5.30 -1.99 
 
(0.041) (0.023) (0.025) (2.230) (1.494) 
Media  -8.52*^ -2.91* -2.04* -2.97 -1.75 
 
(0.031) (0.011) (0.012) (0.844) (0.785) 
Publishing -4.83*^ -2.05 -0.17 -4.48* 0.39 
 
(0.024) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (1.030) 
Travel & Leisure -21.82*^ -9.13* -9.94* -8.80 -9.56 
 
(0.027) (0.017) (0.019) (8.215) (0.351) 
Hotels -26.95*^ -18.29* -15.24* -16.53* -17.54* 
 
(0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008) 
Restaurants & Bars -6.07*^ -1.72 1.08 -1.53 0.74 
 
(0.024) (0.015) (0.016) (0.322) (0.088) 
Travel & Tourism -52.80* -22.91* -18.57* -19.40* -18.79 
Consumer Svs  
  
(0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.006) (12.717) 
Fixed Line -2.80* 2.70 3.21 2.94 4.45 Telecommunication 
  
(0.030) (0.016) (0.017) (5.363) (3.699) 
Electricity  -2.00* -1.70 3.94* -1.82 3.38 
 
(0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (2.968) (0.038) 
Gs/Wt/Mul Utilities -1.43* 0.30 5.55* 0.21 4.07* 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (4.418) (0.010) 
Gas Distribution -1.64* -0.35 5.02* -0.45 3.33* 
 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (2.440) (0.010) 
Multi-utilities -1.82* 0.37 4.26* 0.33 4.15 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.010) (2.063) (1.122) 
Water 3.52 18.68* 22.29* 18.87 21.54 
Utilities  
  
(0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (1.373) (1.584) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of deviation 
are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.1 (cont.)  Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the September 11 Attack 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Banks  1.49* -0.39 1.70 -0.50 1.53 
 
(0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (1.175) (1.525) 
Nonlife Insurance -1.03* -2.55* 0.45 -2.60 -0.38 
 
(0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (1.266) (1.363) 
Full Lin Insurance -5.93*^ -2.84* -0.05 -2.89 -0.38 
 
(0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.817) (0.856) 
Prop/Casualty Insurance -3.90*^ -3.34* 0.49 -4.49* -0.33 
 
(0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.006) (2.824) 
Software -6.97*^ 1.88 -4.15* 1.74 -3.42 
 
(0.051) (0.020) (0.020) (4.877) (6.589) 
Reinsurance -9.86*^ -3.15* -1.28 -3.29 -2.02 
 
(0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (1.248) (1.294) 
Life Insurance -4.76*^ -3.42* 0.36 -3.34 0.15 
 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.012) (4.980) (0.756) 
Real Estate  -3.38*^ -2.58* -1.33 -2.64 -1.49 
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.900) (0.314) 
General Financial -5.86*^ -0.57 0.14 -0.94 -1.05 
 
(0.029) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.010) 
Consumer Finance -8.96*^ -5.18* -4.22* -5.16 -4.28 
 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.017) (2.442) (7.304) 
Specialty Finance -4.22*^ -0.28 2.97* -1.75* 2.47 
 
(0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (1.258) 
Investment Svs -9.86*^ -2.99 -4.51* -1.66 -4.61 
 
(0.037) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.111) 
Mortgage Finance 0.19 3.85* 6.85* 3.86 4.75* 
 
(0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (2.092) (0.011) 
Equity Investment Instruments 0.40 0.46 -2.60 -0.28 -1.72 
Financials 
  
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.325) (0.939) 
Software & Comp Svs -1.54 2.30 -2.82 2.16 -2.19 
 
(0.050) (0.016) (0.016) (4.338) (2.445) 
Computer Services -3.71* 1.74 2.56* 1.71 2.51 
 
(0.041) (0.011) (0.012) (1.393) (1.623) 
Internet -6.79 3.31 -3.17 3.14 -2.81 
 
(0.066) (0.026) (0.025) (4.386) (4.525) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment -3.78* 4.26* -2.87 4.25 -2.44 
 
(0.057) (0.021) (0.020) (4.055) (0.374) 
Semiconductors -9.31*^ 1.67 -5.45 1.60 -3.96 
Technology  
  
(0.059) (0.029) (0.030) (2.341) (2.969) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.2 Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of super sector, sector and sub-sector portfolios following 
the Bali bombing. The Brown and Warner model provide mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of statistical 
significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression 
models measure market adjusted abnormal returns with a level of significance estimated using ordinary least square 
regression t-test In this table, portfolios are presented following the FTSE industry classification. Portfolios in bold 
characters represent super-sector. Portfolios in plain font represent sector and portfolios in italics represent 
sub-sector. 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Oil and Product 2.60*^ 1.56 1.59 1.58 1.69 
 
(0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.952) (2.466) 
Oil Equipment & Svs 4.68*^ 3.39 3.53 3.38 3.69 
 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.023) (4.901) (2.553) 
Oil Exploration & Prod 2.69* 2.80* 2.90* 2.77 3.14 
Oil 
  
(0.030) (0.014) (0.014) (4.049) (2.287) 
Chemicals -0.30 -0.98 -0.32 -0.95 -0.22 
 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.012) (2.826) (1.280) 
Forestry 0.88 -2.03 -0.92 -2.03 -0.89 
 
(0.020) (0.016) (0.024) (4.305) (2.088) 
Industrial Metals -1.14 -2.03 -0.92 -2.03 -0.89 
 
(0.027) (0.016) (0.015) (2.785) (4.529) 
Aluminium -0.46 -1.42 -0.33 -1.44 -0.26 
 
(0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (5.038) (5.312) 
Steel -0.08 -3.79 -2.74 -3.78 -2.76 
 
(0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (23.819) (2.446) 
Mining -1.85 -2.77 -1.37 -2.73 -1.40 
Basic Materials 
  
(0.032) (0.024) (0.024) (4.305) (2.088) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.2 (cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Construction and Materials 0.40 -1.11 -0.53 -1.10 -0.48 
 
(0.032) (0.015) (0.015) (2.644) (2.226) 
Heavy Con -0.30 -1.60 -1.34 -1.58 -1.17 
 
(0.052) (0.017) (0.018) (4.201) (3.761) 
Aerospace/Defence -1.50* -2.68* -2.20 -2.49 -2.21 
 
(0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.739) (9.460) 
Aerospace -2.48*^ -3.44* -2.99* -3.46 -3.06 
 
(0.023) (0.013) (0.014) (12.169) (3.646) 
Defence -0.52 -0.62 -0.04 -0.67 0.16 
 
(0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (9.488) (3.861) 
Containers and Packaging -1.40* -2.40 -1.38 -2.38 -1.33 
 
(0.031) (0.013) (0.012) (5.731) (1.898) 
Diversified Industrial -1.80 -0.82 -0.71 -0.91 -0.75 
 
(0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.145) (1.286) 
Electronical Equipment 1.26 -1.49 -2.21 -1.50 -2.19 
 
(0.029) (0.015) (0.015) (1.860) (1.672) 
Industrial Engineering -1.02* -2.45* -1.95* -2.42 -1.99 
 
(0.024) (0.009) (0.009) (1.549) (0.456) 
Industrial Machinery -1.02 -2.51* -1.81 -2.49 -1.82 
 
(0.024) (0.011) (0.010) (1.182) (4.576) 
Industrial Transport  -0.47 -1.27 -0.29 -1.30 -0.29 
 
(0.023) (0.010) (0.010) (3.428) (1.027) 
Delivery Svs 0.61 -0.42 0.20 -0.49 0.11 
 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.012) (1.901) (0.953) 
Railroads -1.49 ^ -2.18 -0.89 -2.19 -0.88 
 
(0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (2.725) (2.455) 
Transports Svs -0.63 ^ -1.26 -0.31 -1.20 -0.17 
 
(0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (4.178) (4.058) 
Support Svs 0.89 0.84 0.94 0.88 1.31 
 
(0.028) (0.009) (0.009) (3.169) (6.350) 
Business Support Svs 1.05 1.43 1.51 1.37 1.70 
 
(0.025) (0.012) (0.011) (8.406) (2.321) 
Business Training/Emp Ag   2.24 ^ 2.06 1.76 2.02 1.76 
 
(0.035) (0.021) (0.021) (8.502) (3.364) 
Financial Administration 2.17^ 1.60 1.35 1.60 1.64 
 
(0.033) (0.014) (0.014) (8.941) (19.691) 
Waste and Disposal Svs -0.70 -2.44 -2.00 -2.49 -2.11 
Industrials 
  
(0.025) (0.017) (0.018) (0.739) (0.355) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.2 (cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Auto & Parts -2.34* -2.87* -1.28 -2.89 -1.22 
 
(0.021) (0.012) (0.011) (4.387) (2.638) 
Automobiles -1.71 -2.60 -0.72 -2.61 -0.75 
 
(0.024) (0.014) (0.013) (2.997) (2.651) 
Auto Parts 3.07*^ -3.40* -2.33* -3.41 -2.22 
 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.011) (3.753) (4.711) 
Tires -0.16 -1.06 0.97 -1.04 0.75 
 
(0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (20.262) (20.959) 
Beverage  2.48*^ 1.41 1.37 1.43 1.38 
 
(0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (3.923) (2.695) 
Brewers 3.18*^ 2.19 2.69 2.21 2.78 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (4.286) (1.213) 
Distillers and Vintners 4.29*^ 3.81* 4.10* 3.82 4.35 
 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (7.016) (5.264) 
Soft Drinks 1.36^ 1.18 1.01 1.19 -0.43 
 
(0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (7.873) (0.023) 
Food Products   0.93* 0.91 0.90 0.94 0.95 
 
(0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.637) (1.830) 
Dur Household Product -1.14 -1.70 -0.89 -1.67 -1.02 
 
(0.021) (0.012) (0.012) (2.565) (1.036) 
Leisure Goods  0.30 -0.74 -0.20 -0.62 -0.22 
 
(0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (0.104) (5.433) 
Consumer Electronic 1.33 ^ -0.43 -0.92 -0.41 -0.92 
 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (6.054) (7.057) 
Recreational Prd 0.25 1.56 2.07 1.56 2.19 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (1.902) (3.828) 
Toys -0.41 0.38 0.47 3.13 0.73 
 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.016) (0.028) (23.280) 
Personal Goods  0.04 0.75 0.56 -0.03 -0.31 
 
(0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) 
Cloth & Access -0.86 -0.49 -0.06 -0.48 -0.05 
 
(0.023) (0.010) (0.010) (2.623) (2.726) 
Personal Product 0.78 ^ 0.70 0.53 2.79* 3.04* 
 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) 
Tobacco  2.56*^ 3.15 3.78 3.07 3.19 
Consumer Goods  
  
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (70.246) (107.574) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.2 (cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Heath Care Eq & Svs 1.90*^ 1.24 0.96 1.27 1.08 
 
(0.026) (0.010) (0.010) (0.636) (1.038) 
Pharmacy & Bio 3.71*^ 2.12 1.21 2.19 1.41 
Health Care  
  
(0.035) (0.011) (0.011) (6.753) (1.562) 
Retail  0.88* 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.58 
 
(0.029) (0.012) (0.012) (4.289) (2.322) 
Food & Drug Retailers 1.56* -0.20 0.31 -0.23 0.25 
 
(0.025) (0.011) (0.011) (2.314) (3.119) 
Apparel Retailers 0.99 0.12 0.52 0.12 0.48 
 
(0.032) (0.019) (0.019) (0.709) (0.439) 
Home Improvement Retailers 1.18 ^ 0.01 -0.22 0.05 -0.24 
 
(0.026) (0.014) (0.014) (1.759) (1.863) 
Specialized Consumer Svs 1.35 ^ 1.26 0.86 1.24 0.81 
 
(0.030) (0.013) (0.013) (2.318) (3.453) 
Speciality Retailers 1.07 0.91 1.44 0.88 1.26 
 
(0.032) (0.016) (0.016) (11.375) (3.188) 
Media  1.40* -0.49 0.46 -0.50 0.41 
 
(0.032) (0.011) (0.011) (1.008) (0.996) 
Publishing 1.10 0.77 1.01 0.79 1.15 
 
(0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (2.181) (1.360) 
Travel & Leisure 0.87 -1.02 -0.30 -1.02 -0.24 
 
(0.028) (0.011) (0.011) (6.515) (2.367) 
Hotels -0.61 -1.99 -0.85 -1.97 -0.82 
 
(0.026) (0.014) (0.013) (1.588) (2.247) 
Restaurants & Bars 2.38*^ 1.02 1.08 0.49 1.87 
 
(0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.025) 
Travel & Tourism 4.60 ^ -2.01 -0.33 -1.93 0.25 
Consumer Svs  
  
(0.031) (0.022) (0.021) (21.382) (33.945) 
Fixed Line 2.24 ^ -0.99 -0.24 -0.74 0.10 Telecommunication 
  
(0.040) (0.016) (0.016) (0.408) (0.381) 
Electricity  -1.46* -1.40 0.24 -1.35 -0.25 
 
(0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (11.187) (35.809) 
Gs/Wt/Mul Utilities -0.04 0.39 1.63 0.35 1.60 
 
(0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (2.681) (6.105) 
Gas Distribution 0.54 0.36 1.79 0.33 1.72 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (3.789) (2.732) 
Multi-utilities -1.25 0.44 1.62 0.50 1.18 
 
(0.026) (0.013) (0.012) (16.658) (6.600) 
Water 2.14 ^ 0.45 0.49 0.45 0.47 
Utilities  
  
(0.020) (0.005) (0.005) (0.574) (1.745) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.2 (cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
  B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Banks  3.68*^ -0.04 0.45 0.73 0.43 
 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (2.737) 
Nonlife Insurance 4.53*^ -1.39 -0.76 -1.32 -0.82 
 
(0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (2.827) (4.032) 
Full Lin Insurance -0.17 -1.81 -1.15 -1.51 -1.22 
 
(0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.062) (2.493) 
Prop/Casualty Insurance -0.68 -1.29 -0.59 -1.26 -0.58 
 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (2.333) (2.057) 
Software 2.54* 0.24 -1.33 0.23 -1.25 
 
(0.038) (0.016) (0.015) (3.526) (0.350) 
Reinsurance -1.02 -1.28 -0.51 -1.23 -0.68 
 
(0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (15.259) (3.377) 
Life Insurance -0.01 -0.60 0.04 1.31* 0.15 
 
(0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.104) 
Real Estate  -1.31* -1.55* -0.84 -1.53 -1.08 
 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (3.964) (3.559) 
General Financial 2.04* 1.10 1.26 1.11 1.23 
 
(0.025) (0.009) (0.009) (2.483) (1.068) 
Consumer Finance 0.54 0.40 1.03 0.39 1.10 
 
(0.034) (0.015) (0.015) (7.747) (11.373) 
Specialty Finance 1.20 ^ 0.65 1.02 0.68 1.03 
 
(0.021) (0.009) (0.009) (2.651) (1.734) 
Investment Svs 3.85*^ 1.65 1.30 1.66 1.31 
 
(0.028) (0.014) (0.014) (1.507) (0.389) 
Mortgage Finance 1.38 ^ 1.40 1.63 1.47 1.54 
 
(0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (3.756) (4.064) 
Equity Investment Instruments 6.17*^ -3.78* -4.12* -3.79 -4.16 
Financials 
  
(0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (4.215) (3.711) 
Software & Comp Svs 6.59*^ 0.05 -1.18 0.02 -1.15 
 
(0.040) (0.013) (0.012) (1.483) (0.401) 
Computer Services 0.93 -0.65 -0.86 -2.13 0.79 
 
(0.042) (0.013) (0.013) (0.082) (0.073) 
Internet 6.62 ^ 2.95 2.35 2.97 2.72 
 
(0.048) (0.021) (0.021) (35.504) (9.896) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 9.35* -1.02 -2.49 -1.03 -2.41 
 
(0.045) (0.017) (0.017) (0.925) (2.029) 
Semiconductors 1.73 -1.65 -3.58 -1.71 -3.55 
Technology  
  
(0.045) (0.024) (0.023) (12.435) (7.305) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.3 Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of super-sector, sector and sub-sector portfolios 
following the Madrid bombing. The Brown and Warner model provide mean adjusted abnormal returns 
with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado 
rank test. The four regression models measure market adjusted abnormal returns with a level of 
significance estimated using ordinary least square regression t-test In this table, portfolios are presented 
following the FTSE industry classification. Portfolios in bold characters represent super-sector. Portfolios 
in plain font represent sector and portfolios in italics represent sub-sector. 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 
B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Oil and Product -1.67*^ -1.38 -1.17 -1.99 -1.17 
 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.174) 
Oil Equipment & Svs -1.66* -1.25 -1.03 -0.30 -1.03 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.287) 
Oil Exploration & Prod -1.71* -1.10 -0.89 -0.36 -0.86 
Oil 
  
(0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (1.477) 
Chemicals -0.36*^ 0.33 0.43 0.32 0.43 
 
(0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.848) (0.508) 
Forestry -1.48 2.03 2.26 2.03 2.15 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.017) (6.192) (5.415) 
Industrial Metals -0.83 2.03 2.26 2.03 2.15 
 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (1.838) (0.112) 
Aluminium -0.06 2.30 2.55 2.19 2.39 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (2.758) (1.185) 
Steel -0.96 1.32 1.57 1.34 1.59 
 
(0.025) (0.014) (0.013) (2.422) (2.090) 
Mining 0.59 1.55 1.52 1.54 1.52 
Basic Materials 
  
(0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (6.192) (5.415) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.3 (Cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Construction and Materials -1.10* 1.13 1.23 1.13 1.21 
 
(0.024) (0.011) (0.011) (2.889) (1.535) 
Heavy Con -0.63 -1.56 -1.52 -1.63 -1.59 
 
(0.038) (0.010) (0.010) (1.002) (0.352) 
Aerospace/Defence -1.35*^ -0.24 -0.09 -0.30 -0.13 
 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (3.090) (1.004) 
Aerospace -1.21* -0.12 0.05 -0.18 -0.01 
 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (1.095) (0.785) 
Defence -1.48*^ -0.54 -0.44 -0.60 -0.46 
 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.740) (0.541) 
Containers and Packaging -1.61*^ 0.10 0.32 0.10 0.33 
 
(0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.680) (0.791) 
Diversified Industrial -1.51* -0.37 -0.29 -0.38 -0.42 
 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.560) (0.019) 
Electronical Equipment -1.49* 0.36 0.02 0.36 0.02 
 
(0.020) (0.010) (0.009) (1.850) (1.312) 
Industrial Engineering -1.50* 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.21 
 
(0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (1.341) (0.453) 
Industrial Machinery -1.65* -0.13 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 
 
(0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.373) (0.108) 
Industrial Transport  1.00* 1.03 1.15 1.02 1.12 
 
(0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (1.077) (0.900) 
Delivery Svs 0.12 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.61 
 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.006) (0.755) (1.046) 
Railroads 0.21 1.46 1.74* 1.47 1.76 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.749) (0.614) 
Transports Svs 0.34 1.96 2.09 1.97 2.27 
 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (4.350) (0.506) 
Support Svs -1.02* 0.29 0.26 0.35 0.23 
 
(0.020) (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.082) 
Business Support Svs -1.52* 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.09 
 
(0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (1.207) (0.685) 
Business Training/Emp Ag   -0.31 -0.55 -0.94 -0.54 -0.93 
 
(0.026) (0.014) (0.013) (1.928) (1.515) 
Financial Administration -0.60 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.19 
 
(0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.375) (0.701) 
Waste and Disposal Svs -0.55 1.52 1.55 1.53 1.56 
Industrials 
  
(0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (1.523) (7.892) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.3 (Cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Auto & Parts -1.45* 0.01 0.13 -0.03 0.08 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.552) (0.371) 
Automobiles -2.10*^ -0.47 -0.29 -0.48 -0.31 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.720) (1.190) 
Auto Parts -1.68* 0.65 0.69 0.46 0.65 
 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.985) 
Tires -1.85 0.95 1.16 0.89 1.13 
 
(0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (11.101) (3.821) 
Beverage  -2.10*^ -1.35* -1.30* -1.13* -1.31 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.260) 
Brewers 0.46 0.31 0.38 0.32 0.39 
 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (12.585) (1.893) 
Distillers and Vintners -0.72 -0.12 -0.06 -0.14 -0.05 
 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.201) (7.271) 
Soft Drinks -3.64*^ -1.73* -1.67* -2.33* -1.70 
 
(0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.490) 
Food Products   -1.21*^ -0.89 -0.83* -0.93 -0.90 
 
(0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.165) (0.023) 
Dur Household Product -2.54*^ -1.26 -1.08 -1.39 -1.18 
 
(0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.497) (0.431) 
Leisure Goods  -3.31*^ -0.82 -0.78 -0.82 -0.79 
 
(0.019) (0.005) (0.005) (1.520) (0.174) 
Consumer Electronic -2.78 -0.59 -0.80 -0.59 -0.78 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (4.716) (0.584) 
Recreational Prd -4.29*^ -1.60 -1.66 -1.79 -1.68 
 
(0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (8.198) (0.653) 
Toys -2.89*^ -2.69* -2.63* -2.70 -2.69 
 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (5.049) (0.131) 
Personal Goods  -1.68*^ -1.34* -1.26* -1.32 -1.24 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.005) (0.607) (0.651) 
Cloth & Access -1.10 -0.33 -0.30 -0.48 -0.70 
 
(0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) 
Personal Product -2.20*^ -1.75* -1.72* -1.73 -1.72 
 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (2.161) (1.183) 
Tobacco  -2.41*^ -2.88 -2.73* -0.51 -0.21 
Consumer Goods  
  
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.3 (Cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Heath Care Eq & Svs -1.22* -0.15 -0.21 -0.15 -0.43 
 
(0.019) (0.006) (0.006) (0.688) (0.009) 
Pharmacy & Bio -1.46* -0.72 -0.83 -0.71 -0.81 
Health Care  
  
(0.024) (0.007) (0.006) (1.953) (0.204) 
Retail  -1.55* 0.60 0.52 0.56 0.52 
 
(0.021) (0.007) (0.006) (0.550) (2.113) 
Food & Drug Retailers -1.85*^ -0.72 -0.79 -0.77 -0.80 
 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (3.137) (3.364) 
Apparel Retailers -1.11* -0.22 -0.30 -0.22 -0.30 
 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (6.923) (1.261) 
Home Improvement Retailers -1.38* 1.08 1.05 1.06 1.10 
 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (1.088) (5.681) 
Specialised Consumer Svs -2.56*^ -0.49 -0.69 -0.45 -0.65 
 
(0.023) (0.010) (0.010) (1.102) (2.371) 
Speciality Retailers -1.81* 0.01 -0.10 -0.04 -0.13 
 
(0.021) (0.008) (0.008) (0.851) (0.555) 
Media  -0.86* 0.34 0.61 0.39 0.63 
 
(0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.019) 
Publishing -0.39 0.12 0.21 0.00 0.11 
 
(0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.221) (0.358) 
Travel & Leisure -2.02*^ -0.48 -0.47 -0.71 -0.64 
 
(0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.054) 
Hotels -2.71*^ -0.51 -0.40 -0.66 -0.57 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.075) (0.036) 
Restaurants & Bars -0.84 0.72 0.64 0.11 0.67 
 
(0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.802) 
Travel & Tourism -2.09 -0.10 0.08 -0.13 -0.37 
Consumer Svs  
  
(0.025) (0.011) (0.011) (1.261) (0.019) 
Fixed Line -1.25* -0.25 0.09 -0.20 0.14 Telecommunication 
  
(0.020) (0.011) (0.010) (6.384) (1.802) 
Electricity  -1.22*^ -0.45 -0.13 -0.51 -0.15 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.374) (0.207) 
Gs/Wt/Mul Utilities -1.04* -0.85 -0.66 -0.83 -0.66 
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (3.344) (0.485) 
Gas Distribution -1.35*^ -0.85 -0.66 -0.84 -0.67 
 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (1.152) (0.677) 
Multi-utilities -0.65 -1.28 -1.05 -1.23 -1.11 
 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (5.503) (0.192) 
Water -0.28 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.65 
Utilities  
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.752) (5.689) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of deviation 
are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.3 (Cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Banks  1.09* -0.06 0.08 0.26 0.07 
 
(0.012) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.480) 
Nonlife Insurance 0.73* -0.52 -0.39 -0.59 -0.44 
 
(0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.890) (0.446) 
Full Lin Insurance -2.20*^ -0.43 -0.31 -0.49 -0.33 
 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.006) (0.197) (1.042) 
Prop/Casualty Insurance -2.01*^ -0.77 -0.62 -0.81 -0.68 
 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (1.201) (0.263) 
Software -1.19* 0.79 0.57 0.92 0.57 
 
(0.025) (0.008) (0.008) (0.060) (0.100) 
Reinsurance -1.21*^ 0.47 0.61 0.48 0.66 
 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.666) (1.307) 
Life Insurance -2.41*^ -0.49 -0.26 -0.58 -0.32 
 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.006) (1.310) (0.500) 
Real Estate  -1.07* -0.64 -0.59 -0.68 -0.67 
 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.934) (1.337) 
General Financial -2.03*^ 0.15 0.24 0.19 0.24 
 
(0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.059) (0.500) 
Consumer Finance -2.21*^ -0.74 -0.65 -1.95* -0.65 
 
(0.021) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (1.125) 
Specialty Finance -1.56 -0.32 -0.20 -0.24 -0.11 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.061) (0.046) 
Investment Svs -1.93* 1.27 1.35 1.24 1.33 
 
(0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (0.619) (2.399) 
Mortgage Finance -1.48 -0.10 0.02 -0.12 0.03 
 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (1.359) (1.218) 
Equity Investment Instruments 0.76* -0.23 -0.25 -0.39 -0.30 
Financials 
  
(0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.414) (0.488) 
Software & Comp Svs 1.74* 0.55 0.39 0.54 0.39 
 
(0.025) (0.007) (0.007) (0.882) (1.172) 
Computer Services -0.63 -0.36 -0.37 -0.34 -0.36 
 
(0.022) (0.008) (0.008) (0.757) (0.807) 
Internet -0.36 2.29 1.98 2.28 2.03 
 
(0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (2.025) (5.098) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 2.29* 1.52 1.10 1.51 1.09 
 
(0.028) (0.010) (0.009) (4.858) (1.075) 
Semiconductors -0.89 1.81 1.17 1.81 1.20 
Technology  
  
(0.029) (0.014) (0.013) (4.124) (2.937) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.4 Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 1-day abnormal returns of super-sector, sector and sub-sector portfolios following 
the London bombing. The Brown and Warner model provide mean adjusted abnormal returns with a level of 
statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-parametric Corrado rank test. The four 
regression models measure market adjusted abnormal returns with a level of significance estimated using ordinary 
least square regression t-test In this table, portfolios are presented following the FTSE industry classification. 
Portfolios in bold characters represent super-sector. Portfolios in plain font represent sector and Portfolios in italics 
represent sub-sector. 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Oil and Product 1.57* 0.69 1.04 0.75 1.04 
 
(0.020) (0.011) (0.008) (0.153) (0.945) 
Oil Equipment & Svs -0.15 -0.23 0.28 0.12 0.26 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.053) (0.939) 
Oil Exploration & Prod 1.73* 1.60 2.08* 1.36 2.08 
Oil 
  
(0.021) (0.013) (0.010) (0.067) (2.309) 
Chemicals 0.32 -0.13 -0.02 -0.14 -0.03 
 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (1.135) (0.553) 
Forestry 0.02 0.06 0.50 0.04 0.50 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (3.847) (2.059) 
Industrial Metals 1.07 0.06 0.50 0.04 0.50 
 
(0.026) (0.012) (0.011) (1.151) (30.990) 
Aluminium 0.43 ^ 0.12 0.34 0.16 0.42 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.884) (0.154) 
Steel 1.14 0.18 0.85 0.16 0.87 
 
(0.028) (0.017) (0.015) (4.859) (2.314) 
Mining 0.29 -0.09 0.36 -0.09 0.39 
Basic Materials 
  
(0.022) (0.014) (0.012) (3.847) (2.059) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.4 (cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Construction and Materials 0.34 1.67 1.91* 1.66 1.90 
 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.009) (1.066) (0.794) 
Heavy Con -0.55 0.19 0.43 0.19 0.42 
 
(0.028) (0.011) (0.011) (1.484) (0.406) 
Aerospace/Defence 0.67 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.17 
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (1.218) (0.354) 
Aerospace 1.12 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.490) (0.986) 
Defence 0.24 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.482) (0.343) 
Containers and Packaging 1.20*^ 0.84 1.00 0.84 0.98 
 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.730) (0.424) 
Diversified Industrial 0.11 -0.37 -0.47 -0.36 -0.46 
 
(0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.587) (0.291) 
Electronical Equipment 0.23 -0.46 -0.53 -0.46 -0.49 
 
(0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (1.143) (0.688) 
Industrial Engineering 0.08 0.26 0.37 0.26 0.35 
 
(0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.489) (0.305) 
Industrial Machinery 0.01 0.14 0.21 0.12 0.19 
 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (1.029) (0.803) 
Industrial Transport  0.02 -0.56 -0.48 -0.55 -0.48 
 
(0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.921) (0.732) 
Delivery Svs -0.18 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.86 
 
(0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (1.272) (0.697) 
Railroads -0.79 ^ -1.02 -0.93 -1.03 -0.92 
 
(0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (1.538) (1.534) 
Transports Svs 0.12 -0.18 -0.07 -0.13 -0.17 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (2.037) (0.289) 
Support Svs 0.29 -0.15 -0.17 -0.15 -0.17 
 
(0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.566) (0.601) 
Business Support Svs 0.44 -0.96* -0.96* -1.19 -0.98 
 
(0.015) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.247) 
Business Training/Emp Ag   0.17 -1.01 -0.98 -1.03 -1.05 
 
(0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (2.864) (1.969) 
Financial Administration 0.28 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.12 
 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.571) (0.479) 
Waste and Disposal Svs -0.35 -0.62 -0.61 -0.66 -0.63 
Industrials 
  
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (3.530) (0.766) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.4 (cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Auto & Parts 0.23 -0.55 -0.50 -0.55 -0.51 
 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.956) (0.810) 
Automobiles -1.07 ^ -1.32 -1.28 -1.30 -1.29 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (2.105) (3.136) 
Auto Parts 1.72*^ 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.86 
 
(0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (1.851) (0.513) 
Tires -1.06 ^ -1.56 -1.54 -1.56 -1.55 
 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (8.137) (5.064) 
Beverage  0.82* 0.07 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.622) (1.228) 
Brewers -0.08 -0.09 -0.14 -0.07 -0.10 
 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (1.032) (0.315) 
Distillers and Vintners 0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.04 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (1.349) (0.974) 
Soft Drinks 1.50*^ 0.11 -0.02 0.06 -0.07 
 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.895) (0.586) 
Food Products   -0.22 -0.60 -0.65 -0.59 -0.65 
 
(0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (1.275) (0.196) 
Dur Household Product 0.27 -0.50 -0.48 -0.51 -0.48 
 
(0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (1.169) (0.852) 
Leisure Goods  0.45 -0.24 -0.22 -0.23 -0.21 
 
(0.019) (0.004) (0.004) (0.243) (0.243) 
Consumer Electronic -0.55 -1.12 -1.01 -1.10 -0.91 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (3.118) (2.802) 
Recreational Prd -0.02 -0.72 -0.65 -0.73 -0.72 
 
(0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (0.882) (0.940) 
Toys 1.09 ^ -0.35 -0.31 -0.35 -0.32 
 
(0.018) (0.008) (0.008) (2.097) (1.440) 
Personal Goods  -0.25 -0.65 -0.80 -0.64 -0.80 
 
(0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (1.165) (1.125) 
Cloth & Access 0.04 -0.46 -0.46 -0.47 -0.46 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (1.550) (1.219) 
Personal Product -0.57 -0.56 -0.69 -0.52 -0.65 
 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.933) (1.913) 
Tobacco  -0.53 -0.88 -1.01 -0.85 -0.98 
Consumer Goods  
  
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.803) (1.117) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.4 (cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Heath Care Eq & Svs 0.01 -0.14 -0.19 -0.14 -0.19 
 
(0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.747) (0.377) 
Pharmacy & Bio 0.31 0.11 -0.09 0.11 -0.09 
Health Care  
  
(0.019) (0.007) (0.006) (0.848) (0.372) 
Retail  0.14 0.21 0.14 0.21 0.14 
 
(0.017) (0.006) (0.005) (0.492) (0.864) 
Food & Drug Retailers 0.19 -0.39 -0.51 -0.38 -1.46 
 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (14.022) (0.010) 
Apparel Retailers 1.35* 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.00 
 
(0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (1.767) (1.411) 
Home Improvement Retailers 0.27 ^ 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.973) (0.607) 
Specialized Consumer Svs 0.08 0.34 0.25 0.33 -1.59 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (1.930) (0.014) 
Speciality Retailers -1.28* -0.03 -0.10 -0.01 -0.45 
 
(0.017) (0.006) (0.006) (0.735) (0.009) 
Media  -0.43 -0.64 -0.67 -0.64 -0.67 
 
(0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.236) (1.698) 
Publishing -0.94* -0.77 -0.80 -0.77 -0.80 
 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (1.054) (1.678) 
Travel & Leisure -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 
(0.017) (0.005) (0.005) (1.664) (1.552) 
Hotels -0.41 -0.43 -0.43 -0.46 -0.46 
 
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (2.781) (1.255) 
Restaurants & Bars 0.15 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.08 
 
(0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.575) (2.704) 
Travel & Tourism -0.07 -0.14 -0.18 -0.18 -0.22 
Consumer Svs  
  
(0.018) (0.010) (0.010) (1.801) (2.855) 
Fixed Line 0.11 -0.56 -0.68 -0.53 -0.64 Telecommunication 
  
(0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.814) (0.867) 
Electricity  0.45* 0.42 0.55 0.41 0.55 
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.308) (0.331) 
Gs/Wt/Mul Utilities 0.64* 0.57 0.82 0.58 0.83 
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (1.337) (0.488) 
Gas Distribution 0.77*^ 0.58 0.84 0.58 0.84 
 
(0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.945) (0.486) 
Multi-utilities 0.36 0.34 0.50 0.38 0.54 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (1.120) (2.172) 
Water 1.25 ^ 1.05 1.16 1.08 1.21 
Utilities  
  
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (1.635) (2.955) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.4 (cont.) Portfolios Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Banks  1.10* -0.25 -0.34 -0.25 -0.34 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.447) (0.231) 
Nonlife Insurance 0.24 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.01 
 
(0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.377) (0.783) 
Full Lin Insurance 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 -0.03 -0.09 
 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (1.770) (0.648) 
Prop/Casualty Insurance -0.10 -0.12 -0.16 -0.11 -0.15 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (1.119) (0.387) 
Software 0.44 -0.22 -0.38 -0.57 -0.39 
 
(0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.752) 
Reinsurance -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.17 -0.04 
 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (1.575) 
Life Insurance -0.27 -0.90 -0.90 -0.91 -0.89 
 
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (2.466) (1.699) 
Real Estate  0.34* 0.28 0.38 0.27 0.39 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.826) (2.112) 
General Financial 0.38 0.41 0.36 0.41 0.35 
 
(0.014) (0.005) (0.004) (0.390) (0.296) 
Consumer Finance 0.43 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.21 
 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.962) (1.566) 
Specialty Finance 0.18 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.29 
 
(0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (1.556) (0.249) 
Investment Svs 0.87* 0.41 0.36 0.42 0.38 
 
(0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (1.377) (0.694) 
Mortgage Finance 0.85 ^ 0.84 0.74 0.83 0.74 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (1.029) (1.786) 
Equity Investment Instruments 0.28 0.48 0.53 0.47 0.54 
Financials 
  
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.138) (0.098) 
Software & Comp Svs 1.55*^ 0.33 0.19 0.29 -0.17 
 
(0.019) (0.006) (0.005) (0.076) (0.009) 
Computer Services 0.69 1.46 1.39 1.44 1.33 
 
(0.017) (0.008) (0.007) (0.475) (0.123) 
Internet 1.43 ^ 0.97 0.89 1.00 1.20 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (1.585) (0.133) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 2.06* -0.04 -0.21 -0.28 0.27 
 
(0.022) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) 
Semiconductors 0.29 0.12 -0.13 -0.35 0.26 
Technology  
  
(0.024) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
Table 5.2.5 Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the September 11 Attack 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns of super-sector, sector and sub-sector 
portfolios following the September 11 attack. The Brown and Warner model provide mean adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and 
the non-parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models measure market adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns with a level of significance estimated using ordinary least square regression t-test In this 
table, portfolios are presented following the FTSE industry classification. Portfolios in bold characters 
represent super-sector. Portfolios in plain font represent sector and portfolios in italics represent sub-sector. 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Oil and Product -13.44*^ -2.26* -0.20 -2.15* -0.10 
 
(0.064) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) 
Oil Equipment & Svs -15.10*^ -2.01 0.87 -2.38* 0.31 
 
(0.075) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
Oil Exploration & Prod -13.97*^ -2.23* 0.45 -2.42* 0.41 
Oil 
  
(0.069) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
Chemicals -19.03*^ -1.66* 0.78 -2.27* 0.64 
 
(0.047) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
Forestry -16.07*^ -2.02 0.71 -1.85* 0.38 
 
(0.053) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) 
Industrial Metals -31.53*^ -2.02 0.71 -1.85* 0.38 
 
(0.056) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) 
Aluminium -18.40*^ -1.41 1.30 -1.16 0.75 
 
(0.061) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010) 
Steel -24.22*^ -2.81* -0.09 -2.69* 0.08 
 
(0.057) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008) 
Mining -6.11 0.15 0.18 0.08 -0.23 
Basic Materials 
  
(0.083) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.5 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the September 11 
Attack 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Construction and Materials -17.24*^ -2.37* -0.14 -2.31* -0.13 
 
(0.067) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Heavy Con -13.79* -1.74 0.15 -2.20* 0.03 
 
(0.084) (0.011) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) 
Aerospace/Defence -7.63* -1.92* -0.46 -2.04* 0.13 
 
(0.048) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Aerospace -37.36* -4.10* -2.21* -8.40* -6.17* 
 
(0.055) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Defence 22.15*^ 4.30* 4.62* 10.83* 14.28* 
 
(0.050) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) 
Containers and Packaging -18.03*^ -1.85* 0.27 -1.90* 0.14 
 
(0.074) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) 
Diversified Industrial -20.95*^ -1.43* -0.86 -1.50* -0.52 
 
(0.048) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
Electronical Equipment -15.06*^ 1.89 0.35 1.72 0.56 
 
(0.073) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Industrial Engineering -18.09*^ -1.61* 0.20 -1.71* 0.10 
 
(0.050) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
Industrial Machinery -18.51*^ -2.19* -0.19 -2.06* -0.25 
 
(0.047) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) 
Industrial Transport  -19.08*^ -2.34* -0.33 -6.94* -4.31* 
 
(0.059) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Delivery Svs -17.28*^ -0.41 0.18 -0.19 0.26 
 
(0.061) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) 
Railroads -15.70*^ -1.54 0.71 -1.31* 1.23* 
 
(0.055) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
Transports Svs -17.68*^ -1.99 0.37 -1.75* 0.20 
 
(0.054) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) 
Support Svs -14.78*^ -0.71 0.36 -0.75 0.15 
 
(0.071) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Business Support Svs -13.37*^ -0.21 0.42 -0.25 0.40 
 
(0.074) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Business Training/Emp Ag   -21.33*^ 0.98 2.87 0.97 2.89 
 
(0.076) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) 
Financial Administration -11.19*^ -0.74 0.31 -0.25 0.16 
 
(0.075) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Waste and Disposal Svs -25.96*^ -2.82* -0.71 -2.89* -1.02 
Industrials 
  
(0.061) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.5 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the September 11 Attack 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Auto & Parts -22.56*^ -2.58* -1.16 -5.99* -3.87* 
 
(0.052) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) 
Automobiles -20.16*^ -2.38* -1.08 -5.47* -3.66* 
 
(0.051) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Auto Parts -16.67*^ -3.19* -1.37 -6.04* -1.63* 
 
(0.071) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Tires -26.53*^ -2.98* -1.35 -2.90* -1.42 
 
(0.060) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) 
Beverage  -7.11*^ -0.79 -0.33 -0.69* -0.36 
 
(0.044) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Brewers -6.57* -1.86 -1.12 -1.83* -2.06* 
 
(0.045) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) 
Distillers and Vintners -6.79*^ -1.13 -0.21 -1.06 -0.40 
 
(0.038) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) 
Soft Drinks -7.45*^ -0.58 -0.18 -0.54 -0.18 
 
(0.047) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) 
Food Products   -9.99*^ -1.90* -0.73 -1.56* -0.81* 
 
(0.042) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Dur Household Product -17.58*^ -1.76* 0.00 -2.76* -0.37 
 
(0.057) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
Leisure Goods  -19.36*^ -1.70* 0.12 -2.90* -0.21 
 
(0.059) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Consumer Electronic -17.64*^ 0.16 -1.37 -0.39 0.62 
 
(0.080) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) 
Recreational Prd -30.33*^ -4.55* -3.57* -4.50* -3.69* 
 
(0.052) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) 
Toys -13.36*^ -1.42 0.41 -0.76* 0.94* 
 
(0.067) (0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) 
Personal Goods  -16.34*^ -2.16* -1.18 -2.27* -1.46* 
 
(0.051) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) 
Cloth & Access -20.19*^ -1.27* 0.42 -1.49* 0.39 
 
(0.058) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
Personal Product -12.75*^ -2.45* -1.20 -2.36* -0.98 
 
(0.042) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Tobacco  -5.67* -0.84 0.45 -0.73 0.50 
Consumer Goods  
  
(0.044) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.5 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the September 11 Attack 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Heath Care Eq & Svs -10.42*^ -0.72 0.42 -0.75 0.57 
 
(0.066) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Pharmacy & Bio -14.67*^ -0.63 -0.50 -0.52 -0.51 
Health Care  
  
(0.083) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Retail  -15.73*^ 0.13 0.97 0.32 1.24* 
 
(0.076) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.005) 
Food & Drug Retailers -12.00*^ -1.90* -0.44 -1.71* -0.57 
 
(0.059) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Apparel Retailers -23.24*^ -1.07 -0.11 -1.01 0.03 
 
(0.090) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
Home Improvement Retailers -18.97*^ 0.52 1.16 0.84 1.22 
 
(0.072) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) 
Specialized Consumer Svs -10.06*^ 0.89 0.70 0.73 0.38 
 
(0.077) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) 
Speciality Retailers -16.74*^ -0.45 1.00 0.04 1.71* 
 
(0.090) (0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006) 
Media  -15.78*^ -0.62 0.21 -0.85* 0.27 
 
(0.067) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Publishing -10.70*^ -0.95 0.07 -1.72* -0.53 
 
(0.051) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Travel & Leisure -33.88*^ -0.90 -0.53 -4.99* -5.12* 
 
(0.059) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Hotels -40.29*^ -5.65* -3.80* -13.22* -10.96* 
 
(0.064) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) 
Restaurants & Bars -10.58*^ -0.74 0.54 -0.60 0.39 
 
(0.051) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Travel & Tourism -56.97*^ -7.39* -4.84* -15.88* -12.37* 
Consumer Svs  
  
(0.082) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) 
Fixed Line -3.29* 1.68* 1.68* 1.39* 1.85* Telecommunication 
  
(0.064) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
Electricity  -5.42* -0.89 1.35* -0.88 1.57* 
 
(0.047) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Gs/Wt/Mul Utilities -7.77*^ -1.15 1.25 -1.22* 1.75* 
 
(0.041) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
Gas Distribution -8.92*^ -1.33 1.15 -1.45* 1.43* 
 
(0.040) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
Multi-utilities -6.70*^ -0.45 1.10* -0.33 1.90* 
 
(0.042) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Water -2.73 2.49* 3.46* 12.77* 15.41* 
Utilities  
  
(0.048) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.5 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the September 11 Attack 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Banks  -0.87 -0.23 0.23 -0.22 0.25 
 
(0.044) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) 
Nonlife Insurance -2.57* -0.94 0.00 -1.26* -0.20 
 
(0.048) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Full Lin Insurance -14.29*^ -0.87 0.00 -0.97* 0.14 
 
(0.042) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Prop/Casualty Insurance -12.20*^ -1.82* -0.52 -2.79* -1.23* 
 
(0.048) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) 
Software -14.96*^ 1.89* -0.54 1.85 -0.07 
 
(0.110) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.007) 
Reinsurance -12.42* 0.16 1.25* -1.57* -0.65 
 
(0.044) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) 
Life Insurance -11.68*^ -1.47* -0.05 -1.61* -0.07 
 
(0.046) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Real Estate  -7.26*^ -1.07* -0.47 -1.04* -0.45* 
 
(0.027) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
General Financial -14.74*^ -0.06 -0.13 -0.11 -0.26 
 
(0.060) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Consumer Finance -21.05*^ -1.70* -1.64* -1.60* -1.43* 
 
(0.056) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) 
Specialty Finance -11.29*^ -1.13* -0.04 -1.31* 0.33 
 
(0.039) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
Investment Svs -18.36*^ 0.70 -0.03 1.29* 0.51 
 
(0.073) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) 
Mortgage Finance -3.89 0.19 0.72 0.34 0.76 
 
(0.044) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) 
Equity Investment Instruments -3.04* -0.15 -1.64 -0.66 -1.12 
Financials 
  
(0.044) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Software & Comp Svs -3.03* 1.84* -0.10 1.80 0.27 
 
(0.108) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) 
Computer Services -11.99* 0.66 1.12* 0.65* 1.08* 
 
(0.087) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Internet -25.97* 1.74 -0.35 1.60 -0.25 
 
(0.144) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment -5.65* 1.57 -1.58 1.66* -1.22 
 
(0.121) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) 
Semiconductors -28.08*^ -0.35 -3.71* -0.47 -3.03 
Technology  
  
(0.121) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.022) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.6 Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns of super-sector, sector and sub-sector 
portfolios following the Bali Bombing. The Brown and Warner model provide mean adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-
parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models measure market adjusted cumulative abnormal 
returns with a level of significance estimated using ordinary least square regression t-test In this table, 
portfolios are presented following the FTSE industry classification. Portfolios in bold characters represent 
super-sector. Portfolios in plain font represent sector and portfolios in italics represent sub-sector. 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Oil and Product 6.89*^ 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.24 
 
(0.053) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Oil Equipment & Svs 9.97* 0.64 0.66 0.70 0.78 
 
(0.069) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Oil Exploration & Prod 7.33*^ 0.63 0.65 0.75 0.87 
Oil 
  
(0.068) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Chemicals 4.11* -0.54 -0.39 -0.43 -0.28 
 
(0.048) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Forestry 8.41*^ 0.73 1.00 0.87 1.08 
 
(0.043) (0.007) (0.011) (0.020) (0.027) 
Industrial Metals 3.23* 0.73 1.00 0.87 1.08 
 
(0.061) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Aluminium 12.78*^ 1.02 1.29 1.04 1.36 
 
(0.056) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) 
Steel 4.70 -0.43 -0.21 -0.29 -0.10 
 
(0.058) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Mining 3.31 -0.39 -0.06 -0.27 -0.06 
Basic Materials 
  
(0.077) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.027) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.6 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Construction and Materials 6.14* 0.20 0.31 0.21 0.14 
 
(0.071) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Heavy Con 3.78 -0.24 -0.19 -0.04 0.04 
 
(0.112) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Aerospace/Defence -4.07* -1.48* -1.36* -1.47 -1.35 
 
(0.049) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010) 
Aerospace -1.36 -1.34* -1.23* -1.41 -1.32 
 
(0.048) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) 
Defence -6.72* -1.88* -1.74* -2.01* -1.84* 
 
(0.049) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Containers and Packaging 7.71* -0.04 0.16 -0.02 0.21 
 
(0.073) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Diversified Industrial 3.62 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.14 
 
(0.054) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Electronical Equipment 11.83*^ -0.45 -0.66 -0.47 -0.69 
 
(0.065) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) 
Industrial Engineering 6.22* 0.04 0.15 -0.16 0.00 
 
(0.052) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Industrial Machinery 5.36* 0.02 0.18 -0.30 -0.02 
 
(0.050) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Industrial Transport  3.22* -0.39 -0.19 -0.42 -0.23 
 
(0.049) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Delivery Svs 3.42 -0.21 -0.08 -0.30 -0.15 
 
(0.046) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
Railroads 1.26 -0.86 -0.57 -0.82 -0.58 
 
(0.042) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
Transports Svs 0.84 -0.94 -0.76 -0.77 -0.54 
 
(0.046) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Support Svs 7.40*^ 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.25 
 
(0.062) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Business Support Svs 4.48* 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.35 
 
(0.057) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Business Training/Emp Ag   22.54*^ -0.81 -0.93 -0.61 -0.70 
 
(0.079) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Financial Administration 10.92*^ 0.00 -0.08 0.06 0.05 
 
(0.072) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Waste and Disposal Svs -0.63 -0.66 -0.57 -0.64 -0.53 
Industrials 
  
(0.055) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards 
of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.6 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Auto & Parts 3.55* -0.90 -0.53 -0.82 -0.53 
 
(0.047) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Automobiles 2.26 -0.91 -0.46 -0.70 -0.44 
 
(0.051) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Auto Parts 6.08* -0.78 -0.54 -0.79 -0.52 
 
(0.049) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Tires 4.38 -0.71 -0.27 -0.05 -0.01 
 
(0.076) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) 
Beverage  3.14* -1.16* -1.16* -1.15 -1.20 
 
(0.042) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Brewers 3.81 0.14 0.28 0.27 0.42 
 
(0.034) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Distillers and Vintners 5.82*^ 0.70 0.75 0.76 0.89 
 
(0.039) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Soft Drinks 1.60 -1.50* -1.53* -1.60* -1.76* 
 
(0.047) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Food Products   3.42*^ 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.25 
 
(0.039) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Dur Household Product 5.77* 0.32 0.49 0.43 0.53 
 
(0.049) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leisure Goods  6.21*^ 0.51 0.61 0.32 0.75* 
 
(0.054) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Consumer Electronic 6.93 1.54 1.32 1.55* 1.45* 
 
(0.056) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) 
Recreational Prd 7.58* 0.92 1.02 1.03* 1.10* 
 
(0.057) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Toys 5.51* 1.02 0.98 2.31* 2.14* 
 
(0.054) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Personal Goods  5.67*^ -0.16 -0.19 -0.61* -0.70* 
 
(0.042) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cloth & Access 8.20*^ 0.37 0.44 0.71* 0.49 
 
(0.050) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Personal Product 2.94* 0.02 -0.01 -1.63* -1.64* 
 
(0.034) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Tobacco  7.56*^ 1.29 1.47 1.22 1.25 
Consumer Goods  
  
(0.047) (0.010) (0.010) (0.028) (0.027) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.6 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Heath Care Eq & Svs 2.73* -0.14 -0.20 -0.04 -0.09 
 
(0.054) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Pharmacy & Bio 6.83* 0.44 0.24 0.55 0.36 
Health Care  
  
(0.074) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
Retail  6.07*^ 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.14 
 
(0.065) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Food & Drug Retailers 3.17* 0.14 0.27 0.09 0.21 
 
(0.056) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Apparel Retailers 8.55*^ 0.62 0.68 0.54 0.65 
 
(0.074) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
Home Improvement Retailers 14.35*^ -0.34 -0.37 -0.84* -0.85* 
 
(0.058) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Specialised Consumer Svs 8.09* -0.06 -0.18 -0.09 -0.23 
 
(0.064) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Speciality Retailers 9.36*^ 1.32 1.43* 1.29 1.36 
 
(0.070) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Media  5.41* -0.05 0.17 -0.04 0.19 
 
(0.068) (0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.028) 
Publishing 4.32* -0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.01 
 
(0.046) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) 
Travel & Leisure 4.54* -0.34 -0.16 -0.36 -0.14 
 
(0.061) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) 
Hotels 1.88 -0.29 -0.04 -0.36 -0.10 
 
(0.055) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Restaurants & Bars 3.31* -0.55 -0.54 -0.82 -0.81 
 
(0.049) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Travel & Tourism 13.68* -0.13 0.24 0.22 0.54 
Consumer Svs  
  
(0.078) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Fixed Line 9.58*^ 0.15 0.38 0.32 1.35 Telecommunication 
  
(0.092) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026) (0.015) 
Electricity  0.24 -0.97 -0.60 -0.84 -0.93 
 
(0.064) (0.007) (0.006) (0.021) (0.008) 
Gs/Wt/Mul Utilities 0.25 -0.67 -0.41 -0.70 -0.32 
 
(0.047) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) 
Gas Distribution 2.03 -0.79 -0.49 -0.79 -0.40 
 
(0.041) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) 
Multi-utilities -2.90 -0.47 -0.22 -0.21 -0.07 
 
(0.057) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.012) 
Water 2.74 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.14 
Utilities  
  
(0.046) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.6 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Bali Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Banks  6.04*^ 0.55 0.68 0.60 0.73 
 
(0.040) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Nonlife Insurance 7.16*^ 0.23 0.41 0.38 0.45 
 
(0.044) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Full Lin Insurance 8.48*^ 0.20 0.38 0.46 0.54 
 
(0.044) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Prop/Casualty Insurance 4.40* 0.28 0.46 0.32 0.47 
 
(0.044) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Software 10.07*^ -0.09 -0.48 -0.14 -0.52 
 
(0.085) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
Reinsurance 4.20*^ -0.27 -0.08 -0.07 0.00 
 
(0.040) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) 
Life Insurance 7.95*^ 0.61 0.77 0.92* 0.96* 
 
(0.040) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Real Estate  1.63* -0.16 -0.02 0.00 0.05 
 
(0.033) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011) (0.009) 
General Financial 9.85*^ 0.64 0.69 0.63 0.64 
 
(0.056) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Consumer Finance 3.64* -0.02 0.16 -0.18 -0.03 
 
(0.077) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Specialty Finance 2.85 0.59 0.68 0.56 0.61 
 
(0.046) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Investment Svs 12.70*^ 0.66 0.58 0.65 0.57 
 
(0.061) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Mortgage Finance 9.77*^ 1.13* 1.21* 1.08* 1.13* 
 
(0.044) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Equity Investment Instruments 6.98*^ -0.14 -0.23 -0.08 -0.18 
Financials 
  
(0.039) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
Software & Comp Svs 13.34*^ 0.26 -0.04 0.12 -0.21 
 
(0.088) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Computer Services 13.65*^ 1.07 1.04 0.68 0.73 
 
(0.100) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Internet 12.34 0.29 0.09 0.08 0.02 
 
(0.103) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 13.78* -1.12 -1.49* -1.76* -1.72* 
 
(0.098) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) 
Semiconductors 12.97* -1.50 -1.99* -1.85* -2.62* 
Technology  
  
(0.099) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.7 Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns of super-sector, sector and sub-sector 
portfolios following the Madrid bombing. The Brown and Warner model provide mean adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and 
the non-parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models measure market adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns with a level of significance estimated using ordinary least square regression t-test In this 
table, portfolios are presented following the FTSE industry classification. Portfolios in bold characters 
represent super-sector. Portfolios in plain font represent sector and portfolios in italics represent 
sub-sector. 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Oil and Product 0.32 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.14 
 
(0.036) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Oil Equipment & Svs 2.28* 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.57 
 
(0.041) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Oil Exploration & Prod 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.40 0.33 
Oil 
  
(0.038) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Chemicals 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.034) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Forestry 0.91 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.42 
 
(0.028) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) 
Industrial Metals 0.12 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.42 
 
(0.056) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
Aluminium 0.76 0.41 0.41 0.33 0.28 
 
(0.043) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Steel -0.38 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
 
(0.057) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) 
Mining -1.00 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.14 
Basic Materials 
  
(0.054) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.7 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Madrid 
Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Construction and Materials 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 
 
(0.054) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Heavy Con 3.67 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 
 
(0.083) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Aerospace/Defence -1.03 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 
 
(0.035) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Aerospace -0.41 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 
 
(0.037) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Defence -1.60 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 
 
(0.033) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Containers and Packaging 1.15 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 
 
(0.037) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Diversified Industrial 0.58 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
(0.033) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
Electronical Equipment -0.45 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27 
 
(0.045) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) 
Industrial Engineering 2.05* 0.77* 0.77* 0.76 0.75* 
 
(0.043) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Industrial Machinery 0.78 0.63 0.63 0.64* 0.64* 
 
(0.037) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Industrial Transport  1.64 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.17 
 
(0.037) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Delivery Svs 5.25* 0.71* 0.72* 0.75* 0.77* 
 
(0.034) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Railroads 0.91 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.33 
 
(0.027) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Transports Svs 2.50 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.76 
 
(0.037) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Support Svs 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.25 
 
(0.046) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Business Support Svs -1.51 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 
 
(0.044) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Business Training/Emp Ag   5.90 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 
 
(0.061) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) 
Financial Administration -0.57 -0.25 -0.25 -0.23 -0.23 
 
(0.046) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Waste and Disposal Svs 2.10 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.74 
Industrials 
  
(0.037) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.7 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Auto & Parts 0.51 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28 
 
(0.036) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) 
Automobiles 0.62 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 
 
(0.043) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) 
Auto Parts 2.05 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
 
(0.035) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Tires 1.27 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.42 
 
(0.086) (0.014) (0.014) (0.036) (0.034) 
Beverage  -1.79*^ -0.39 -0.39 -0.35* -0.38* 
 
(0.030) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Brewers -0.40 -0.37 -0.37 -0.44 -0.46 
 
(0.026) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
Distillers and Vintners -0.62 -0.07 -0.07 -0.29 -0.29 
 
(0.024) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Soft Drinks -2.83*^ -0.41 -0.40 -0.38* -0.41* 
 
(0.034) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Food Products   -1.53* -0.33 -0.33 -0.36* -0.35* 
 
(0.025) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Dur Household Product -0.71 -0.07 -0.06 -0.14 -0.11 
 
(0.037) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Leisure Goods  -1.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 
 
(0.045) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Consumer Electronic -0.26 -0.40 -0.41 -0.45 -0.46 
 
(0.043) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Recreational Prd -2.58 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.13 
 
(0.051) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Toys 0.48 -0.12 -0.11 -0.19 -0.02 
 
(0.042) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Personal Goods  -1.25 -0.37 -0.37 -0.28 -0.28 
 
(0.030) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Cloth & Access -0.19 -0.01 -0.01 0.33 0.06 
 
(0.033) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Personal Product -2.55*^ -0.46 -0.45 -0.25 -0.33 
 
(0.026) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tobacco  -3.38 -1.30 -1.29 -0.51 -0.55 
Consumer Goods  
  
(0.043) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.7 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Heath Care Eq & Svs -0.61 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 
 
(0.043) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Pharmacy & Bio -1.99* -0.38 -0.38 -0.35 -0.31 
Health Care  
  
(0.053) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Retail  -0.96 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
 
(0.048) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Food & Drug Retailers -1.90 -0.30 -0.30 -0.32 -0.30 
 
(0.038) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.011) 
Apparel Retailers -0.36 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 
 
(0.054) (0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014) 
Home Improvement Retailers -0.78* 0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.07 
 
(0.037) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Specialized Consumer Svs 1.99 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.35 
 
(0.052) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
Speciality Retailers -1.96 -0.12 -0.12 -0.17 -0.17 
 
(0.048) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
Media  0.03 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 
 
(0.040) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Publishing 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 
 
(0.029) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Travel & Leisure -1.61 -0.24 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 
 
(0.045) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hotels -2.61 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 -0.18 
 
(0.032) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Restaurants & Bars -0.68 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.43 
 
(0.036) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Travel & Tourism -2.77 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 
Consumer Svs  
  
(0.056) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Fixed Line -1.26 -0.19 -0.18 -0.20 -0.19 Telecommunication 
  
(0.042) (0.005) (0.005) (0.024) (0.014) 
Electricity  0.72 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.29 
 
(0.030) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gs/Wt/Mul Utilities -0.05 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 
 
(0.025) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gas Distribution -0.73 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.15 
 
(0.024) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Multi-utilities 0.97 0.32 0.32 0.33 -0.28 
 
(0.027) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Water 0.27 0.16 0.16 0.30 0.29 
Utilities  
  
(0.021) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.7 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the Madrid Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Banks  0.24 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.13 
 
(0.026) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
Nonlife Insurance -0.25 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 
 
(0.032) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Full Lin Insurance -1.09 0.01 0.02 -0.13 0.02 
 
(0.033) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Prop/Casualty Insurance -2.35* -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 
 
(0.034) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Software -0.82 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 
 
(0.055) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Reinsurance -1.46 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 
 
(0.025) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Life Insurance -2.34* 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.08 
 
(0.031) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Real Estate  0.30 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.13 
 
(0.024) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
General Financial -0.93 -0.07 -0.07 0.14 -0.07 
 
(0.041) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) 
Consumer Finance -1.70 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.46 
 
(0.049) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) 
Specialty Finance -1.63 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.04 
 
(0.030) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Investment Svs -0.80 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 
 
(0.043) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Mortgage Finance -1.34 -0.21 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 
 
(0.043) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) 
Equity Investment Instruments 0.59 -0.18 -0.19 -0.10 -0.08 
Financials 
  
(0.030) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Software & Comp Svs -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 
 
(0.055) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Computer Services 0.46 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 
 
(0.049) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
Internet 6.01 1.17 1.16 1.19 1.31 
 
(0.052) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment -0.16 0.45 0.44 0.53 0.05 
 
(0.063) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
Semiconductors 0.61 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.35 
Technology  
  
(0.067) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.8 Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
This table contains estimates of 5-day cumulative abnormal returns of super-sector, sector and sub-sector 
portfolios following the  London bombing The Brown and Warner model provide mean adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns with a level of statistical significance estimated using a parametric t-test and the non-
parametric Corrado rank test. The four regression models measure market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
with a level of significance estimated using ordinary least square regression t-test In this table, portfolios are 
presented following the FTSE industry classification. Portfolios in bold characters represent super-sector. 
Portfolios in plain font represent sector and portfolios in italics represent sub-sector. 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Oil and Product 1.21 -0.28 0.01 -0.33 0.00 
 
(0.020) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Oil Equipment & Svs 0.19 -0.41 -0.06 -0.35 -0.07 
 
(0.019) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
Oil Exploration & Prod 1.15 -0.12 0.23 -0.02 0.26 
Oil 
  
(0.021) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Chemicals 2.61* 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.20 
 
(0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Forestry 2.41 0.29 0.55 0.26 0.45 
 
(0.012) (0.004) (0.006) (0.014) (0.017) 
Industrial Metals 5.85* 0.29 0.55 0.26 0.45 
 
(0.026) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) 
Aluminium 5.72 0.58 0.71 0.63 0.67 
 
(0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Steel 6.49* 0.10 0.48 0.08 0.50 
 
(0.028) (0.008) (0.007) (0.020) (0.023) 
Mining 0.80 -0.38 -0.08 -0.37 -0.04 
Basic Materials 
  
(0.022) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.017) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.8 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the London 
Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Construction and Materials 0.68 0.27 0.40 0.26 0.38 
 
(0.019) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Heavy Con 1.97 -0.30 -0.20 -0.32 -0.22 
 
(0.028) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Aerospace/Defence 0.86 -0.27 -0.26 -0.28 -0.29 
 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Aerospace 0.89 -0.32 -0.30 -0.35 -0.34 
 
(0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Defence 0.90 -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 -0.14 
 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Containers and Packaging 2.60* -0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
 
(0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Diversified Industrial 2.32* 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Electronical Equipment 3.63* -0.21 -0.34 -0.21 -0.32 
 
(0.017) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.006) 
Industrial Engineering 2.50* 0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.06 
 
(0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Industrial Machinery 1.85* -0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 
 
(0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Industrial Transport  2.39* -0.30 -0.27 -0.42 -0.38 
 
(0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Delivery Svs 2.23 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 
 
(0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Railroads 0.35 -0.56 -0.50 -0.63 -0.61 
 
(0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Transports Svs 4.92 ^ 0.45 0.48 0.45 0.47 
 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Support Svs 2.02* -0.07 -0.11 -0.06 -0.11 
 
(0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Business Support Svs 1.26 -0.12 -0.16 -0.28 -0.14 
 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Business Training/Emp Ag   4.65* -0.07 -0.14 -0.04 -0.14 
 
(0.020) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Financial Administration 2.09 -0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 
 
(0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Waste and Disposal Svs 1.53 -0.29 -0.29 -0.37 -0.38 
Industrials 
  
(0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. 
Standards of deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.8 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the London 
Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Auto & Parts 3.06* 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.18 
 
(0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Automobiles 3.32 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.11 
 
(0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Auto Parts 2.05 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.18 
 
(0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Tires 2.86 -0.31 -0.35 -0.33 -0.37 
 
(0.024) (0.009) (0.009) (0.024) (0.025) 
Beverage  2.36* 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.17 
 
(0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Brewers 4.15^ 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.14 
 
(0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Distillers and Vintners -1.16 -0.57 -0.51 -0.57 -0.50 
 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Soft Drinks 3.51*^ 0.36 0.32 0.30 0.23 
 
(0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Food Products   1.01* -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12 
 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dur Household Product 1.06 -0.39 -0.40 -0.40 -0.41 
 
(0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Leisure Goods  3.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 
 
(0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) 
Consumer Electronic 2.50 -0.30 -0.29 -0.18 -0.18 
 
(0.024) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.023) 
Recreational Prd 4.59 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.23 
 
(0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Toys 2.70 -0.22 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 
 
(0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Personal Goods  2.57* 0.32 0.28 0.34 0.26 
 
(0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cloth & Access 3.85*^ 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.16 
 
(0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) 
Personal Product 1.29 0.20 0.16 0.28 0.23 
 
(0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Tobacco  0.87 -0.11 -0.14 -0.10 -0.15 
Consumer Goods  
  
(0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.8 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
  Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Heath Care Eq & Svs -1.08* -0.57* -0.59* -0.56 -0.59 
 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Pharmacy & Bio 2.30* 0.09 -0.04 0.11 -0.04 
Health Care  
  
(0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Retail  1.43* 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 
 
(0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Food & Drug Retailers 1.46 -0.14 -0.20 -0.19 -0.13 
 
(0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.006) 
Apparel Retailers 1.86 -0.28 -0.32 -0.27 -0.30 
 
(0.020) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Home Improvement Retailers 5.44 ^ 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 
 
(0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) 
Specialized Consumer Svs 1.14 -0.05 -0.17 -0.50 -0.26 
 
(0.018) (0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.010) 
Speciality Retailers 1.45 0.25 0.19 0.31 0.30 
 
(0.017) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Media  1.18* -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 
 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Publishing 0.68 -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 
 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Travel & Leisure 2.06* 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 
(0.017) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) 
Hotels 1.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.26 -0.25 
 
(0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Restaurants & Bars 2.50* 0.30 0.26 0.35 0.30 
 
(0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) 
Travel & Tourism 0.24 -0.30 -0.34 -0.36 -0.40 
Consumer Svs  
  
(0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Fixed Line 2.50 -0.12 -0.16 -0.06 -0.09 Telecommunication 
  
(0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Electricity  1.89* 0.18 0.31 0.20 0.32 
 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012) (0.006) 
Gs/Wt/Mul Utilities 1.67* 0.16 0.35 0.17 0.35 
 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
Gas Distribution 1.63* 0.18 0.37 0.19 0.39 
 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) 
Multi-utilities 1.62* 0.04 0.17 0.12 0.24 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Water 2.55 0.10 0.15 0.01 0.06 
Utilities  
  
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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Table 5.2.8 (cont.) Portfolios Cumulative Abnormal Returns following the London Bombing 
Portfolio Estimation Model 
 
 Regression Model Industry 
 B&W CAPM FF GARCH GARCH FF 
Banks  2.48*  -0.01  -0.03  -0.06  -0.04  
 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Nonlife Insurance 0.56   -0.18  -0.17  -0.19  -0.13  
 
(0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) 
Full Lin Insurance 1.05   -0.15  -0.16  -0.18  -0.20  
 
(0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) 
Prop/Casualty Insurance 0.05   -0.30  -0.29  -0.33  -0.32  
 
(0.013) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Software 4.55*^ 0.44  0.34  0.49  0.34  
 
(0.020) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Reinsurance -0.08   -0.07  -0.04  -0.16  -0.24  
 
(0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Life Insurance 0.20   -0.52  -0.47  -0.52  -0.47  
 
(0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Real Estate  1.88*  0.11  0.20  0.08  0.24  
 
(0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) 
General Financial 2.35*  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.03  
 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Consumer Finance 1.40   0.06  0.04  0.04  0.03  
 
(0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Specialty Finance 2.57   0.13  0.14  0.14  0.15  
 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Investment Svs 3.00*  0.00  -0.04  0.00  -0.03  
 
(0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Mortgage Finance 1.20   -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  
 
(0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Equity Investment Instruments 0.24   0.23  0.25  0.23  0.23  
Financials 
  
(0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
Software & Comp Svs 3.56*  0.51 0.41 0.60  0.53  
 
(0.019) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Computer Services 3.00*  0.84* 0.78* 0.80* 0.55 
 
(0.017) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Internet 7.05  0.21  0.05  0.26  -0.03  
 
(0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 4.46*  0.26  0.09  0.43  -0.03  
 
(0.022) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Semiconductors 5.53*  0.34  0.09  0.57  0.13  
Technology  
  
(0.024) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
*Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level. ^Corrado test statistic is significant at the 0.10 level. Standards of 
deviation are in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This PhD thesis has investigated some of the consequences of terrorism on equity 
financial markets. It has focused on the U.S market and terrorist attacks that followed the 
September 11 attack, 2001. The first contribution of this thesis has been to provide evidence 
of market efficiency following the September 11 crisis. Investors appear to have identified 
firms with direct damage from the attack and adjusted their equity value accordingly. The 
second major finding of this thesis has been the identification of specific terrorism industry 
effects. These effects were found to apply to both equity price and volume. According to the 
statistical evaluation, equity returns and volumes as well as volatility and volume are 
significantly related following terrorist attacks. Another contribution from this research has 
been the critical analysis of event study methods with evidence of abnormal return sensitivity 
to the method. 
 
 
6.2 Summary of Results 
 
This thesis has presented three empirical studies. The first considered the issue of 
market efficiency following September 11 crisis. It has assessed market efficiency by 
comparing the equity return of firms with direct damages from September 11, namely World 
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Trade Center tenants. The equity return of tenant firms was compared to the equity returns for 
control firms not directly involved in the attack. The comparison of firm abnormal returns 
suggests that investors discriminated against tenants firms. The break up of the samples into 
industry portfolios showed that tenants firms from finance, leisure and travel, and media 
industry experienced higher negative abnormal return than their industry counterparts.  
A sectional regression analysis of firm abnormal returns and firm specific 
characteristics, including size, leverage and financial performance, provided additional 
insight. These results suggested that the equity returns of tenant firms were lower than those 
of other firms. This finding corroborated the results from the abnormal returns analysis. A 
cross sectional analysis however did not confirm that investors discriminated against tenant 
firms according to their industry segments. Instead, it found that investors did take into 
account industry segments when re-evaluating the equity value of firms not directly involved 
in the attack. Results also indicated that market participants considered firm financial 
performance. Firms with strong financial performance experienced smaller abnormal returns 
than other firms. Findings from this study provide some evidence of market efficiency 
following the September 11 attack. The equity return of tenants firms reflects the exceptional 
damages that these businesses incurred by being at the centre of the attack. Findings from this 
investigation also suggested that terrorist attack could have an industry differential effect on 
equity returns. 
The second empirical study investigated and confirmed terrorism industry differential 
effects. To formally identify these effects, this study compared the price effect and volume 
effect of terrorism on firms from various industries and sectors. It estimated the abnormal 
returns and volumes of 42 industry and sector portfolios on the U.S, Spanish and the U.K 
equity markets following the September 11 attack, the Madrid and the London bombing. The 
abnormal returns and volumes were calculated and statistical tests based on Brown and 
Warner (1985) and Corrado and Zivney (1992) ranking test. Results from this study showed 
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heterogeneity in industry and sector responses to terrorist attacks. It identified the industries 
and the sectors least and most responsive to terrorist attacks. Across country markets, the 
health care and financial sectors appeared the most resilient to terrorist attacks. The travel and 
leisure and the leisure good sectors seemed to be the most sensitive sectors. These findings on 
the industry differential effect of terrorism suggest that equity diversification across industries 
and sectors could lower terrorist risk. 
Further analysis of these results showed that although some patterns can be identified in 
industries and sector response to terrorist events, this pattern was not the same across all 
markets. The U.S and the Spanish markets display similar behaviour. Relative to their 
markets, their industries and sectors did exhibit comparable level of sensitivity to terrorist 
attack. Moreover, their markets were quite responsive to local events. In contrast, the U.K 
market was fairly resilient to local attacks. Moreover, on this market, industry and sector 
equity responses to terrorist attacks did differ from the reactions observed on U.S and Spanish 
markets.  
Finally, an assessment of trading volume showed evidence of abnormally high levels of 
trading activity on markets following September 11 attack and, to lesser extent, following the 
Madrid bombing. These results also indicated that terrorism had an industry differential effect 
on trading volume. The high volumes appeared to coincide with high abnormal returns. A 
positive and statistically significant positive relationship between abnormal volumes and 
abnormal price volatility was found. According to trading theories, this positive relationship 
could signify that, following terrorist attacks, traders shared pessimistic views about the future 
of the markets.  
The last study of this thesis provided a critic of event study methods used for estimating 
price effects. A case study analysis illustrated the abnormal return sensitivity to method. 
These empirical results were drawn from a study on the equity returns of 95 U.S industry, 
sector and sub-sector indexes and portfolios following the September 11, the Bali, the Madrid 
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and the London bombings. Fives estimation methods were used including the Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) mean adjusted return and four market adjusted returns based on the 
CAPM model, the Fama and French three factors model (1996), the GARCH model and the 
GARCH model with Fama and French factors. 
Results showed discrepancies between the mean adjusted returns and the market 
adjusted returns. Mean adjusted method detected a higher percentage of abnormal returns than 
the market adjusted methods. Mean abnormal returns also tended to be larger than the market 
adjusted abnormal returns. This last analysis implies that the abnormal returns estimated in 
the first and second study21 of this thesis would have been possibly smaller and not as 
statistically significant if estimated using the market adjusted method rather than the mean 
adjusted method.  
Although they are based on the same framework, the market models do not necessarily 
provided comparable results. Econometric adjustments for missing variables (Fama and 
French factors) or for correcting the error terms (GARCH) do alter the sign, size and level of 
statistical significant of the abnormal returns. As this study estimates abnormal returns of U.S 
sector portfolios following various terrorist attacks, it provides further evidence of the 
industry differential effect of terrorism. It demonstrates that the September 11 attack had an 
extreme negative impact on the hotel and the aerospace firms, while having a positive impact 
the defence and the water firms.  
 
                                                 
21
 Studies one and two evaluate abnormal returns statistical significance using both a parametric and a 
non parametric test. Because it uses both tests, study one and two provide abnormal returns estimates which are 
not less robust than market adjusted abnormal returns estimated using Ordinary Least Square method or GARCH 
model. 
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6.3 Extensions and Limitations 
 
This section details suggestions of future research. These analyses are beyond the scope of 
this dissertation but they are important for future projects.  
 
The industry differential effect of terrorism on financial risk could be estimated. This research 
could use a market model including dummy variables to measure change in systematic and 
unsystematic risks. The sample to be investigated could consist of industry and sector 
portfolios which have exhibited extremely large or extremely small price responses to recent 
terrorist attacks. This analysis would provide an opportunity to evaluate some of the long-
term impact of terrorism on the market. 
 
Equity markets are extremely reactive and the effect of new information can be significant yet 
short lived. Maillet and Michel (2005) use high intensity data to survey the foreign exchange 
market reaction to September 11 but, so far, no equity market based research on terrorism has 
used such data. Future research should examine intra day data. Using such detailed data 
would enable the conduct of more sensitive analysis to assess the immediate impact of 
unexpected events on equity markets. It could evaluate the possible impact of “minor” 
terrorist acts, such as foreign terrorist attacks targeting Western interests. 
 
In the future, it would also be of interest to compare the U.S equity market reaction to 
hurricane Katrina against the September 11 attack. While both occurrences are significant 
catastrophic events, they present different features. For instance, hurricane Katrina lasted over 
several days and generated higher costs than the attack (Michel-Kerjan and Pedell 2006). 
September 11 lasted only a day but it was an unexpected event which generated such damage 
and uncertainty that the equity market was closed for a week.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined some aspects of the consequences of terrorist attacks on equity 
stock markets. It has introduced the subject of terrorism with a survey of the literature on the 
impact of terrorism on the economy and financial markets. The literature review has also 
made the link between terrorism and other external market events such as wars and 
catastrophic events. The thesis has presented three empirical studies.  
The first study has shown evidence consistent with market efficiency following the 
September 11 attack. It has presented an event study analysis on the equity returns of firms 
involved in the event. It has found that the firms’ equity level did reflect its level of exposure 
to the September 11 attack. It has concluded that like other catastrophic events, terrorist 
events do not seem to prevent market efficiency. This first study also found that the 
September 11 attack had an industry specific effect. 
 The second study has presented an in-depth investigation of the differential effect of 
terrorist attacks. It has analysed industry and sector equity performance across three equity 
markets and three terrorist events. It has presented detailed results and pointed out the 
industries and sectors that appeared most sensitive or resilient to terrorism. It has also 
provided evidence of a statistically significant relationship between price volatility and 
volume trade.  
The first and second studies have presented quantitative analyses performed using a 
traditional event study method combined with robust non-parametric statistical tests. The final 
study has introduced alternative event study methods and proposed a critical analysis of event 
study methodology. It has discussed the impact of methodological choices. The discussion 
was illustrated by a case study that clearly shows the disparity of event study estimation 
results. This last study drew attention to the need to carefully consider the methodology when 
using event study methods or results.  
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This dissertation has aimed to add to our knowledge of the impact of terrorism on 
equity markets. It may help to eliminate some uncertainty about the markets response to 
terrorist events and to identify opportunities for reducing terrorist risk. Results from this thesis 
suggest that equity markets can remain efficient on the wake of terrorist events. Terrorist 
events can trigger abnormal movement in equity price and volume traded. These price and 
volume effects are influenced by the industry differential impact of terrorism. The detailed 
analysis presented in this thesis can be used to exploit the industry effect and to build the 
diversification strategy that would minimize terrorist risk through industry diversification. 
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GENERAL APPENDIX 
Table 6.1.1 FTSE / DJ Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
Industry Super-sector Sector Subsector 
0533 Exploration & Production 0530 Oil & Gas 
Producers 0537 Integrated Oil & Gas 
0573 Oil Equipment & Services 
0001  
Oil & Gas 
0500 Oil & Gas 
0570 Oil Equip., 
Serv. & Distrib. 0577 Pipelines 
1353 Commodity Chemicals 1300 Chemicals 1350 Chemicals 
1357 Specialty Chemicals 
1733 Forestry 1730 Forestry & 
Paper 1737 Paper 
1753 Aluminium 
1755 Nonferrous Metals 
1750 Industrial 
Metals 
1757 Steel 
1771 Coal 
1773 Diamonds & Gemstones 
1775 General Mining 
1777 Gold Mining 
1000  
Basic 
Materials 1700 Basic 
Resources 
1770 Mining 
1779 Platinum & Precious Metals 
2353 Building Materials & Fixtures 2300 Construction  
& Materials 
2350 Construction & 
Materials 2357 Heavy Construction 
2713 Aerospace 2710 Aerospace & 
Defense 2717 Defense 
2723 Containers & Packaging 2720 General 
Industrials 2727 Diversified Industrials 
2733 Electrical Components & Equipment 2730 Electronic & 
Electrical Equip. 2737 Electronic Equipment 
2753 Commercial Vehicles & Trucks 2750 Industrial 
Engineering 2757 Industrial Machinery 
2771 Delivery Services 
2773 Marine Transportation 
2775 Railroads 
2777 Transportation Services 
2770 Industrial 
Transportation 
2779 Trucking 
2791 Business Support Services 
2793 Business Training & Employment Agencies 
2795 Financial Administration 
2797 Industrial Suppliers 
2000 
Industrials 
2700 Industrial 
Goods & Services 
2790 Support 
Services 
2799 Waste & Disposal Services 
3353 Automobiles 
3355 Auto Parts 
3300 Automobiles  
& Parts 
3350 Automobiles  
& Parts 
3357 Tires 
3533 Brewers 
3535 Distillers & Vintners 
3530 Beverages 
3537 Soft Drinks 
3573 Farming & Fishing 
3500 Food &  
Beverage 
3570 Food Producers 
3577 Food Products 
3722 Durable Household Products 
3724 Nondurable Household Products 
3726 Furnishings 
3720 Household 
Goods 
3728 Home Construction 
3743 Consumer Electronics 
3745 Recreational Products 
3740 Leisure Goods 
3747 Toys 
3763 Clothing & Accessories 
3765 Footwear 
3760 Personal Goods 
3767 Personal Products 
3000 
Consumer 
Goods 
3700 Personal & 
Household Goods 
3780 Tobacco 3785 Tobacco 
Source: FTSE. http://www.ftse.com/Indices/Industry_Classification_Benchmark/index.jsp 
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Table 6.1.1 (cont.) FTSE / DJ Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) 
Industry Super-sector Sector Subsector 
4533 Health Care Providers 
4535 Medical Equipment 
4530 Health Care 
Equipment & Services 
4537 Medical Supplies 
4573 Biotechnology 
4000 Health Care 4500 Health Care 
4570 Pharmaceuticals 
& Biotechnology 4577 Pharmaceuticals 
5333 Drug Retailers 5330 Food & Drug 
Retailers 5337 Food Retailers & Wholesalers 
5371 Apparel Retailers 
5373 Broadline Retailers 
5375 Home Improvement Retailers 
5377 Specialized Consumer Services 
5300 Retail 
5370 General Retailers 
5379 Specialty Retailers 
5553 Broadcasting & Entertainment 
5555 Media Agencies 
5500 Media 5550 Media 
5557 Publishing 
5751 Airlines 
5752 Gambling 
5753 Hotels 
5755 Recreational Services 
5757 Restaurants & Bars 
5000 Consumer 
Services 
5700 Travel & 
Leisure 
5750 Travel & Leisure 
5759 Travel & Tourism 
6530 Fixed Line 
Telecommunications 
6535 Fixed Line Telecommunications 6000 
Telecommunications 
6500 
Telecommunications 
6570 Mobile 
Telecommunications 
6575 Mobile Telecommunications 
7530 Electricity 7535 Electricity 
7573 Gas Distribution 
7575 Multi-utilities 
7000 Utilities 7500 Utilities 
7570 Gas, Water & 
Multi-utilities 
7577 Water 
8300 Banks 8350 Banks 8355 Banks 
8532 Full Line Insurance 
8534 Insurance Brokers 
8536 Property & Casualty Insurance 
8530 Nonlife Insurance 
8538 Reinsurance 
8500 Insurance 
8570 Life Insurance 8575 Life Insurance 
8733 Real Estate Holding & 
Development 
8730 Real Estate 
8737 Real Estate Investment Trusts 
8771 Asset Managers 
8773 Consumer Finance 
8775 Specialty Finance 
8777 Investment Services 
8700 Financial 
Services 
8770 General Financial 
8779 Mortgage Finance 
 8980 Equity Investment 
Instruments 
8985 Equity Investment Instruments 
8000 Financials 
 8990 Nonequity 
Investment Instruments 
8995 Nonequity Investment 
Instruments 
9533 Computer Services 
9535 Internet 
9530 Software & 
Computer Services 
9537 Software 
9572 Computer Hardware 
9574 Electronic Office Equipment 
9576 Semiconductors 
9000 Technology 9500 Technology 
9570 Technology 
Hardware & Equipment 
9578 Telecommunications Equipment 
Source: FTSE. http://www.ftse.com/Indices/Industry_Classification_Benchmark/index.jsp 
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